RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

HAROLD IRVING SMALL, Major General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 11 March 1932, Plymouth, Maine

YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: Over 37 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 1 Nov 1986

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

The Aviation School, Fixed Wing and Rotary Training Course
The Infantry School, Jump, Ranger, Jumpmaster Advanced Courses
Naval Intelligence School, Language Division (German)
The Command and General Staff College
The Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

University of Nebraska (Omaha) - BS Degree - Business Administration

Shippensburg State University - MBA Degree - Business Administration

University of Southern California - MS Degree - Aviation Safety

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (Last 10 Years)

FROM		TO		ASSIGNMENTS
Aug	72	Jun	73	Student, Army War College
Jul	73	May	75	Dep Cmdt for Tng and Ed, USATSCH
May	75	Nov	76	CO, 101st Abn DISCOM
Nov	76	Aug	77	A/Cmdt, USATSCH
Aug	77	Aug	79	J4, USREDCOM
Aug	79	Jul	83	CG, Ft Eustis
Jul	83	Oct	86	CG, MTMC

PROMOTIONS	DATES OF APPOINTMENT
2LT	19 Dec 52
1LT	22 Jun 54
CPT	15 Apr 59
MAJ	1 Apr 64
LTC	13 Sep 67
COL	1 Oct 73
BG	1 Nov 77
MG	1 Mar 80

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star Medal w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Distinguished Flying Cross w/4 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal w/V Device and 2/Oak Leaf Clusters
Purple Heart
Meritorious Service Medal w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Air Medal w/23 Awards
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Master Army Aviator Badge
Senior Parachutist Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION OCS

INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

Interview with Major General Harold I. Small, Commander Military Traffic Management Command.

Major General Harold I. Small was interviewed by Captain Joseph A. Sokol at Larken Hall, Ft. Lee, Virginia, on 13 February 1986.

The topic of discussion was "The Effects of Modernization on Logistical Operations."

MG SMALL, who has been a soldier for over thirty years was asked a series of questions designed to contrast the logistical system of the Korean/Vietnam era with the present day logistical system. He had a particular appreciation for logistics having been on the "receiving end" of support throughout much of his career. **MG SMALL** spoke favorably concerning the many innovations made to assist the supply process, but cautioned that soldiers must remain familiar with the "stubby pencil" process due to potential equipment failure.

MG SMALL discussed the use of female soldiers in Forward Support Battalions and whether the American public was ready to accept extensive female casualties (in the event of war). He also discussed the potential effects of having very few peacetime active duty rail and stevedore units.

Finally, **MG SMALL** discussed those things about which a young officer should concern himself as he/she develops.

This is the Amy Transportation Oral History interview with MG Harold I. Small conducted by CPT Joseph A. Sokol on 13 February 1986, at Fort Lee, Virginia. **MG SMALL** was, at the time, the Commander of the Military Traffic Management Command. The major topic **MG SMALL** wished to address was "The Effects of Modernization on Logistical Operations."

CPT SOKOL: **MG SMALL**, during your Army career spanning approximately 35 years, you have held a wide variety of jobs. Please relate how each of these jobs developed you as a logistician.

MG SMALL: I think probably the most important factor was that, having served on the gaining end of support as a young infantry enlisted man and officer, I developed more of an appreciation for the importance of logistics than a lot of our logisticians probably had the opportunity to experience. As a result, I realized how important support is to the infantryman and the ground combat soldier, and that probably gave me a little different attitude on the importance of providing good support. Branching off from there into the aviation end of the business, I relied on the logistics system to sustain the aircraft weapons system, and that gave me an appreciation for the importance of logistics. I think if you look through the majority of my assignments, you'll find I have been the recipient of logistics support and that's probably influenced my thinking on the logistics system. My feeling on the importance of logistics is twofold: One: maintaining a sense of urgency, and; Two: Keeping things simple and doing things rapidly so as to sustain the infantryman and the artilleryman, the aviator and the tanker.

CPT SOKOL: Based on your prior experience, do you think you have a better appreciation for logistics--as opposed to somebody who goes straight into a combat arms field and just expects logistics to be there and things to happen--that you have an appreciation for what it takes to make the logistics happen?

MG SMALL: I think so; when you're cold or hungry, you begin to think of better and simpler ways to do things. Then when you transfer from combat arms into the combat service support arena, you take some of these thoughts and lessons with you and try to make things very simple and very easy.

CPT SOKOL: How has modernization affected the way the Amy conducts its logistical business, both in a peacetime and in a tactical setting, regarding streamlining the policies and procedures.

MG SMALL: I think if you look at some of the systems we have today that are being changed (fortunately), there's a tendency or has been a tendency in the logistics arena to do things the same way we did them during World War II. A classic case in point is the deployment process. We still plan to deploy a force overseas basically using 1940 technology, or what we had up until a couple of years ago. Now through automation and innovation we're in the process of bringing ourselves into the late 20th century in deployment by doing away with TCMDs (Transportation Control and Movement Documents) as well as a lot of other paper. I think the total Army is looking toward the same thing within the logistics system. There's a move afoot as we get extensively into automation and electronic data transfer to become more of a paperless Army. We're also looking at taking away some of the responsibilities we used to place at the company level, withdrawing them back through the chain and consolidating them at battalion or brigade level. So the logistics operator at the lower level becomes a true operator, and those burrs and detractions which he had to put up with five or ten years

ago are being withdrawn. I think we're trying to make our equipment a little easier to maintain, easier to use, and easier to detect faults. Probably in the future you're going to find a lot more throwaway items than you have in the Army now. They'll be used until broken, disposed of, and replaced. I think the Army's force modernization process and the new policies coming out of the logistics directorates in the Army staff and other places are going to make it easier for us to do our job. It will be easier for us to support the soldier, easier to sustain the equipment, and easier to the equipment onto the battlefield.

CPT SOKOL: You mentioned a paperless Army. Virtually all of the new equipment being fielded is transistor- or microchip-based, as opposed to the old vacuum tube type. This type of equipment is easily rendered non-operational by an EMP (electromagnetic pulse). What effect, if any, do you see this playing on the next war?

MG SMALL: I think that's a risk both sides will have--any potential adversary will be in the same technological age that we're in. I'm not too sure that EMP is going to have that much bearing. I don't think that either we or our potential adversary want to be in a position to destroy the earth. I think you'll find that the conflicts we engage in future years are going to be on the lower rather than the higher end of the spectrum of war because of the potential catastrophe of total destruction of the earth. And I don't think the bad guys want that any more than the good guys do. Though there are going to be some problems as we get into microchip and transistor technology, I don't think we're going to be put into the position where all the equipment (test equipment, communications equipment, and so forth) that we have on the battlefield is going to be wiped out through EMP. I still think we're going to operate generally in a conventional or lesser spectrum of war.

CPT SOKOL: My concern as a transportation officer, having just come from Europe, is that the Soviet forces have a great numerical superiority. The number of Soviet tanks compared to ours is causing us to take a look at our first use of nuclear weapons policy. The Soviet numerical superiority in conventional war is forcing us almost certainly to be the first to use nuclear weapons I think it will be more along the lines of a tactical nuclear weapon than a strategic. I see it as the only way that we can win in a confrontation. If we use them, then I see the bad guys retaliating in kind, although maybe not on a destroy-the-world scale. How do you see this tying in with the EMP pulse and the systems?

MG SMALL: I'm not sure a European scenario is the most likely course of action. I think a more likely event is something down in Central America, or in the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) area of responsibility in Southeast Asia, or maybe in Eighth Army's area of responsibility. I think those are far more likely scenarios than a war in Europe. Let's assume that-the bad guys are coming across and the U.S. feels it has to use nuclear weapons. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is relatively strong, and there are some political as well as international legal implications that may restrict our use of nuclear weapons. Since we are a member of NATO, which operates by consensus (at least in theory) you must have a consensus of NATO before you could

even employ tactical nukes. I'm not sure we would gain that consensus, nor am I sure that we would want to make a unilateral decision. We might if that's the only way to prevent total destruction. However, even though we are outnumbered in tanks, artillery pieces, and total number of divisions, I think that our forces are capable of stopping the Soviets. The American soldier has the ability to operate independently, to exercise judgment, and to take the initiative to act on his own. His Soviet counterpart does not have this. The Soviets are very, very regimented, operating through routine in a very sterile environment. They're not adaptable to change. If the Soviets haven't been through an exercise before and can't rely on their memory to be successful, then they appear to be lost. I think the flexibility and initiative of the American soldier and his allies--the ability of the individual to react, of somebody to always step in place when the leader is killed, wounded, or otherwise rendered ineffective, of that individual to fulfill his role as new leader--is going to be a big plus that will offset the numerical equipment advantages that the Soviets have.

CPT SOKOL: Many innovations have occurred in the MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command) arena with regard to modernization, the rail assembly portion of the TMT (Tactical Marine Terminal) being but one example. What single innovation stands out in your mind as having had the greatest impact on modernizing MTMC operations?

MG SMALL: Looking at it from that standpoint, I suppose the technology we're getting involved in right now, have used in the past REFORGERs (Return of Forces to Germany), and will use from here on, is basically in two areas. One of them is in LOGMARS (Logistics Applications of Automated Market and Reading Symbols) technology, and the other is in what we call CODES (Computerized Deployment System). They go hand in hand. As I indicated earlier, we're trying to get away from TCMDS. We have done it for unit moves effective with REFORGER 86. We hope to be able to do it with all re-supply moves beginning the first of FY 87, where we use the bar code technology to track equipment through the system. This is going to tie into our computerized deployment system, which will be an automated stow plan system. Stow planning is a dying art in the American maritime industry because we've gotten away from using break-bulk vessels and gone to container vessels and RO/ROs (roll on/roll off). So there are no stow planners left out there in the commercial sector we can draw upon in mobilization. We will have developed an automated program which gives us the ability to stow-plan vessels in the automated mode. I guess for me, utopia would be to have a deploying unit load up its train or its convoy using the LOGMARS technology (as the train or the convoy is ready to depart). Then the unit would bar-code-read what is on that train or that convoy and transmit this information to the port through a modem into the CODES system, where we can begin the stow planning while the equipment is en route to the port. It would also give us the ability to give an accurate assessment as soon as we receive the information. We can then order up vessels for that deploying force and get the right type vessels or at least the right capacity vessels there to move that equipment to the other side. So I can't say it's been one system; it's been two systems within MTMC that have improved our strategic mobility capability.

CPT SOKOL: What you said when you talked about the LOGMARS system (the ability to roll a convoy up and LOGMAR it and load it from there) sounded similar to the way that the rail people do business. They're able to know what cargo is coming in on a train (through a modem) and they're able to organize that and then send it out through another modem to the gaining terminal. I think that's what you were telling me.

MG SMALL: The Army has looked at two or three different systems. One concept was the VICS (Visibility of In-Transit Cargo System). Under this system, magnetic chips or some other device was implanted on the trucks, trailers, and other equipment. The equipment passed a certain point where it could be scanned; then that trailer or truck, that piece of cargo or whatever it was, could be tracked. LOGMARS is basically a similar system; and it is not very expensive. I guess by the time the Amy gets where it wants to be, a new piece of equipment coming off the production line will have implanted in it a microchip that will stay with that equipment throughout its life. We will always be able to identify that specific truck, howitzer, tank, or whatever, and I think within the next four or five years you'll see that. We won't have to worry about a bulk number.

CPT SOKOL: Sir, currently there are no active duty rail units; all rail assets are found within the Army Reserve. Do you see this as being significant?

MG SMALL: I don't see it as detrimental to our operating capability. We do have one railway operating detachment in the USAR (US Army Reserve) which comes to MTMC at mobilization. We at MTMC had offered this detachment to CENTCOM should they need it in their AOR (area of responsibility). Then, of course, we do have some maintenance units. I'm not sure that the active Army or the reserve component can afford to have more rail forces than we have. Our concept has been to rely on host nation support and to provide only whatever supervision necessary. And I think that's probably a workable solution. One of the other things we are looking at is the tremendous amount of short line railroads in the United States. We've had some queries from the rail industry as to whether it would be feasible for these short line outfits to form a railway operating company which would be activated in time of crisis to go to areas where we can't be assured of host nation support. This seems to be a pretty reasonable solution to the problem, and we're exploring it.

CPT SOKOL: You said we can't afford to have more military type rail operations. Is that driven by the end strength within the Army?

MG SMALL: Yes, end strength in both the active force and the reserve component force. Rail operation is one of the things that can definitely be satisfied through host nation support or through contractual obligation. About the only difference in railway operations in the Middle East versus railway operations in the United States is maybe in the type of power plant used and track gauge used. Other than those things, railway operations are pretty much standard worldwide. You can't say the same thing for maintenance of equipment. I think we can rely on the host nations or even on

commercial contractors to provide us with railway operations. But we can't necessarily do that with some of the other combat service support areas we're concerned about.

CPT SOKOL: Outside of the 7th Transportation Group, active duty employment opportunities for soldiers with a stevedore MOS are virtually nonexistent. The TDA (table of distribution and allowance) units within the MTMC also employ stevedores; however, these are civilian-contracted (primarily). What effect do you anticipate the shortage of trained stevedores having in the event we have to go to war?

MG SMALL: I can't see any adverse impact on the system at all. If you look at the European scenario, port operations right now by negotiation are 100 percent host nation supported, either by commercial stevedores over there or by a host nation military organization. On the Korean peninsula, once again port operations are predominately a Korean show. We do have a few US forces going over there, but not too many--it's either Korean military or Korean host nation support. But in Japan it's strictly host nation support. In the CENTCOM's area of responsibility there is a mixture of host nation support and commercial contract as well as some military types. And I think there are sufficient terminal outfits in the active and reserve forces to satisfy the total worldwide requirements, given that we can't fight three or four different wars simultaneously. I think in both the active and reserve structure we have sufficient terminal service units to do that mission. In the United States we're going to rely 100 percent on the commercial sector to outload the vessels, and it's well within the capability of the commercial sector to do that for us.

CPT SOKOL: Sir, what effect do you see the regimental system having on the Transportation Corps?

MG SMALL: Hopefully, it will pull our Corps together and make it more closely knit than it is. I think basically we're going to a regimental system with the regiment being the total corps. That's the solution that was accepted. Other solutions were examined, such as taking the truck companies within the S&T (supply and transport) battalions and making them a sort of Transportation Regiment, with A Company being a first division and B Company being the first cavalry, and so forth. But, all things considered, we've probably come up with about the best solution. We are a relatively small corps. Probably we'll get smaller over the next few years--hopefully not too much smaller--but at least it's going to make the transportation soldier affiliate himself with the regimental home at Fort Eustis. And I think there's going to be more feeling of belonging to the Transportation Corps. We have a lot of transport soldiers who don't serve within transportation organizations. At least they'll have a home, a regimental home with which to affiliate themselves. Specifically, some of our 64C MOS (truck driver) soldiers serving in infantry and artillery battalions will be able to affiliate more with the Transportation Corps than they may with the particular battalion they happen to be temporarily serving with.

CPT SOKOL: When do you see the regimental system having an impact--over the next how many years?

MG SMALL: Hopefully very, very shortly. I know that the Chief of Transportation is working right now on distinctive unit insignia and things of that nature. Before too long, we'll have the regimental colors, the Regimental Adjutant, and the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment. I think within a year and a half it'll all be worked out. Once you can come up with something that soldiers can relate to, such as the regimental distinctive insignia, regimental belt buckles, the Regimental Command Sergeant Major, the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, then you begin to get that cohesiveness where people begin to feel a part of the corps, a part of the regiment. I think that's where the benefits will be derived, where the payoff will come in.

CPT SOKOL: Every two years an event known as PROLOG (program logistics) occurs. During this demonstration, manufacturers display many types of futuristic logistical equipment to potential buyers. Detailed information concerning the capabilities of this equipment is made readily available to those who attend. Is the United States Government generally too lax in the security precautions it takes surrounding the procurement and fielding of new equipment?

MG SMALL: I don't believe so. I think it's part of living in the free world and part of living within a democratic society that we don't have censorship. The majority of the equipment you see at PROLOG has already been published (photos, specifications, capabilities, limitations) within the various technical publications and technical journals that are available in the commercial sector. So I can't see where it's a threat as far as transfer of technology. If you look at aviation journals, transportation journals, and traffic management journals, you can generally find all that material has already been published anyhow. I can't see any great threat to the United States or to our allies because of PROLOG.

CPT SOKOL: During World War II, Hitler made a decision that ultimately cost him the European theater. Rather than attack the Kursk Salient when Soviet fortifications were weak to nonexistent, he delayed the attack until the new Tiger heavy tank, Panther medium tank, and Ferdinand 88-mm self-propelled gun were fielded. The Soviets used Hitler's fielding time (approximately three months) to construct strong defensive barriers and to mass their numerically superior, but technologically inferior, tanks. When the conflict initiated, many of Hitler's new tanks were deadlined before they could reach the front as a direct result of not being battle-tested. The Soviets with their cheaper but more plentiful tanks subsequently devastated the German Army. Today Warsaw Pact countries continue to enjoy a significant numerical advantage in tanks. The U.S. Army, rather than produce en masse, chose to develop the very expensive, not so easily replaced, Ml tank. The question is twofold: 1) does U.S. doctrine generally place too much emphasis on technology as opposed to mass: and 2) has the United States and perhaps its allies, failed to learn from this great mistake of Hitler's?

MG SMALL: I don't think we're placing too much emphasis on technology. Still believe in first-round accuracy, first-round kill, very high probability of kill, and things of this nature. As we discussed earlier, the flexibility, the ingenuity, and so forth, of the American soldier are very important. I think that even though the enemy may have a

superior advantage in numbers, we have the technological advantage. With the ability of the American soldiers or fire teams, to operate almost independently and to take advantage of the enemy's limitations, they would quickly overcome numerical superiority. Probably a pretty good indication of that is the degree of the Soviets' technological intelligence efforts in the United States. They're constantly trying to steal our technological secrets. You know: look down, shoot down, first-round accuracy, laser-guided weapons. These things give us a technological advantage and a higher probability of kill with the first round.

The Soviets place a great deal of effort trying to steal these secrets so they can employ them. But I think as long as we're willing to spend the money on research and development, willing to spend that extra dollar to ensure that we have a high probability of kill with the first round, we stand a hell of a good opportunity of overcoming their numerical advantage. With mass, they're going to break through occasionally, but if you look at Soviet doctrine, they don't have the capability, once they make a penetration, of following up that penetration continuously. They continue to have to stop, regroup, refit, re-supply, or whatever. Unless they could penetrate the NATO arena and go all the way to the Atlantic Ocean without stopping, I'm not sure that they have the advantage. I think that if they penetrate and then have to stop to re-supply, to refit, to do whatever they have to do, that's when we're going to get them the same way we did the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge. If you look at what happened at the Battle of the Bulge, a very small amount of people held off numerous German divisions. Once again, by ingenuity, dedication, and in some cases, a slight technological advantage (albeit a small one) with a 2.36 rocket launcher, we have the capability of stopping the bad guys.

CPT SOKOL: Soviet doctrine places a great deal of emphasis on rear area operations; specifically, the disruption of combat service support activities. The general trend in the combat service support arena, at least when I was leaving Europe, was a reduction in combat service support strength. The Department of the Army was taking away from us to man the new light divisions, and so on. I commanded a company for 18 months, an Alpha Company of a forward support battalion. The company had 82 soldiers when I assumed command and 71 when I left. Yet the mission remained the same. The question is, will today's logistical soldier be able to effectively accomplish his mission while doubling as an infantryman looking out for himself?

MG SMALL: I'm not sure he can do that. I think we may have gone a bit too far in whittling down our logistics forces, not only in the heavy divisions but also in the light divisions. A soldier can work 18 to 20 hours a day, for an indefinite period of time, getting by on 4 hours of sleep a night without any tremendous degradation of performance. But our commanders have to understand that a soldier can do one of two things: either he can drive a truck and re-supply a unit, or he can be on guard duty. He can't do both. The Army has vacillated back and forth on who has the rear area protection mission. Should we organize and equip infantry brigades, for example, for the rear area protection mission, or should we allow the combat service support soldier to work part-time and protect part-time? Should we give that mission to Military Police? How should we do it? We constantly seem to vacillate on the best way to do it.

Considering the forces the bad guys have (roughly eight airborne divisions, roughly four or five thousand or maybe more in the SPETZNATZ (Soviet Special Forces Units)) there is a real threat out there. Once the war starts, the ground commander or the theater commander is going to make a judgment call, and he's going to have to divert some of his combat power to the rear area protection mission. The combat service support soldier cannot provide support and be an infantryman simultaneously. It's an either or situation. I think you'll find that unless we correct that deficiency doctrinally, recognize the threat, and organize units to do the mission, when the war starts (say it's a high-intensity war in the European scenario), then the theater commander is going to have to divert some of his front line combat power to the rear area protection mission if he wants to sustain himself in the war.

CPT SOKOL: Will the female soldiers that are currently allowed in forward support battalions be allowed to remain in forward support battalions in the event of a conflict?

MG SMALL: I would hope so. If not, it's going to devastate the morale of those forward support units. We have made a corporate decision within the Army that we're going to accept large numbers of females within the force structure. We've analyzed which jobs they should go to based upon the probability of casualties, the combat probability, and that's the way we've assigned our female soldiers. They have a right to be there in wartime since they have a right to be there in peacetime. The only thing I'm not completely sure of is whether we in the United States understand that we're going to suffer tremendous casualty rates in the next conflict; a good many of those casualties are going to be female soldiers. From a national standpoint, I think we have to be prepared for this. There is one thing that could prohibit females from going into combat with their comrades, and that is an act of Congress. For example, if we are told to reinforce NATO, is Congress at the eleventh hour going to say "don't send females" and pass a law which prohibits that? If they do, it's going to be very detrimental, not only to the females who expect and want to go, but also to the males who have to go. Are you going to strip units down to something less than their true capability? Think that we within the Army leadership expect to deploy all soldiers when we have to deploy. If we're an infantry unit, where the combat probability is one, then no females will be in that organization. But if there is a combat probability of greater than one, then there are going to be females in a unit. The leadership accepts that. That's the way we do our planning, that's the way we do our training, and that's the way we operate. But as I said, there are two other questions: one, is the Congress going to let it happen; and two, is the nation ready to accept large numbers of female casualties? And we'll just have to wait for those two questions to be answered when we have to deploy the force.

CPT SOKOL: What role do you see the Transportation Corps playing in space?

MG SMALL: If you look into the future in the 1990's I think we will have a terminal service or terminal transfer mission in space. It's no different from running an aerial port or water port. There will be a space port and it should be a transportation mission. Whether it's going to be an Army mission or an Air Force mission because it's in space,

is yet to be answered. I think that the generic transporter is going to have a role to play there.

CPT SOKOL: Sir, the last question I have for you concerns myself and a lot of the other young officers that I work with. What can a junior grade transportation officer do to prepare himself better for the logistical challenges presented by modern technology?

MG SMALL: I think the first thing that everybody in the military should recognize is that nobody's going to manage their career and develop them professionally except themselves. Although our friends at MILPERCEN (Military Personnel Center) would like to tell you that they're going to do that, they can only do it within certain constraints. For example, they can send you to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but they can't get you a job as an S-3 (Operations Officer) or a battalion XO (Executive Officer) or a company commander at that installation. You've got to work that yourself. Professional development is a lot on your part as opposed to the branch's part. When it comes time for higher military education, that's going to be based on how well you did and how well you compared with your peers when it comes time for selection. I think the Transportation Corps officer has to prepare him or herself for the future and do the best he can in any job he has to improve professionally. As far as modern technology is concerned, just continue to reach out. You're going to find a lot of the people you work for are not interested in automation. They feel uncomfortable with it. But I think the younger officer has to reach out to convince his leadership and his superiors that there's a better way to build a mousetrap and an easier way to do things.

Once you can develop programs that are nothing more than management aids, you can sit down and decide how to use that management information. Hopefully, you will figure out what information you want and how you're going to use it before you develop a software program to pull that information. Unfortunately, many soldiers don't, and I think that's basically because the feel uncomfortable around computers. Younger officers should teach us older guys some of the values and benefits of modern technology.

On the other hand, soldiers should always be prepared to go back to the stubby pencil method like they did in World War II, because in a tactical environment, even though it may be a non-nuclear one, disruptions of automation, communications, and so forth, will exist--hopefully not for very long periods of time. But we have to be able to carry on.

I think if I were a younger officer today, I would always strive to do the job of a couple of grades over mine. If we have to mobilize the force tomorrow and institute the draft, today's captains are going to be battalion commanders within the next six months. This process follows patterns set in World War II and the Korean conflict. I'm the only person who is going to manage my career, and I'm going to keep my sights a couple of grades above what I am now. If I were the battalion S-3, I should want to be the brigade S-3.

Soldiers should grab the initiative when it comes to automation. They should decide how to improve today's jobs and be able to sell that to their bosses, always keeping in mind that automation is not the ultimate solution, especially in situations where it may

be necessary to go back to the stubby pencil to get the job done. Does that answer your question?

CPT SOKOL: Yes, sir. Sir, that concludes all the questions I wanted to ask you. If you care to, do you have anything you'd like to say, or would you like to summarize what we talked about?

MG SMALL: I guess I have a great concern, maybe two concerns, about our Corps. The first one is that a lot of our people don't want to get out and spend time in divisions. They seem to feel more comfortable in a European environment, staying within the Transportation Group or in the TRANSCOM (Transportation Command), as opposed to getting down to the 3rd or the 8th Infantry Division. I think that's wrong. All of us should spend as much time in divisions as we can, if nothing more than to learn the importance of doing our job correctly and of supporting the soldier. Receiving that support helps you understand how to do it better and provides you with more of a sense of urgency in accomplishing good support. So I think our people should get out there and get their boots muddy spending time with divisions.

Another reason to spend time in divisions, probably equally as important, is that selection boards usually consist of a three-panel system, generally with f our officers per panel , a total of twelve people considering each officer, the majority of those twelve are Combat arms officers. Therefore, as you serve in divisions, and with combat arms, you may develop a reputation that these officers might remember during the selection process. Or they may read through your file and decide that since you survived in the 3rd Infantry Division and did a good job, you might be a better choice than another officer who wasn't in a division. These officers may relate to a division, whereas they might not relate to 37th Transportation Group. So, if you succeed in a division, even though one of your peers did an equally good job within the 37th Group, you, as the soldier who served in the division should come out ahead. The combat arms people understand divisions; they don't understand 37th Group. I believe our people should spend a lot of time in divisions, but many of them don't want to because they get cold, wet, muddy, and hungry, and they must put in long hours.

Homesteading is the kiss of death. Try to make sure that you get a pretty good shot pattern of assignments. Don't spend too much time at Fort Eustis. If you have to spend time there, try to vary it--so much time in the school, so much in the group. Don't try to spend a lot of time in Europe. You're better off having varied assignments--for example, from Fort Eustis go to Europe; go back to Fort Hood; go to Fort Bragg, then to Panama or to MTMC or Korea; and then maybe start the cycle over again. If your record indicates you have done it, then that's a strike in your favor. Remember, people are not looking for a reason to promote you, to select you for the school, or to do anything else for you from a career standpoint. They're looking for a reason not to do it. That reason not to do it can be any one of a number of things. Most of the records that go before a selection board pretty much mirror one another, so you're looking for that little discriminator as to why not he or why not she. You're not looking for a reason that says "he or she should be promoted because." Be careful of the homesteading standpoint

and make sure to manage your career. If you want to command a company, never walk in and tell the boss, "I need to command the company." Walk in and tell him you WANT to command the company. If you enjoy command, then strive, once you've completed command of the company, to spend as much time in troop units as you can, whether from the S-3 standpoint or the XO standpoint. That will certainly help you when it is time for the centralized battalion command selection board. The more recent the time you've spent with troops, the better off you will be. The same rule applies for an 0-6 (colonel) command. Once you've finished your battalion command, try to stay as close to troops as you can. If you're going to stay in the Army for 20 or 30 years, sooner or later you will pay your penance by going to Washington. Get it out of the way as fast as you can, and stay there as short a period of time as possible. Reason number one, it's frustrating; number two, financially it's a disaster. Definitely try not to homestead in that area.

Take time to "smell the roses," as the saying goes. And above all, take care of your people. If you can take care of them in a peacetime environment--explain to them why things have to be done and try to be considerate--when the bullets start to fly, and you have to send some of them out to get killed, they won't question it, they'll understand. They'll do what you want them to do, even knowing that they may not come back. I guess that's all part of the military profession. Not one of us wants that to happen, but it's what we get paid for. And that's about it.

CPT SOKOL: Sir, on behalf of myself and the Transportation School, I'd like to thank you for your time and your thoughts, and I'm sure a lot of people will be interested in hearing what those are. Thank you very much.

MG SMALL: It's been my pleasure, and good luck to all of you.