

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

HOWARD FRANCIS SCHILTZ, Major General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 21 July 1913, Dubuque, Iowa

YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: Over 28 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 30 September 1972

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

The Command and General Staff College

The Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Iowa State College - BS Degree - Engineering Economics

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (Last 10 years)

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jun 61	Mar 62	Member, Ops Br, Trans Div, J4, OJCS
Mar 62	Mar 63	Trans Officer, HQs 8 th Army
Jun 63	Jun 64	Proj Mgr MOHAWK, AMC
Jun 64	Jun 67	CG, AVSCOM
Jun 67	May 69	Dir of Dist and Trans, AMC
Jun 69	Sep 72	CG, Ft Eustis

PROMOTIONS

2LT

21 Jul 34

1LT

21 Mar 41

CPT	25 Jul	42
MAJ	8 Mar	43
LTC	5 Dec	50
COL	19 Jul	60
BG	20 Jun	64
MG	1 Feb	68

MEDALS AND AWARDS

Distinguished Service Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster

Legion of Merit w/Oak Leaf Cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Army Commendation Medal w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters

SOURCE OF COMMISSION ROTC (Iowa State College)



INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

Interview with **MG (Ret) Howard F. Schiltz**

MG (Ret) Howard F. Schiltz was interviewed by CPT Dennis M. Harms on 10 May 1985 in San Diego, California. **MG SCHILTZ** entered active service in 1941 through the Reserves.

This interview deals extensively with **MG SCHILTZ's** involvement as project manager for the Mohawk helicopter and the support provided by the Aviation Systems Command (AWCOM) and the Transportation Research Command (TRECOM) during the Vietnam War. He speaks of the value of the project management program in supporting existing aircraft as well as developing new projects. The valuable contributions of civilian technical representatives in support roles were also discussed. Communications in maintenance support was also discussed. Communications in maintenance support was also a lesson learned mentioned by **MG SCHILTZ**.

This is the Oral History Program, and this is an interview between **CPT HARMS/MG (Retired) Howard Schiltz** on May 10, 1985.

CPT HARMS: Good Morning, today is May 10, 1985, the interviewee is MG

Howard Schiltz, US Army Retired, and my name is CPT Dennis Michael Harms,

Transportation Officer Advanced Class 3-85. We are in San Diego, CA.

CPT HARMS: Sir, when you became the Mohawk Project Manager in May, 1963, there were approximately 189 Mohawks in the field: 43; OV-IAs, 65; OV-IBs, and 81 OV-ICs. In December 1964, TRECOM, Transportation Research Command, which at that time was commanded by COL Micahel Stroke, identified several design features which could be improved in the Mohawk. Last year, the Phoenix lab conducted a crash analysis that recommended several safety modification improvements. Also during this time frame, Project Warpath was taking place. In 1965, we didn't purchase any Mohawks. Was the Mohawk providing the full troop support it was supposed to?

MG SCHILTZ: At that time it was not maximized to provide the total troop support. What they were doing besides improving the safety was developing and testing the

surveillance equipment the Mohawk was supposed to carry. A lot of our effort was taken up putting on this extra intelligence gathering capability. In other words, adding this to the capability of the basic Mohawk. Several of the planes at that time, as indicated by the numbers you just gave were equipped to go into an airfield for short take-offs and short landings but they didn't have all of the sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment that later aircraft did. That period of time was devoted to adding this to the basic Mohawk.

CPT HARMS: So that is the reason why in 1965 we didn't purchase any new ones.

MG SCHILTZ: That is correct.

CPT HARMS: When you stated sir we were trying to develop more functional capabilities for the Mohawk, were you given guidelines from AMC to do that, and if you were, were there any key players giving you those guidelines?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes. We heard from General Frank Besson, General William Bunker, and other people up there to carry on with what we were doing to improve our side-looking airborne radar equipment and our infrared equipment. We worked with Grumman and with the various manufacturers to get this equipment, the best equipment available and put it on the aircraft.

CPT HARMS: Did TRECUM, the Transportation Research Command, play any role in the research and development?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes. They were working on the research and development part of it, and that's Colonel Strok instead of Colonel Stroke. His people were testing and improving the Mohawk's intelligence gathering equipment.

CPT HARMS: Sir, I've gone through some of the old files and came up with data, supply and non--mission ready data, that says the Mohawk was not meeting the Department of the Army's standards. The standards at that time were 7% could be deadlined at anytime and the Mohawk seemed for months to be between 9 and 13 percent. Were there any reasons for that, and if there were what were they, what was going on?

MG SCHILTZ: I really can't recall any criticism for having the excessive downtime on the Mohawks, but we probably did. I don't recall any particular problem unless it was with the engine, the T-53 engine supplied by Lycoming. Grumman built a terrific amount of redundancy of that plane. It may have been on or some of the intelligence gathering equipment that we had on the plane. I don't recall specifically any figures as to downtime. In the aviation business, we were always trying to get more flying time out of the aircraft and less downtime.

CPT HARMS: I gather then that Grumman was working with a good attitude toward giving us what we needed.

MG SCHILTZ: Oh, yes.

CPT HARMS: Sir, the Howe's Board met in 1963, when you were the project manager and chartered the Army to meet battlefield air mobility requirements. The 11th Air Assault Division, commanded by MG Kinnard, was a direct result of the board. In the spring of 1964, the Transportation Research Command, commonly called TRECOCOM was transferred to AVSCOM. AVSCOM's mission then began with research and progressed through development, product engineering, procurement and ended up with logistical supply support; a cradle-to-grave philosophy. Also, during this time frame the aerial jeep was being developed to meet battlefield air ability requirements. Were these events interrelated and was there a change in the aircraft procurement philosophy taking place?

MG SCHILTZ: I really don't recall any change in this nor the relationships of one to the other. The aerial jeep was, of course, designed to do a lot more than the Mohawk was ever designed to do. They are really two different things and I can't really recall anything else on that.

CPT HARMS: Sir, what happened with the aerial jeep? Why didn't it fly after we put in all that R&D time?

MG SCHILTZ: I'm lost on that too. I don't really recall. I didn't have anything to do with the aerial jeep.

CPT HARMS: What influence did MG Kinnard have on helicopter support, battlefield support, during this time frame?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, we got input from time to time from Harry and worked with General Kinnard and his people to be sure we were supporting their aviation requirements or working towards supporting their aviation requirements. As I recall it, General Harold Kinnard was happy with our response to his requirements. Although no tactical commander is ever completely happy unless he has aircraft in numbers, unlimited numbers, that he can call upon at any time during his operation, and I'm sure we never did that.

CPT HARMS: Sir, during the Army's buildup in the Republic of Vietnam the role of AVSCOM in support of our aviation units became increasingly important and more inclusive than ever before. What burdens did this deployment create in term of supplying the here and now requirements of supply logistical support where you have a low density of aircraft and a high dollar value per item to be supported?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, we had to be responsive to their aircraft requirements over there. There was an awful lot of pressure on us to produce at AVSCOM; to get supplies over there at the tire they were required. As a matter of fact, I went to Vietnam with a team and we developed, organized we might say, a small AVSCOM over in Vietnam so that we could be talking the same language with St. Louis. We also developed a nightly

telecom with the people over there and as a result we could be responsive to their demands for additional engines, spare parts, and things of that nature. I think that without this added telephonic communications, we would have been in bad shape. It really worked out fine. We gave them the support, the optimum support-let me put it that way, that they required during that period.

CPT HARMS: What kind of dollar value did all this extra support have? Was it excessive?

MG SCHILTZ: It was a terrific dollar value. I can't recall the figures, but they ought to be in the records some place. Our budget at AVSCOM wasn't a small budget, it was substantial.

CPT HARMS: I would imagine it had to be multi-billion dollars.

MG SCHILTZ: Yes.

CPT HARMS: Sir, at that time, AVSCOM was supplying world-wide support for aircraft. How did you balance the needs of let's say USAREURL with CONUS, and Vietnam.

MG SCHILTZ: Well, Vietnam naturally had the priority, Europe was second, and CONUS was third. There wasn't any question about the priorities and when there was a shortage, the CONUS units were the ones that had to wait. Most of our problem were in the engine; engines that keep the aircraft flying, and keeping spare engines on hand in Vietnam so that they could have one to put in when one engine went bad. Of course we had tech reps over there you know, too.

CPT HARMS: Were they civilian or military?

MG SCHILTZ: We had civilian tech reps, in the Vietnam war zone.

CPT HARMS: Sir, what were your thoughts when you designated the Operational Planning Division for Management Science & Systems Office at AVSCOM to supply better support?

MG SCHILTZ: Say that again.

CPT HARMS: Sure sir. To further enhance AVSCOM's responsiveness to the deployed units in the Republic of Vietnam, you designated the Operational Planning Division Management Sciences & Systems Office as the focal point for receiving and maintaining information on the current status of all actions taken by the responsible action elements of the command. What were your thoughts when you did that?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, it was more or less following up on the project management concept. You have a group of people whose responsibility was providing support for

Vietnam and everything would funnel through that. In fact this is where the telecommunications with Vietnam occurred every night.

CPT HARMS: As opposed to having different functional elements of the organization getting different Vietnam requirements and no one being able to centralize them?

MG SCHILTZ: That is correct. They served as a project management group. When they wanted something they would go out and find it. If it was available any place they got it.

CPT HARMS: I see. Sir, I went through a lot of the records, in fact I pulled out all the Jane's since 1959 on the Mohawk, and no where at all did I see anything that said the Mohawk had any weapon capability or armor capability. Were we doing anything in term of giving the Vietnam deployed units those capabilities to protect themselves and to fire upon the enemy?

MG SCHILTZ: Not on the Mohawk, but we did on the helicopters; helicopters certainly. We didn't have any offensive gun capability on the Mohawk. They of course, could stand off quite a ways from their side-looking airborne radar to take their pictures. They didn't have to be right over the battlefield, they could be a long way off.

CPT HARMS: Which aircraft were we working on the weapon systems and anti- (air defense and ground defense)?

MG SCHILTZ: The Huey - UH-1 gun ship of course, now they got some real sophisticated gun ships with a lot of armor capability and fighting capability with the Hueys. But they did a human job over there in Vietnam.

CPT HARMS: Sir, earlier you spoke of project management-ship. When you were the Mohawk project manager you were located at AMC headquarters in D.C. If AVSCOM was supposed to be responsible for cradle-to-grave support, aircraft support, how could the project manager report to someone other than the ACSCOM commander?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, actually most of the work activity was transferred to AVSCOM. For instance, they had several offices: a CH-46 office and offices for the other helicopters. I don't recall anything going around the AVSCDM commander after this transfer. However, the project manager was never limited to going to me, he could always go to the top dog; to General Besson or General Bunker.

CPT HARMS: What were your thoughts on that, sir?

MG SCHILTZ: I thought it was a good idea. I think the project management philosophy is a great thing to have and I never objected to anyone going to the top for something we probably weren't properly supporting. Other people didn't like project management like this. They felt like they should be on the knowing of everything, but I think as it developed it was a wonderful philosophy and still continuing I hope.

CPT HARMS: I believe they are. Sir, as the AVSCOM commander you were responsible for providing the aircraft to meet the Army's here and now needs as well as the Army's future aviation needs; with R&D sometimes taking 10-15 years to put a product on the shelf, how did you balance those two requirements?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, of course they were all interrelated. When the Vietnam War was going on we always had that as a number one priority and we took care of that before we did anything else. So if it was a matter of balancing, Vietnam got the emphasis and the other activities just followed in. Again I didn't see anything wrong with that philosophy; you put your assets where they're required to do the best job and that's what we try to do.

CPT HARMS: Sir, I believe at this time we were working with the Germans on some R&D with the VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) capabilities. Do you recall that?

MG SCHILTZ: No. I have no recollection that. If we were working with them it was really on a lower level basis, probably through TRECUM, and Bill Barthel and people like that in our own R&D Division at St. Louis.

CPT HARMS: Were we doing a lot of coordination work with our allies and with other agencies within the DOD for aircraft support, putting an aircraft on the shelf?

MG SCHILTZ: I don't recall any exciting meetings with any of our allies on this, no. Again I don't recall that at all.

CPT HARMS: Okay. Sir, in our procurement philosophy, did you feel that the way we did our contracting with the multi-year contract, where we would tell a vendor we need this many for this year, and then obligate the US government to commit so many, and that we have a need so many more in the future, was the way to go about that?

MG SCHILTZ: I think that's alright for the end item. However, when you get in supporting the aircraft you're always learning, always getting more information, more experience, and better experience factors as to how many of this gadget you need per hour or hundred hours of flying and things of that nature. As a result, you re-compute these things periodically and come up with different factors. This is the hardest part of the aviation support business. You develop the original support package based on engineer estimates as to what the -mortality of a certain piece of equipment is. You build in your best estimate as to how the wear out factor of certain equipment is going to be. It's rather imprecise. This is the thing that always worried me; developing better figures as to wear out rates of equipment and certain parts in the aircraft. This is the bug-a-boo that the aviation industry has had for years. You find yourself with excess parts of one kind and not enough of something else. It's a tricky job and I was never satisfied during my period that we had the right answers. I think we proved that in Vietnam when we got better figures from the people on the ground than we ever would have gotten in letters or reports, or anything like that.

CPT HARMS: Sir, what did you do to try to correct that situation?

MG SCHILTZ: Well one thing was to develop this small AVSCOM setup. It worked through the 34th Group in Vietnam. We sent people over there, they sent people back to us, and we had this daily telecom. We tried to get down to where the activity was concerned; getting the answers or finding out the problems from the people on the ground rather than having this stuff fester in somebody's mind for a long time-and then corm out with a great big problem.

CPT HARMS: Were the contractors responsive to our needs when it had been projected we would need XYZ parts and it turned out that no, we didn't need those we needed ABC and we had to..... ?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes, most of the contractors were very receptive. As a matter of fact I can recall calling the Vice-President down at Bell Helicopter; I told him some parts we needed and that we had to get them out that night. If they couldn't find them, they would take them off the production lines, and where as it might interfere with a total aircraft being properly equipped, it took care of that particular problem in Vietnam. We did that and I think that was just a personal look-see that the Army had. Also the Transportation Corps officers in the 34th Group did a terrific job coming up with better experience factors. They leved (*sic*) this fly thing day and night. Colonel Luther Jones was the commanding officer there for a while.

CPT HARMS: Did you have relationships with other contractors as you did with the Bell firm?

MG SCHILTZ: Oh, yes. Our biggest problem was I think with the Huey because we had more of them. We had problems with the other manufacturers, but generally speaking they were responsive and receptive to the ideas and suggestions that we had. We worked very closely with the tech reps. At that time we had tech reps down on the first floor of the building in St. Louis so that we could talk with them every day if we wanted to.

CPT HARMS: And they were paid by the contractors?

MG SCHILTZ: Oh, yes. We were very careful in not getting them into trouble. But we were the boss.

CPT HARMS: Sir, you mentioned that vendors provided technical reps right inside your building. Do you feel that the contractors had a philosophy of patriotism? That they were really trying to help us provide what our soldiers needed in Vietnam or were they only looking at the dollar value of what a particular delivery order would give them?

MG SCHILTZ: No. I think they were sincerely trying to help us as much as they could. Of course, any contractor must be responsible to his people and to his stockholders, so the idea is for them to make money but I don't think this was a forward consideration

during the support period we had for Vietnam. I think they helped out a lot. There was a question about the contractor's reps being in the same building and sometime after I left St. Louis this was discouraged and the contractor's reps were situated elsewhere in St. Louis. I think they probably thought that maybe they were getting too much on the inside as to what was happening. But I always felt that if you keep these fellows informed as to what's going on, that they could help you more. We always didn't call the manufacturer himself at some remote place in the United States. We worked through these tech reps; we would say we need better production on this item here, or you're giving us something that's bad. We'd tell them the problem and they'd go right to the company and we got wonderful results from that.

CPT HARMS: You mentioned earlier sir that the support group in Vietnam was set up with Colonel Luther Jones being commander there?

MG SCHILTZ: He's now mayor of Corpus Christi.

CPT HARMS: How did they get that organization set up? How was it manned in terms of officers, enlisted personnel, warrant officers? How did they actually expedite? Well you mentioned earlier that they expedited by telecom, nightly telecom but how were the parts actually expedited through the supply system? What kind of technical expertise did this imply?

MG SCHILTZ: It was just part of our supply directorate. Of course it was next door to the people who computed the supply requirements and who were supposed to be up-to-date on what supplies were available. So many "X" number of gadgets and so on and so forth. So they just talked to those people and this was manned 24 hours a day. If they wanted anything they just went to them and got it.

CPT HARMS: Did Colonel Jones find that the people in the field had the technical knowledge to do the maintenance support that they were required?

MG SCHILTZ: That's one reason they had the companies themselves place tech reps over there. For instance Lycoming, our engine man, had a rep right in the field there and anything that was complicated, the tech rep was right there to be of assistance. When something broke down he'd go right to the factory to get support. But to answer your question, I never got any complaints from the 34th Group over there that the tech reps weren't supporting them, so I'd say that there was about as good a system you could have.

CPT HARMS: Was that support group carried on after your tour of watch?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes, it was carried on. The commanders for the most part were good officers. We had some Vietnamese working in the 34th Group.

CPT HARMS: Sir, with the 34th Group supplying the link between the headquarters and the troops in the field, they probably cut out a lot of the problems; however, my question is, were the troops, the actual guys doing the DS and GS support, did they have the technical expertise to do that kind of work? Or, were they lacking in their training?

MG SCHILTZ: I don't think you ever get enough technically qualified people in the field to do the job the way it should be done. That's the main reason why they had tech reps right in the field to give this advice or if they needed somebody else the tech reps would get in touch with their company; then they would send that particular specialist over there and the troops would do the work. Sometimes instead of change a spare part they would exchange a major component and send that to maintenance. We had maintenance companies spread around in Vietnam that did rest of the work.

CPT HARMS: That certainly had to cut down the dead time.

MG SCHILTZ: Oh goodness yes. I thought our support over there and from the reports I got from people in Vietnam, the people on the ground, and from when I went over there, was that they were doing a human job of supporting them. Of course, as I say, the commander always likes to have 100% of his aircraft and helicopters flying all the time and that is an impossibility. At least it was during the war-time.

CPT HARMS: Sir, during your watch at AVSCCM, I believe there were some questions concerning your TDAs and AMC trying to take away several hundred of your civilian slots and also the untimely reassignment of field grade officers to Vietnam. Do you have any thoughts on this matter?

MG SCHILTZ: I don't think we were shorted, not particularly, by capable officers or by reduction of personnel spaces to do the job. Many things were on an austerity basis of course. But I don't think we were harmed terribly by that.

CPT HARMS: So, you were given the assets to do the job?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes.

CPT HARMS: Sir, during this time frame you reported to the MOCOM [transcriber note: believe this to be TACOM or Tank-Automotive Command in Warren, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. TACOM reported to Army Materiel Command (AMC).] which I believe reported to AMC, is that correct?

MG SCHILTZ: Not on everything, but the project managers didn't go through there. That was up in Detroit, MOCOM, and I was responsive to him, to the General there, the Commanding Officer. He was under General Besson and AMC. I don't recall any particular hiatus as a result of that.

CPT HARMS: What do you mean by that, sir?

MG SCHILTZ: I don't recall any difficulty that we had because of having to report to them. Do you have anything that indicates we did have any problem because of that?

CPT HARMS: No, sir.

MG SCHILTZ: Of course, everybody likes to report directly to the top. You know that, so some of the people might have objected to that but I didn't object to it. I never had any objection to project management: it was a great thing and I don't think we could have got along on without it.

CPT HARMS: Sir, in 1966 the Army and the Air Force got together and came up with the Tactical Transport Agreement, do you recall that agreement?

MG SCHILTZ: Tactical Transport, what was it?

CPT HARMS: It gave the Air Force responsibility for fixed-wing and the Army responsibility for rotary aircraft. I was wondering if this agreement had any effect upon Army aviation.

MG SCHILTZ: It didn't while I was mixed up in it; I don't recall that. It sounds like a sensible arrangement. I don't remember the Mohawk ever going under the Air Force though.

CPT HARMS: It never did, we gave up the Caribou, and we kept the Mohawk.

MG SCHILTZ: That's right, the Caribou yeah, that was a Canadian firm. I guess that was because it was a transport aircraft. It was a pretty good ship, a DeHavilland, wasn't it?

CPT HARMS: Yes sir.

MG SCHILTZ: That was a short take-off and landing aircraft, STOL aircraft.

CPT HARMS: So it was doing the job it was supposed to?

MG SCHILTZ? Well, I think so. We never did have too many of them. I don't think it was a major aircraft in any of our supply operations. We didn't have too many of them.

CPT HARMS: Sir, approximately during this time frame, the Army had the TRECUM lab and the AMES Lab outside of Cleveland. Bill Barthel at AVSCOM, who's now in the project management office of the Cobra, told me that you were one of the "guiding lights" in terms of getting closer coordination between our labs and the NASA labs, so that we weren't being redundant in terms of manpower and resources.

MG SCHILTZ: I don't recall exactly what I did personally on that thing but of course I'm a great one for getting people talking with one another. Communications or lack of

communications is the main reason why difficulties develop. I was always in favor of supervisors going down and talking with the working people and the supervisors talking with one another. Wherever you have two or three agencies working toward one single goal, if they aren't all talking or reading off the same sheet of music, you're in trouble. So if I was instrumental at all it was probably encouraging this kind of activity.

CPT HARMS: I would imagine with an organization as large as AVSCOM, communications would be the key.

MG SCHILTZ: That's right. I don't really know what our telephone bills were. They weren't small.

CPT HARMS: Sir, did you ever see a contradiction in terms of the technology buildup time required for an aircraft and then trying to get money put into that R&D budget?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, this is the nature of the aviation business. Long before an aircraft becomes obsolete you're developing something else to take its place. You can see that in the bombers that they have right now. The obsolescence is going in before another one comes. The idea is to try and balance one against the other so that you can get the development, research, and production ready to go, before you want to phase something out. This does create a big problem in your funding and you see that in the aviation business today. Where Congress says, for instance, gee we got this Stealth bomber coming along, what are you spending money on the B-1 Bomber, it's already practically obsolete. This is the nature of the business, you have to have something to stay in there until the something that's coming along actually hits production and goes out to the field. There's a heck of a lot of testing that goes on before this happens. It is a long process and you try to compress it but I don't think anyone comes up with the exact way to compress without spending an awful lot of money working on an old machine while you're coming in with a new one.

CPT HARMS: Sir, did you look for a certain personality pattern for the guys in the R&D who could come up with ideas with tangible obligations and benefits?

MG SCHILTZ: That's what you like to get, all the time, but you always didn't get to pick and choose. I think your best R&D people are engineers with some background or with flexibility and an ability to think deeply; what's going to happen to this and what's coming on next. Innovations to different things. I used to try to tell the people to get off in a room every once in a while and think. If you have a big problem, think of what YOU 're doing today and what we can do better, and how do we get there. Just come up with those ideas. You didn't grade a guy on how many ideas he'd come up with in a month or year.

CPT HARMS: So, there were no five smart ideas per month?

MG SCHILTZ: No, nothing like that. You get a young guy like yourself, see, and that guy's capable. He's got a good keen mind, good background, things like that and you put him in research and development; he'd say right off the bat, I don't know anything

about that, I'm a something else, I'm a financial man or something, but sometimes those guys are very good . Basically speaking you couldn't pick and choose these people. They come down the pike, and were assigned to you and then you try to fit them in, where they fit best.

CPT HARMS: Were we accessing well the here and now technology in the private sector in getting it into the military system?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, I don't know what they're doing right now, but

CPT HARMS: I mean at your time, at AVSCOM?

MG SCHILTZ: You never get enough of that. We tried to find out what they were doing, and they were generally trying to find out what we wanted to do, what our requirements were. If we couldn't tell them what we needed, then there was a hiatus there, things didn't happen, but that didn't happen very often.

CPT HARMS: I would imagine then the key had to be having a close rapport with the industry reps?

MG SCHILTZ: Oh, that's correct.

CPT HARMS: For example, having them in the building, the Sperry Univac defense system guy? And him being on a first name basis with our people?

MG SCHILTZ: That's Correct.

CPT HARMS: Sir, what do you think happened to the AH-56, that was the Cheyenne?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, that was a good machine. You man they don't have that anymore?

CPT HARMS: No, sir.

MG SCHILTZ: Let's see the 64 was a big crane, flying crane wasn't it?

CPT HARMS: Yes, sir.

MG SCHILTZ: That's still working. I believe that's still in the system. But the AH-56 is not. That was an attack helicopter.

CPT HARMS: Sir, that was the one that was cancelled after we spent all kinds of money? That was after you all had left, and I think McNamara became the Secretary of Defense with a new procurement philosophy.

MG SCHILTZ: I don't know, it must have been, I really don't know the evolution of that thing. I would guess that somebody said well we're working on this thing here and until

that comes in we'll have to get along with what we have and the heck with this intermediary thing, the 56.

CPT HARMS: It had to be. I would imagine it would have to have been hard to balance where you're going to put those R&D, millions of dollars and not getting any tangible pay off for maybe five years down the line?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, that's what happens, yeah. I imagine the people that decided the 56 weighed one against the other and said well in the mean time we can get along without that. We're not fighting anyone right now, so let's take a calculated risk and let this thing go. 56, I don't know if that's the one?

CPT HARMS: It was called the Cheyenne, sir.

MG SCHILTZ: Yeah, Cheyenne 56, yeah. CH-54 is the one we had. Forty-six, fifty-four, and then came the T-64, I think. Isn't that terrible, I forget the numbers on the aircraft.

CPT HARMS: I never do get them right. Sir, do you think the organization that we had at your time was solid enough to provide the aircraft support chartered with reporting through the MOCOM to AMC?

MG SCHILTZ: Well I think the proof of the pudding is eating it. You never have enough support, the support that you really require; but all in all and everything put together, I think that the aviation support in CONUS was better than any other support. We put more emphasis on it and these were the reports I got back. Sure we had some shortages of certain equipment or some engine shortages sometimes but many, many times they took parts off the production line to give to the field. Putting things back in condition in the field at the expense of the production line and then sometimes your production line would fall behind. It was a delicate balance. Where we had the proper rapport with production people, we didn't have any big problems. Again this was based mostly upon personal relations with the people. You call up a guy and say Bill, we have to have such and such out, and get it on an aircraft today to go over to the man in the field. Or we'd get a request sometimes from The Commanding General of an Infantry Division, or Armored Division saying, my aircraft has been down for ten days now, and I need a new engine. Well, you go out and try to get him a new engine. There's a delicate balance in that area and by and large we did a pretty good job. You depended upon aviation so much in the field and they always will, for support and things like that. If you don't support them, you're in difficulty. We were in difficulty sometimes too, but we seemed to work it out.

CPT HARMS: Sir, I read an article about Colonel Strok at TRECOT, which said that the lessons we were learning about aircraft mobility in Vietnam, the use of aircraft in the battlefield in Vietnam, were probably only short term lessons for use in that particular country as opposed to lessons that could be applied on a doctrinal basis. Do you think that worked out to be true, that statement?

MG SCHILTZ: Well, it certainly was. Everything you learned there was how to support a command in an area like Vietnam and it was quite a bit different than trying to support the same aircraft in an area like Germany, France, or something like that. If you didn't have the capability within your own system or within the tech reps, you didn't have it over there; whereas some place like in a modern country you could probably find that technical capability to help you. But by and large you have to have that capability within your Army structure; within your national defense structure; it's certainly the way to go, and it certainly solves an awful lot of problems. I think that's what they're doing today. They're getting a lot more capable people and more educated people. Not that these people didn't do a good job, but, if you get a guy that has that ability to grasp something and learn something in a hurry, you're a lot better off than if you don't have to do that. The type of people that they're getting in the service today is certainly going to help solve a lot of those problems; if they just retain them. That's the thing, the more difficult part. You get them in, get them trained, and pretty soon industry offers them a lucrative job. This happens so many times in the aviation business with the result being you've lost an awful lot of money training a man and the capability to get the job done.

CPT HARMS: I would imagine you must have run up against that a lot of times at AVSCOM with your civilians. You get them trained, and all of a sudden three years later they go make double the money somewhere else, or NASA would take them?

MG SCHILTZ: Oh, yes, that's right. But this is a common thing in the aviation business. The Air Force is suffering that now. I don't know what their retention rate is in the Air Force, in fact, I don't know what it is in the Army, but it's better than it was, I think. By the time they finish things in Congress, I don't know what it's going to be like.

CPT HARMS: Sir, to rephrase that question before the last tape ran out; what roles did you and your organization have in coordinating with the folks at Fort Rucker and Fort Eustis in the training of the helicopter pilots and the mechanics?

MG SCHILTZ: We didn't have anything to do with the training of the helicopter pilots, but, we certainly did in the mechanics. We had liaison with the people in the field including Fort Rucker; give and take communications, back and forth, and visits. The same as in any other activity, you have to have this communication, this liaison, with one another to find out just what the problems are and to take corrective actions if there are any problems.

CPT HARMS: Sir, your people would actually go down there?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes, and frequently they would have people come up to us but not as much as we were down. It was mostly us going down, finding out how things were; the project managers office in St. Louis and AVSCDM had people out all the time like this, not just with Rucker but with other users.

CPT HARMS: And would they also go in the field?

MG SCHILTZ: Yes, they went over to Vietnam and Korea and places like this. I was a firm believer in project management. I hope they're still using it, because I don't see how you could get the job done without it.

CPT HARMS: This concludes the interview on 10 May 85, between MG Howard Schiltz, USA Retired, and CPT Dennis Michael Harms, TOAC 3-85.

MG SCHILTZ: Well, thank you very much and I hope you got something out of it. It's been a long time since I retired. Quite a long time since I was at St. Louis in AVSCOM. We had a wonderful organization down there, and they were really dedicated people who tried to be responsive to the wants of the people in the war zone in Vietnam, really dedicated. I was really proud of most of them.

CPT HARMS: Thank you, sir.

MG SCHILTZ: You're welcome.