

SUPERVISION OF TRANSPORTATION
BY THE
SUPPLY DIVISION OF THE GENERAL STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT
1940 - 1942

Monograph prepared by
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C O N T E N T S

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ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Prior to December 1940 the clearing house for transportation matters in the General Staff was the Transportation Section, Supply and Transportation Branch, Supply Division (G-4). The function of the section was to aid the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, in the fulfillment of his responsibilities for the preparation of plans and policies, and the supervision of activities concerning "Transportation by land and water, including ports of embarkation, and their necessary auxiliaries", and "Traffic control". During the greater part of 1940 a single officer and a stenographer made up the staff, but in October an expert on motor transportation was added. The Chief of the Transportation Section during 1940 was Major Frank S. Ross, who later as Colonel, and eventually as Major General, served as Chief of Transportation in the European Theater of Operations from its establishment.

In December 1940 the Supply and Transportation Branch was combined with the Planning and Equipment Branch to form the Requirements and Distribution Branch. The Transportation Section was not disturbed by this reorganization, but continued to function in the usual manner as a subdivision of the new branch. This set-up continued until early in April 1941. On the first

of that month, Lt. Colonel Charles P. Gross was appointed Chief of the Transportation Section, and on April 5th he recommended that the Section be reconstituted a Branch. This recommendation was placed in effect with promptitude. Colonel Gross subsequently became Chief of Transportation in the Services of Supply (later, Army Service Forces), and as this monograph is being written holds the rank of Major General.

From this point onward there was a steady expansion of activities and an increase of personnel in the Transportation Branch. As the staff increased, the establishment of subdivisions became expedient. A Transportation Branch organization chart of May 26, 1941, shows, under Lt. Colonel Gross as Chief and Lt. Colonel Ross as Executive, a Statistician, an Administrative Section, a Planning Section and an Operations Section. The latter was broken down into separate units for Motor and Air, Rail, Water (See Annex I). The Staff of the Branch on that date consisted of six officers and five civilians.

A functional chart of the Supply Division, G-4, dated September 15, 1941, defines the functions of the Transportation Branch as follows.- "Preparation of plans and policies and supervision of activities concerning:

- (a) Transportation by rail and water.
- (b) Ports of embarkation and their necessary auxiliaries.
- (c) Distribution and movement of labor troops used in connection with transportation.
- (d) Traffic control.
- (e) Determination of financial requirements concerning the above."

According to a G-4 chart dated October 20, 1941, the staff of the Transportation Branch on that date included 11 officers. Seven civilians were employed. The Branch was subdivided into Sections designated Planning, Rail, Water, Motor, Lend-Lease. The Administrative and Statistical Sections had been discontinued and these activities placed under the Executive Officer.

This set-up continued until after our entry into the war when further expansion became necessary. On December 17, 1941, the staff embraced 18 officers; on January 4, 1942, there were 23 officers; on February 21, 1942, there were 50 officers (number of civilians not available). By the latter date, sections had been added for Troop Movements, Air Priorities, and Administration; the name of the Lend-Lease Section had been changed to Defense Aid. A list of officers and sections as of February 21, 1942, is given in Annex II. The Functions of the operating sections, as shown in a G-4 chart of January 19, 1942, are presented in Annex III.

The increase in Branch activity and personnel which has been noted was accompanied by a growing participation in operating matters, as distinguished from matters of planning and supervision which identify a purely staff unit. In the pressure atmosphere which characterized

the period just before and following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the line of demarcation between the staff functions of the Transportation Branch, G-4, and the operating functions of the Transportation Division, OQMG, became progressively less distinct. More and more the Transportation Branch was called upon by other elements of the General Staff and by the supply arms and services for assurance that specific freight or troop movements would be accomplished as planned. The Branch, in order to guarantee the desired results, found the issuance of specific operating instructions more and more necessary. Further comment on this subject appears in the next section of this monograph.

The outcome of this development was inevitable, namely, a merger. This was accomplished concurrently with the reorganization of the Army and the establishment of the Services of Supply in March 1949. In the new Transportation Division which was then created, were incorporated the Transportation Branch, G-4, (less the Motor Section), the Transportation Division, OQMG; the ports of embarkation including the staging areas, and the holding and reconsignment points. The Chief of the Transportation Branch became the Chief of the new Transportation Division.²

RESPONSIBILITIES AND PREROGATIVES

In the preceding, section allusion was made to the increasing participation of the Transportation Branch of G-4 in operating matters which under more normal circumstances would have been left entirely to the care of the Transportation Division, OQMG. The several Army regulations bearing on the subject did not clearly define the responsibilities of these units, and there was ground for a genuine difference of opinion, which naturally came to the surface as the pressure in the transportation field became heavier.³

On January 23, 1941, Major Ross, Chief of the Transportation Section of G-4, addressed a memorandum to his superior, in which he reviewed the historical and practical aspects of the controversy rather fully. Having regard to the lack of clarity in the Army Regulations and the broad responsibilities of the General Staff, and notwithstanding the provision of the National Defense Act which forbade members of the General Staff Corps "to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department...", Major Ross concluded: "...it appears logical to assume that while the General Staff is not expected to 'operate', it is, nevertheless, charged with close supervision and in the last analysis will be held responsible for results."⁴

Various proposals were made with a view to clarifying the regulations, but without success. After April 1941 the Transportation Branch of G-4 took a stronger and stronger hand in directing operations as a matter of practical expediency, and the Transportation Division, OQMG, with a similar regard for the requirements of the emergency, accommodated itself to this situation. The inevitable misunderstandings and occasional miscarriages resulting from two staffs, both working under pressure, dealing with operating details, were resolved by the Army reorganization of March 1942, which placed both staffs under one head.

There also was lack of clarity in the Army regulations regarding the relationship between G-4 and the Quartermaster General on the one hand and the parts of embarkation on the other. Here again the pertinent regulation failed to cover the point.⁵ A memorandum prepared in the Supply and Transportation Branch for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. December 21, 1939, indicates that this question had been raised by the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, who felt that his prerogatives were being encroached upon and recommended that a study of the regulation be made with a view to clarifying jurisdiction and fixing the chain of command.⁶ The memorandum also refers to strong views expressed by the Quartermaster General, who did not see eye to eye with the Port Commander in regard to their respective authorities. In the memorandum lack of a clear-cut definition of responsibility was acknowledged, but it was not considered possible to draw a sharp line of differentiation, and the view was expressed that those concerned should be able to effect a workable solution of any problems that might arise; redrafting of the regulation would not accomplish the desired results, it was felt.

The question was kept alive, however, by criticisms of the handling of certain overseas troop movements, which indicated that there was lack of understanding of their functions on the part of the several commands concerned, and consequent lack of coordination. The Chief of Staff accordingly requested G-3 to make a study of the operation of the ports and to give consideration to the possibility of placing them under control of the commanders of the respective corps areas. Although G-3 prepared a report under date of April 30, 1940, it apparently was not sent up to the Chief of Staff. However, a new regulation eventually was drafted, and after extensive consideration was issued as AR 270-5, Ports of Embarkation and Debarkation; Control, Administration, Operation, November 30, 1940. This regulation stated: "Ports of embarkation and debarkation operate directly under the War Department ...", except for court martial jurisdiction and certain matters covered by Army regulations.

AR 270-5 did not indicate, however, to what office of the War Department the port commanders were responsible, nor did it eliminate, so long as AR 30-1110 continued in effect, the controversy between the Quartermaster General and the commander of the ports as to the scope of their respective authorities in connection with the Army Transport Service. On March 20, 1941, the subject was again brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff in a memorandum from G-4, prepared by Lt. Colonel Ross. The memorandum pointed out that the War Department always had considered the control of a port of embarkation a command function which should remain under the Adjutant General. The Quartermaster General, on the other hand had practical reasons for contending that the ports were transportation facilities and therefore were under his jurisdiction. Colonel Ross discussed four proposals which had been offered to settle the question, and supported the one which gave the Quartermaster General full jurisdiction over all War Department transportation facilities utilized in the movement of personnel or cargo to overseas destinations.

Although the matter was intermittently discussed, no satisfactory solution was reached until after our entry into the war. On December 17, 1941, the Adjutant General issued a memorandum stating that, by direction of the President, ports of embarkation and general depots within the continental limits of the United States were placed under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. and that the Chief of the Transportation Branch would represent and act for the Assistant Chief of Staff in command of the ports.⁷

During January 1941 negotiations with the Maritime Commission for the acquisition of additional ships for the Army Transport Service reached a critical point because of the scarcity of bottoms. At a meeting held at the Maritime Commission on January 29, the War Department was represented by officers from three separate bureaus, namely, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and Office of the Quartermaster General. In his report on this meeting to the Chief of Staff, dated February 3, 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff recommended that further negotiations with the Maritime Commission be conducted by G-4. Thereafter, the broader aspects were left to G-4, the Quartermaster General confined himself to the handling of details, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary withdrew from the picture. In July 1941 the Chairman of the Maritime Commission suggested that the War Department appoint a specific officer for liaison with the Maritime Commission, and on August 5th the Secretary of War advised the Chairman that Colonel C. P. Gross had been designated. When, because of the critical shipping situation which developed immediately following our entry into the war, the President established the Strategic Shipping Board, Colonel Gross was designated as the member for the War Department.

In the early months of 1941 the need for the establishment of some control over the operation of the principal ports and the utilization of their facilities was recognized in many quarters. On March 28, 1941, Mr. Ralph Budd, Transportation Commissioner in the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defenses informed the Secretary of War that he was considering calling together a committee to discuss this problem and requested the Secretary to nominate a representative. On April 9, 1941, the Secretary, advised Mr. Budd that Lt. Colonel W. H. Sadler of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War had been nominated. A notation on the file copy of the last mentioned letter, initialed by Colonel Gross on April 10, stated: "Colonel Sadler directed by Gen. Moore to have no conference with Mr. Budd on transportation at ports without having, Col. Gross present." Mr. Budd convened the committee and various phases of port operation were discussed, but no action resulted.

During 1941 the Transportation Branch, G-4 maintained informal contact with the inland carriers as represented by the Association of American Railroads, American Trucking Association, and National Association of Bus Operators. When the Office of Defense Transportation was established by executive order in December 1942, the Branch immediately established liaison with that organization. In response to a request from Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, Director, ODT, the Secretary of War advised, on January 21, 1942, that Colonel Gross has been appointed liaison officer. Subsequently, when a Division of Local Transport was set up by ODT, and an advisory committee organized by the division chief, an officer of the Transportation Branch was designated as representative on that committee.

In his memorandum of April 5, 1941, recommending the establishment of a Transportation Branch in G-4. Colonel Gross proposed that aside from requirements, distribution and maintenance of motor transportation, "all other matters pertaining to transportation or traffic be referred to the Transportation Branch." The following incidents illustrate the effort which was made to insure that the prerogatives of the Branch in this broad field were not by-passed. On May 16, 1941, Colonel Gross recommended to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, that the Transportation Branch be consulted in connection with all activities of the Federal Works Administration Branch pertaining to highway facilities, and be represented at conferences

relative thereto. On October 11, 1941, through a memorandum from the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, to the Director of Defense Aid, dissent was expressed to a proposal to assign an officer of the Defense Aid Section as liaison with the Division of Defense Aid reporting on transportation matters, and appointment of an officer from the Transportation Branch was recommended. At a meeting held on December 6, 1941, Colonel Gross announced that in the future all transportation problems arising in connection with the forwarding of military missions, troop units and construction contractors' employees to overseas regions would be handled by the Transportation Branch, in order to eliminate the confusion and duplication which had existed. When instructions were issued by the Chief of Staff to GHQ to arrange sailing dates for convoys to Iceland and Ireland, and to maintain liaison with the Navy regarding these movements, protest was raised and a recommendation was sent to the Chief of Staff that the instructions be rescinded and that G-4 continue to perform this function insofar as transportation was concerned. This recommendation was contained in a memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, dated January 1, 1942, and a notation by the Chief of Staff on the file copy indicates that the requested action was taken.

An interesting aspect of the attitude which Colonel Gross took toward the responsibilities of the Transportation Branch is revealed in a letter which he wrote to the Commanding General of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation on January 22, 1942. The letter refers to some embarrassments which had arisen because the commander of the port had endeavored to iron out certain difficulties in connection with the movement of supplies by direct telephone conversations with Washington representatives of the supply services involved. The last paragraph of Colonel Gross' letter reads:

“There is no objection, of course, to direct liaison between your staff officers and their respective Chiefs in Washington in the performance of their duties under you. That action is encouraged. But when they are stopped and matters come up to you to break through resistance or inaction, it is desired that you call up this office in your effort to get favorable action or decision.”

While taking a broad view of the responsibilities of the Transportation Branch, G-4, and insisting on every occasion that the branch's prerogatives be respected, Colonel Gross was equally diligent in defending the prerogatives of the Quartermaster General in respect to transportation. The following incident is illustrative. During the early part of 1941, the Corps of Engineers was under necessity of arranging for the movement of large numbers of contractors' employees and large quantities of construction materials to overseas Army bases, and requested, with the support of the War Plans Division, some relaxation of the requirement that arrangements for such movements be made through the Quartermaster General. In a memorandum to WPD dated April 3, 1941, prepared by Colonel Gross for the signature of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, it was emphasized that sea transport was the greatest of all bottlenecks and that control of its use by a single agency was essential. Accordingly the proposal was not concurred in, and as an alternative it was suggested that the Chief of Engineers maintain a liaison officer in the Office of the Quartermaster General to facilitate necessary arrangements for water transportation. A notation on the file copy of the memorandum indicates that

as a result of a conference held the same day between representatives of the Quartermaster General, the Corps of Engineers and the Transportation Branch, this alternative was accepted as a satisfactory solution.

ARMY-NAVY RELATIONS

The agreement between the Army and the Navy regarding joint operations, incorporated in the pamphlet entitled, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", became a highly important instrument the moment Europe went to war. The service departments had had little experience in planning and executing amphibious undertakings, and early steps were taken to overcome this deficiency. The transportation unit of G-4 had a significant role to play in this connection, particularly as regards the provision of transport and the operation of the ports.

Plans for joint exercises on the Pacific coast were formulated in September 1, 1939 and the exercises took place in the following January. The transportation unit of G-4 arranged for five Army transports and one chartered vessel to be assembled at Tacoma and Olympia in Puget Sound for the loading of troops and supplies, and to proceed thence to Monterey, California, where landing operations were undertaken. Following the exercises reports were rendered by the Commanding Generals of the 4th Army, the 3rd Division, and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, and G-4 took cognizance of certain points which these reports brought out. Among those with which G-4 was in general concurrence, was the desirability of continuing the exercises on shore for a sufficient time after the initial landing to adequately test the supply system; to so organize the Army Transport Service that temporary ports of embarkation and debarkation could be set up without delay; to study possible modifications in existing Army transports to better fit them for expeditionary uses; to design and construct future Army transports with particular attention to the requirements of combat loading. With regard to the suggestion that stevedore companies be organized in peace time for war-time expansion, G-4 believed this to be impracticable and favored the detail of a line unit to serve as a port labor unit. Also, G-4 did not concur in the recommendation of the Commander of the 3rd Division that the Army Landing Force Commander have command and control of the loading of ships, G-4 considered this the duty of the port of embarkation commander, but agreed that the planning of the stowage, being so closely related to the tactics of the operation, should remain with the Army Landing Force Commander.⁸

Joint exercises held in the vicinity of Culebra Island, Puerto Rico, in January 1941, in which the 1st Division participated, also led to a number of suggestions looking to the better equipment of the transports. Lt. Colonel Davis S. Rumbough, who as official observer rendered a report to the Adjutant General under date of February 21, 1941, offered a number of recommendations. With regard to his proposal that the transports be equipped with gravity davits and boat cradles capable of carrying either life boats or "Y" boats, G-4 pointed out a number of technical difficulties but advised that experiments were being made on one of the transports in an endeavor to improve the method of handling such boats. The observer's suggestion that amphibian tanks be provided for each combat team elicited the comment from G-4 that although no amphibian vehicle had yet been standardized, the matter was being studied and that 12 amphibian tractors

were on order, 3 of which would be assigned to the 1st Division and 3 to the 3rd Division or training purposes. G-4 did not concur in the proposal to install extensive bridge controlled blackout systems on the transports, because conditions did not then warrant the large expense, but it did recommend that all transports be provided with dead-light blanks and shutters, and that blackout drills be instituted without delay.⁹

In the course of the arrangements for these and later joint exercises, the Transportation Branch of G-4 had occasion to protest against the intrusion of other bureaus into its field. On April 10, 1941, a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, prepared by Colonel Gross and signed by the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, pointed out that the War Plans Division had initiated a directive to the New York Port of Embarkation regarding the preparation of transportation plans for forthcoming amphibious exercises, and emphasized the high desirability of having all matters relating to transportation centered in one General Staff Division.¹⁰ On July 16, 1941, in a memorandum prepared in the Transportation Branch exception was taken to inclusion in a WPD directive of the statement that GHQ was “responsible for further implementation of the Army’s part” in a pending exercise; the memorandum urged that GHQ should not be permitted to “in any way assume the prerogatives of G-4 in matters of control of the Quartermaster General or Ports of Embarkation.”

One need clearly demonstrated by joint exercise of the winters of 1940 and 1941, and emphasized by the more extensive operations then being planned, was for transports properly adapted to combat loading. The Navy, whose responsibility it was to provide such vessels, found it difficult to obtain suitable ships through the Maritime Commission and called upon the Army to surrender certain of its transports for conversion. By late summer 1941, four such transports had been delivered by the Army. Then the Navy proposed that the Army turn over 10 additional transports. This was strongly opposed by the Transportation Branch, and in a memorandum of August 30 to WPD, which apparently favored the project. G-4 pointed out that conversion for combat loading renders a transport a specialized ship and entails a loss of 15% of its troop carrying capacity. The 10 vessels singled out for conversion were described as the most efficient in the Army transport fleet; the 19 remaining vessels were considered inadequate for the Army’s needs. It was recommended, therefore, that the plans of the Joint Board, which necessitated such conversions, be reviewed “in the light of available shipping for the whole war effort”, and that action to convert more than 4 transports for combat loading be indefinitely postponed.¹¹

Notwithstanding the objections of G-4, which were concurred in by the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Staff approved the conversion of all 10 transports including 2 hulls then under construction. In a memorandum to G-4 dated September 18, 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, advised that this conversion had been agreed to on the understanding that during the conversion period Navy transports would be made available as far as possible when they were needed to supplement the Army Transport Service.¹²

The Transportation Branch also resisted a proposal of the Chief of Naval Operations to convert the transports WAKEFIELD, MT. VERNON, and WEST POINT (formerly the luxury liners MANHATTAN, WASHINGTON, and AMERICA) into airplane carriers. In a memorandum to the Chief of Staff on August 26, 1941, written for the signature of the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-4, Colonel Gross pointed out that these large, fast vessels were essential to fulfilling certain of the Army's strategical plans; that their conversion would put them out of use for any purpose for a year, which because of a lack of ships might become a critical one. The recommendation against proceeding with this conversion prevailed, and the vessels continued to operate as troop transports.

During World War I, Army transports had been manned by Navy crews and there was widespread belief that the same arrangement would be adopted if the United States should enter World War II. However in a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated November 26, 1940, G-4 suggested that consideration be given to such an arrangement during the "transition period". The Quartermaster General, on December 3, 1940, wrote in opposition to this plan. In a second memorandum from G-4 to the Deputy Chief of Staff, December 7, 1940, which was prepared by the Chief of the Transportation Section, the view was expressed that the Quartermaster General had not recognized the basic reasons for the proposed change, which was designed to accomplish certain results, namely, provide immediate militarization of crews, provide an operating management which would not have to be changed should an emergency arise and place the operation of the transports under a department whose primary training was in navigation and shipping.¹³

This question came actively to the fore in early April 1941, when the Chief of Naval Operations requested the Chief of Staff to designate officers to enter into discussion of the subject with representatives of the Navy and the Bureau of Navigation. Commenting on this proposal, Colonel Gross defined the Army's interest as:

- (a) to retain control of the Army's transports as to missions and movements;
- (b) to retain control over actual loadings of combat teams and task forces and the installation of gear to accomplish this; and
- (c) "to have the Navy sail, maintain in seaworthy condition, and defend our transports."

Under date of April 8, 1941, the Chief of Staff notified the Chief of Naval Operations that Colonel Gross together with Colonel T. E. Dillon, Chief of the Transportation Division, OQMG, had been designated by him to participate in the discussions.

In May 1941 the Army and Navy agreed to a plan for the manning of Army transports with Navy crews, the vessels to continue in service on Army missions. At that time there were 30 such vessels. By December the number had considerably increased, but only seven had been manned by the Navy. The others were operated with civilian crews recruited by the Army. On January 9, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed to the Chief of Staff that "in view of the urgent demands for trained naval personnel", Navy crews be removed from all but one of the Army transports as soon as the Army could make the necessary arrangements.¹⁴ In a memorandum dated January 23, 1942, prepared by Colonel Gross for the signature of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, the above facts were reviewed and the Chief of Staff was advised that the Army could

provide the necessary crews without difficulty. Accordingly it was arranged for Navy crews to be replaced at the first opportunity.¹⁵

THE SUPPLY OF SHIPPING

During 1940 the Army had been able to acquire, through purchase or charter, the vessels needed to handle its increasing overseas traffic. By early 1941, however, the market for ships had become exceedingly tight and request was made upon the Maritime Commission to arrange for the Army to obtain 5 additional passenger vessels and 5 cargo ships. The Maritime Commission readily agreed to the allocation of the former, but demurred on the assignment of additional freighters. Being responsible for the utilization of the American merchant marine in the way that would accomplish the best over-all results, and having many other claimants to satisfy, the Maritime Commission required evidence that the Army's existing fleet was being efficiently employed and that the permanent acquisition of additional cargo carriers was justified by the military requirements.

The need for continued expansion of the Army Transport Service was fairly obvious in the light of increased overseas commitments created by the development of new bases in the Atlantic and the strengthening of the Hawaiian, Alaskan, Philippine and Panama Departments. Certain adjustments were necessary, however, in the handling of Army traffic and the employment of Army transports. The transportation unit of G-4, together with the Quartermaster General's Transportation Division, effected these adjustments in the course of the winter and spring of 1941. Among them were the discontinuance of the Army's intercoastal service and the transfer of this traffic to the transcontinental railroads, the utilization of transports on their homeward voyages to lift strategic imports for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation when the space was not required for military cargo, and the utilization of space on commercial steamship lines whenever the military requirements could be met thereby. The net result was that with the aid of the Maritime Commission the Army's shipping requirements were met with reasonable promptitude up to November 1941, when a special effort to reinforce the Philippines created an exceptionally heavy demand on the Pacific coast.

Because of the growing scarcity of ships under the American flag, the Quartermaster General pointed out in April 1941 the desirability of utilizing commercial space on vessels of foreign registry, especially for traffic in the western hemisphere. Such use runs in conflict with Section 1 of the Act of April 28, 1904, which restricted transportation of Army supplies to vessels under the United States flag. However, after consultation with the Judge Advocate General, it was decided in G-4 that the War Department had authority by delegation from the President to use foreign shipping if circumstances rendered this expedient from a military standpoint. Accordingly it was arranged that when such circumstances arose, the Quartermaster General would request authorization which would be granted in the discretion of G-4. The requests involved principally Norwegian vessels sailing between the United States and the new Atlantic bases, but a few trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific sailings were also involved.¹⁶

On July 1, 1941, the President advised the Secretary of War that because of complaints received an investigation would be made to determine whether the ships which had been turned over to the Army and the Navy were being used to their maximum efficiency.¹⁷ In this connection the Deputy Chief of Staff informed the Secretary of War on July 10, 1941, that the assignment of ships to the Army was not excessive, that prospective movements of troops and supplies would be well above the capacity of the existing transport fleet, and that the War Department had done everything possible to utilize the transports to their full capacity. A list of Army transports showing their employment as of July 1, 1941, was prepared in Transportation Branch of G-4 for submission to the President. Under date of July 25, 1941, Colonel Gross addressed the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, pointing out that the Army supplies and construction materials to be shipped overseas during the fiscal year 1942 had been estimated at 2,317,900 weight tons; that the effective capacity of the Army Transport Service for this period was estimated at 939,200 tons, leaving a balance of 1,378,700 tons to be moved by commercial transport.¹⁸

During the next few months, repeated studies were made in the Transportation Branch of G-4 relating to shipping requirements and availability. Under date of September 10., 1941¹⁹ a memorandum was sent to the Chief of Staff over the signature of the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, pointing out that the Army's transport fleet then consisted of 16 troopships and 15 freighters. Two additional troop ships were under construction on that date. A large amount of commercial shipping space was required and all requests for such had been met promptly by the Maritime Commission. This memorandum indicated that the shipping then under the control of the Army and Navy could sustain a force of about 125,000 men overseas under war conditions; that with the aid of additional shipping which the Maritime Commission might assemble for an all-out effort, a force of 640,000 could be sustained overseas, ten months to a year being required to transport them. It was pointed out, however, that the ship construction program would increase these potentialities, and it was expected that by July 1943 it would be possible to transport and maintain overseas an average of about 275,000 men per month.

The memorandum of September 10, 1941, included a revealing paragraph on the necessity of greater preparations for handling traffic at overseas ports of debarkation. It said in part: "A small and belated beginning has been made in the proposed organization of Port Headquarters and Port Battalions and their assignment to ports of embarkation for training and in the recent approval of the Chief of Staff of a program for the procurement of harbor craft and auxiliaries in the Fiscal Year 1942." There was the added comment: "As it takes time to create these units and facilities, there will be real embarrassment if movements are made before they become available."

Naturally, our entry into the war largely vitiated the earlier studies in regard to the shipping situation, and during the weeks following December 7, 1941, the Transportation Branch G-4 worked night and day, with very uncertain material, in an effort to draw a clearer picture of prospects and potentialities. With a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff dated December 21, 1941,²⁰ G-4 transmitted a study of the shipping situation and pointed out that in addition to the war strength garrisons totaling 455,000 men then prescribed for our overseas bases, existing bottoms, together with those expected to be available up to the end of 1942, would be able to maintain a force of 459,000 men in Europe or 306,000 in the Far East; by the end of 1943 it was estimated that the figure for the European Theater would be 1,262,000 and for the Far Eastern Theater 841,000. The distribution of the forces between the theaters naturally would depend

upon military developments. The memorandum stated, "Even the increased force which could be transported and maintained at the end of 1943 is so small that the whole question of ship production should be re-examined by the Strategic Shipping Board at once with a view of developing ways and means of increasing the output of ships."

In a further study sent to the Chief of Staff on January 12., 1942,²¹ G-4 indicated that troop carrying ships were no longer a critical question due to the availability of the large British passenger vessels, and "more particularly to the huge (industrial) production program announced by the President in his congressional message, which will demand more cargo ships to carry the essential raw materials." The lend-lease program as outlined by the President was expected to make inroads on the supply of freighters, and "cargo ships now therefore are critical and determine capacity of overseas effort because of the lack of numbers and of their slow speed."

Pursuing further the matter of cargo shipping, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, on January 31, 1942,²² sent a chart to the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, which illustrated the limitations which would be imposed on the Army's overseas effort if no more cargo ships were allocated to it. "Under that supposition", G-4 pointed out, "only an additional 90,000 men can be added to present forces overseas during the remainder of 1942. Such an effort on its face fails to meet the requirements of the military situation." It was further stated that in order to meet the contemplated military programs beginning in February 18 additional cargo vessels per month would have to be added to the 110 then on hand.

In a memorandum addressed jointly to Admiral Vickery of the Maritime Commission and Mr. Stacy May of the War Production Board, dated February 13, 1942, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, pointed out that the current 1943 program for the construction of 10,667,000 deadweight tons of shipping would make possible a force of only 1,600,000 men overseas by the end of 1943. This figure would be increased to 2,260,000 men if the ship program were boosted to 15,000,000 deadweight tons for 1943. "It is evident," the memorandum stated, "that immediate steps must be taken to step up the ship building program to an even higher figure." Determination of the possibilities and advice to the Army as to what it might expect, was requested.

The chief factor limiting the amount of shipping available to the Army was the lend-lease program as established by the President. Commenting on this situation in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, January 19, 1942, Colonel Gross pointed out the vastness of the lend-lease shipping requirements and remarked that if these requirements were met the shipping used would be so great that no additional overseas military expeditions could be considered or undertaken. He summed up his position in the following words: "The decision must be boldly made based on shipping. If a maximum military effort is to be accomplished, Lend-Lease transfers should be limited to what can be carried in British shipping and about 180 U. S. ships which will gradually be deleted during the year until all U. S. ships are withdrawn."

Although momentarily the capacity of the troop carriers to build up the forces overseas was greater than that of the cargo fleet to support such forces, the ultimate need for greater troop capacity was not overlooked. Under date of December 10, 1941,²³ G-4 informed the Deputy Chief of Staff of his strong support of the Maritime Commission's proposal to build 35 troop

ships with a total capacity of 175,000 men. At a meeting of Army, Navy and Maritime Commission officials held on March 7, 1942, this subject was discussed in the light of a letter from the President supporting a program for the construction of 15,000,000 deadweight tons in 1943 and directing the distribution of this construction among the several types in accordance with the needs of the Army and the Navy. In view of the possibility that a change of emphasis from one theater to another might disturb the prearranged balance between freight and troop carriers, it was then suggested by the Army that if the need for greater troop capacity should arise, it could be met in part by the hasty conversion of C-2s and C-3s.²⁴

PORT FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS

In September 1939, when Europe went to war, there were two Army ports of embarkation in the United States from which military personnel and supplies were shipped to the overseas departments and bases; viz., New York and San Francisco. The spread of the war and the increasing involvement of American interests necessitated an increase in the number of Army ports and an enlargement of the facilities operated by those ports. Proposals in these directions sometimes came from the commanders of established ports, sometimes from the Quartermaster General and sometimes from the General Staff. In any case the transportation unit of G-4 carefully scrutinized all aspects of the proposal and recommended concurrence or non-concurrence to the Assistant Chief of Staff. A separate monograph, entitled, "Expansion of Army Facilities, 1941 - 1944" presents these developments in considerable detail so that only a general outline is given here.

Additional Ports of Embarkation.

The first addition to the list of Army ports of embarkation was New Orleans, which because of its location was a natural outlet for the increasing stream of men and supplies flowing to the Panama Department, and afforded a considerably shorter route to the Canal than did the Port of New York. The latter consideration was an important one in view of the severe shortage of ships which began to develop toward the end of 1940. The original announcement of intention to utilize New Orleans was made by the Quartermaster General in November 1940, and rehabilitation of the Army Base at that port was begun soon thereafter. Although a number of sailings were handled by the local Quartermaster during the intervals the formal opening of a port of embarkation at New Orleans was not announced until July 1, 1941. About the same time the establishment of a sub-port at Charleston, South Carolina, was announced, this port being favorably located to serve Puerto Rico and the new bases which were being established in the Caribbean area. One by one, as the need appeared. Army transportation organizations were installed at additional ports, so that on March 9, 1942, when the Army reorganization took place, there were ports of embarkation, or sub-ports in operation or in process of establishment at

Boston, New York, Charleston, New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Prince Rupert, B.C.

Additional Port Facilities.

In addition to deciding at what places Army ports should be established, the question of purchasing or constructing additional port facilities had to be studied and determined. On the east coast this was a relatively simple problem, since the large Army bases which had been built during World War I were still available at Boston, New York, Charleston and New Orleans (also at Hampton Roads and Philadelphia, where Army ports were established later), and it was felt that such additional general cargo terminals as might be needed could be obtained by lease as the requirements became apparent. On the Pacific coast, however, a different situation obtained since no bases had been built there during World War I. The old Army terminal at Ft. Mason was definitely limited in capacity and accordingly it was decided early in 1941 to expand the facilities of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation by the construction of additional docks and warehouses at Oakland, California. Early in 1941 also the so-called Pacific Terminal was purchased at Seattle, the facilities of which subsequently were augmented by the construction of two piers. It was decided to rely upon leased terminals at Los Angeles, at Portland (if this port should be required) and at Prince Rupert.

The above applies only to general cargo terminals. In the matter of special piers to load explosives and special igloo installations near the ports for the temporary holding of explosives destined overseas, an extensive program of new construction was necessary. This development had its inception in the early summer of 1941 and by the end of the year a general program had been completed and construction authorized. A program of new staging areas to handle troops detained in transit at the ports also was developed step by step, and in the main had been authorized prior to March 9, 1942. The same may be said of holding and reconsignments points, which were considered necessary as reservoirs for holding freight back from the ports and thus aiding in the avoidance of the port congestion which proved so great an obstacle in World War I. Further information regarding all these facilities will be found in the monograph referred to above.

Because the Army intended to rely in a large measure upon leased commercial facilities, even at the ports where it had its own terminals, it was especially concerned that such facilities should not be taken over and utilized by other agencies for storage purposes, repair and processing plants, and other uses which would render them unavailable for the handling of overseas shipping. In addition to the Army Transport Service, the Air Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Navy and the Maritime Commission were actual or potential claimants for such facilities, and some incidents of "grabbing" were early noted. The Maritime Commission, whose position was more neutral than that of the other agencies, took the lead in rationalizing the situation. On October 6, 1941, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission addressed the Under Secretaries of War and Navy, proposing that the Army-Navy Munitions Board be designated as the

coordinating agency in respect to the utilization of port facilities. On October 23, 1941, the Under Secretary of War informed the Chairman that he and his colleague of the Navy were in agreement with the proposal and felt that the problem could be handled properly by the Ocean Shipping Section of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, upon which the Maritime Commission had a representative.

As soon as we entered the war the demand for additional port facilities by both the Army and the Navy developed rapidly. The War Department representative on the Ocean Shipping Section of the Army-Navy Munitions Board was from the office of the Under Secretary, so that the Transportation Branch of G-4 had no direct part in the action taken by the Section on matters affecting the utilization of port facilities. Working under pressure to build up the Army's port establishment to meet the rapidly growing requirements, G-4 was sometimes irked by delays experienced in obtaining the Board's approval of its requests. In connection with a letter from the Board to the Secretary of War calling attention to the arrangement with respect to its coordinating function, Colonel Gross, on January 21, 1942, expressed the view that the arrangement would not be "beneficial to the efficient operation of the G-4 Division", and would "serve to retard prompt shipment of overseas supplies and equipment".²⁵ 1

Nevertheless on January 29, 1942, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, in compliance with the Board's request, issued a directive to the Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services calling attention to the agreement and requiring that any proposed acquisition of facilities of this type be submitted first to his office.²⁶ On the same date Colonel Gross requested the Chief of the Construction and Real Estate Branch to submit all applications to the Transportation Branch for "consideration and clearance from the Army-Navy Munitions Board."

Control of Port Traffic.

The maintenance of continuously liquid ports was an objective of which the transportation unit never lost sight. Obviously, extensive pier and storage facilities would be of little advantage if the port as a whole became so congested that traffic could not flow freely through it. The lessons of the last war in this respect were fresh in memory, and during the peace interval the subject had been dealt with extensively in courses of instructions given to Army officers. A disquieting aspect of the situation, however, was the fact that no single government agency had sufficiently broad authority to deal with the problem effectively. Several proposals for cooperative action put forward early in 1941 produced no results.

In the early months of 1941, G-4 concurred in a number of measures which aimed at the better control of the port-bound traffic of the Army. The Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services were required to submit to the Quartermaster General a monthly estimate of tonnage to be shipped overseas during the ensuing 60 days. Army transportation officers and contractors were required to give consignees advance notice of their shipments by telegraph. In April a Traffic Control Branch was established in the Transportation Division, OQMG, to study traffic trends, survey

transportation facilities, recommend such additional regulations and facilities as might seem necessary, and devise machinery for the control of War Department traffic by a release or other system whenever authority for such control should be granted. In May 1941 the Commercial Traffic Branch of the Transportation Division began to exercise occasional informal control over the movement of certain quartermaster shipments of lend-lease supplies to ports where there were signs of approaching congestion, by designating dates for shipment from origin points. In August War Department Circular No. 182 was issued amending AR 30-905.²⁷ This circular prescribed that no shipment of War Department freight amounting to one carload or more, destined overseas, should be made unless a "shipping release and routing" had been issued by the Quartermaster General. It had the effect of placing port-bound shipments of one carload or more under control, formalizing the use of release dates, and bringing shipments of War Department supplies for both Army and lend-lease purposes under the same form of regulation.

The troublous weeks which followed our entrance into the war soon demonstrated that control of War Department port-bound traffic alone was not enough. If the lend-lease supplies shipped by the Treasury Department and the Department of Agriculture, and the supplies of the Navy, were permitted to move into the ports without regulation, it seemed inevitable that the feared congestion would be realized. In fact it was very quickly realized at San Francisco and New York, where before the end of December 1941 sufficient congestion had arisen to cause grave concern. At San Francisco it was the sudden influx of Army and Navy freight into a Port area of relatively limited capacity which caused the trouble. At New York it was principally lend-lease supplies for the British and Russians which accumulated in the railway and steamship terminals. The British had been maintaining a large bank of supplies at the ports which they used, in order to be able to meet all loading requirements without delay, and the bank grew rapidly as normal ship operations were interrupted during the early days of our belligerency.²⁸ The management of Russian lend-lease traffic had not attained a satisfactory degree of coordination, and changing priorities received from Moscow left supplies which had been brought to the port under pressure stranded there because other commodities had become of greater immediate importance.

At a staff meeting called by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, on December 10, 1941, it was agreed that an endeavor should be made to control the shipments of other federal agencies to the ports by "cooperative means." On December 11, 1941, a meeting was held in the office of the Secretary of Agriculture, at which the primary interest of the Army in the maintenance of liquid ports was recognized and the departments of Treasury and Agriculture agreed to honor any request which the War Department might make in respect to the movement of their lend-lease traffic. This informal arrangement was helpful, but the control was not sufficiently complete and precise to meet the requirements of the situation.

The Transportation Branch of G-4, with the aid of the Transportation Division, OQMG, maintained constant contact during this period with the situation at the respective ports. Cars were held on the sidings outside the ports until the number in the port area could be reduced. Extensive use was made of open and covered storage to expedite the unloading and release of cars. At San Francisco, cars which already had reached the port were moved back to railway yards at Stockton, Sacramento, and other outlying cities. Army regulating stations were established at strategic points on the transcontinental railways for the purpose of holding or diverting port-bound cars upon request of the Western Defense Command. In the East, the

holding and reconsignment points at Marietta and Voorheesville, although not yet completed, were impressed into service. On January 26, 1942, the Adjutant General issued a memorandum reinforcing the control measures introduced by the above mentioned War Department Circular No. 182.²⁹

In order to relieve the port of New York, the Russian lend-lease operation was transferred first to Boston and then to Philadelphia. In each case the transfer was followed by threatened or actual port congestion. The situation in Philadelphia, which was perhaps the most serious of any of the East Coast, did not clear up until after Colonel Gross, during a visit to that port in March, had directed the Army Port Agency there to break the jam by whatever means might be found necessary.

The need for more effective control of port-bound shipments at the source soon became apparent to all agencies concerned, including the newly established War Shipping Administration and Office of Defense Transportation. In the middle of March 1942 these agencies joined the Army and Navy in the establishment of a Transportation Control Committee, composed of representatives of the four government departments and the British Ministry of War Transport. The Committee established ceilings for the amount of freight which might be shipped to the respective ports, by the issuance of monthly block permits. Unit releases for specific shipments could then be issued, by the agencies vested with that authority, but only so long as the block permits were not exceeded. The Transportation Control Committee also had broad police powers over port-bound traffic at all stages, under authority delegated by ODT, and could order shipments held or diverted as it might consider necessary. This authority naturally was not exercised to the extent of interfering with urgent military and naval shipments.

The subject of traffic control as it relates to the periods both before and after the formation of the Transportation Control Committee is an exceedingly intricate and interesting one, and will receive elsewhere more thorough treatment than can be given here. The presentation in this monograph has been confined to a bare outline of major developments in a field which the transportation unit of G-4 made one of its special concerns. It is appropriate to state that during the crucial winter months of 1941-42, the Transportation Branch of G-4., as well as the Transportation Divisions OQMG, leaned heavily upon the Association of American Railroads, whose entire organization, particularly the Port Traffic Office which had been established in New York in the fall of 1939 with a view to dealing with just such problems, was most helpful in providing traffic information upon which to base decisions and in carrying into effect decisions affecting railway operations.

RAIL, HIGHWAY AND AIR TRANSPORTATION

The reliance of the War Department upon the commercial carriers for transportation within the United States, meant that a close liaison was necessary with those carriers. Prior to our entrance into the war this liaison was maintained chiefly through the Quartermaster General, since this office was responsible for day-to-day traffic operations. However, as the year 1941 progressed and concern began to be felt in various quarters regarding the ability of the transportation system

to cope with the growing requirements, the Transportation Branch, G-4, took a more active part in relations with the carriers. This was accomplished for the most part through contacts with the associations of carriers which maintained headquarters in Washington - notably the Association of American Railroads, American Trucking Associations, National Association of Motor Bus Operators and Air Transport Association of America.

The Railroads.

Prior to the United States becoming an active belligerent, at least 95 per cent of the Army's inland traffic moving by commercial carrier was handled by the railways. So adequate was the railway services however, and so forehanded had the railroads been in planning for the emergency, that no serious problems arose during that period. The Transportation Branch kept a watchful eye upon the supply of rolling stock, particularly after the crop movement in the fall of 1941 had brought to attention how heavy might be the load placed upon the carriers by an expanding military traffic superimposed upon the basic civilian economy, and exhorted the railroads against too conservative a policy in the ordering of new equipment. Because of the shortage of Pullman cars, the Branch supported a proposal that the Army requirement of sleeping car accommodations for troops making overnight trips be waived in connection with maneuvers when only one night of travel was involved. Proposed railway abandonments were scrutinized from the standpoint of the potential value of the trackage involved to the Army, and supported or opposed as the circumstances warranted. The ability of the transcontinental rail-ways to absorb the traffic that would be thrown upon them in case the intercoastal steamship services should be withdrawn was explored before that proposal of the Maritime Commission was acquiesced in.

As has been indicated above, the outbreak of hostilities placed the Transportation Branch in a position where it felt obliged, in view of its responsibilities, to take a very active part in directing transportation operations. Among the most immediate and pressing of its problems was that of preventing congestion at the ports and keeping the flow of supplies to the seaboard within the volume which the available shipping could move overseas. Since this subject has been dealt with in a general way in the preceding chapter, and will be touched upon again with particular reference to the Pacific Coast, it need not be elaborated here.

While it was important to keep the ports and the transportation lines liquid, it was important also to see that shipments of high priority supplies were moved with the utmost dispatch. To this end the Transportation Branch required "passing reports" from the railroads showing the movement of port-bound cars and other critical shipments. These reports were required first at two-hour intervals on a 24-hour basis, and then, as this frequency was found impractical, on a daily basis. During the period of about eight weeks that they were submitted, the reports were used by the Branch as a basis for expediting, diverting and reconsigning shipments as such action was found necessary.

During this period the supply arms and services found themselves under great pressure to make immediate deliveries to posts, camps and stations, and particularly to ports of embarkation. It was only natural that they should undertake to expedite their shipments by calling upon the

railroads for special service. So numerous were these requests, and so disturbing to the railroads, that G-4 found it necessary to call an early halt. By a letter of December 19, 1941, prepared in the Transportation Branch for the signature of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the president of the Association of American Railroads was authorized to advise all railroads to ignore requests for special service, except those originating with the Office of the Quartermaster General and filed through the Military Transportation Section of the Association. The Adjutant General sent appropriate instructions to all Army installations. It soon was found advisable to modify this arrangement so as to permit the Ordnance Department to file direct requests for special service and tracing in connection with materials and component parts moving between private manufacturers and ordnance establishments, or vice versa, in view of the great complexity of ordnance manufacture and the continual adjustment of requirements.³⁰

The railroads reported that the transportation officers at stations from which troop movements were contemplated sometimes called in railway equipment before the date of departure was fixed, thereby keeping the cars idle unnecessarily. The Transportation Branch recommended to G-3 that in all warning orders and movement orders a clause be inserted requiring that railway equipment be not ordered until information as to actual time of departure had been received. To expedite entraining and detraining, G-3 was requested to direct field commanders and corps area commanders to give troops advance training in these operations and it was arranged that the railroads would furnish cars for this purpose at major stations.

Certain states had laws or regulations regarding the length or make-up of trains, which if enforced might adversely affect important troop movements. After consideration of various means of overcoming this possible handicap, a directive was issued over the signature of the Chief of Staff, providing that whenever the make-up or length of a train was otherwise satisfactory to the railway officials and the commanding officer of troops, but was counter to the laws or regulations of a state through which the train would pass, the commanding officer of troops would issue to the railroad representative a "request" in which he would indicate the military necessity which was responsible for such train length or makeup.³¹ This statement from the Army was considered adequate to protect the railroad involved from punitive action by state authorities.

Highway Transportation.

The commercial motor carriers, in contrast with the railways, constituted a relatively new industry, and it was not nearly so well integrated. The organic motor equipment of the Army itself was undergoing a tremendous expansion, which inevitably would bring problems in its wake. As already indicated, a motor transportation expert was added to the staff of G-4 in the fall of 1940, as part of the Transportation Section, Requirements and Distribution Branch. When Lt. Colonel Gross, shortly after assuming charge of the Transportation Section, recommended that a Transportation Branch be established in G-4, he expressed the view that "the requirements, distribution and maintenance of motor transportation" should remain under the Requirements and Distribution Branch "pending further decision."³² Accordingly, the Motor and Air Unit of the Transportation Branch concerned itself initially with such matters as highway utilization,

movement control and employment of private vehicles. Annex I, however, indicates that subsequently this scope was considerably broadened.

The activities of the Motor and Air Unit, and its successor, the Motor Section, were closely identified with those of the Highway Traffic Advisory Committee. This committee had been set up in accordance with a proposal of the Secretary of War, put forward in December 1940, with Thomas H. Macdonald, Commissioner of Public Roads, as Chairman. The motor expert of the Transportation Section, and later the Transportation Branch, was a member. The committee served as a useful medium through which many highway problems of concern to the Army were studied and solutions developed. Advisory committees were set up in the several states, also, and during March 1941 nine regional meetings of these committees were held, in which the representative of G-4 participated.

Prominent among the problems then facing the War Department was that of establishing means of mobilizing the motor equipment of the nation for emergency service, if that should become necessary. Consequently one of the first proposals placed before the Committee by the Department called for a nation-wide inventory of trucks and buses, with information as to type, owner, location and present employment. Because so large a part of the motor equipment of the country was in the hands of small independent owners, who could not be reached through any central association, this inventory involved certain basic difficulties. However, the aid of state highway authorities was enlisted, questionnaires were distributed, and in a report to the Secretary of War, dated February 9, 1942, the Committee stated that the inventory was virtually completed. Fortunately the country did not have to endure invasion or mass bombings, so that it was never necessary to impress these privately owned vehicles into federal service.

Another matter of primary interest to the War Department, and in which the Transportation Branch took an active part, was securing the cooperation of state and local highway officials in regulating and facilitating the movement of military motor convoys over the public highways.

In a memorandum to Colonel Gross, dated April 25, 1941, the motor traffic expert of the Branch referred to the Army maneuvers contemplated for the summer and recommended that a study of results be made to ascertain whether the planning and execution had been satisfactory from both military and civilian standpoints, and with a view to improving the techniques included in Army training circulars. In its report to the Secretary of War, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Highway Traffic Advisory Committee stated that the state advisory committees had collaborated fully in this study, and that considerable data had been assembled regarding routes, physical limitations of the highways, bivouac areas, water supply, hospitals, etc.

The need for careful study of traffic control equipment and techniques was recognized by G-4. Following tests which were made with the 4th Division during July 1941 maneuvers, the motor traffic representative of the Transportation Branch reported that information had been obtained on 32 control devices, including portable traffic signals, black-out road delineators, blackout headlights, etc., some of which were believed to have definite possibilities. The tests were to continue until September, covering all phases of the problem, after which an Infantry Board report would be rendered. Infantry Board Report No. 1252, dated September 8, 1941, was passed to various offices in the War Department for comment. The Chief of Infantry's

endorsement referred to the recent appointment of a Provost Marshal General, within whose province military traffic control presumably would come, and returned the report without recommendation. The Provost Marshal, in a final (eleventh) endorsement commented at some length on the findings of the Board and indicated certain lines of future development which he considered necessary. The tests made and the experience gained at this period were taken into account in the revision of FM 25-10, Basic Field Manual - Motor Transport, issued March 12, 1942.

The ability of the commercial motor carriers to assemble sufficient equipment and to properly execute a mass movement of troops was untested prior to January 1941. In that month the concentration of the 153rd Infantry Regiment, Arkansas National Guard, at Camp Robinson by bus and truck, was ordered with a view to giving this method a trial. The motor traffic representative of G-4, who was present as an observer, reported that the movement was successful, considering that it was the first of its kind. However, since only about 1800 men were involved and the distances ranged only from 25 to 200 miles, it was considered desirable that a further test be made with more men and over a greater distance. This was accomplished in the following September, when the 28th Division was moved by motor from Indiantown Gap, Pa., to Lisleville, NC. A portion of the division, 2,460 troops and their impedimenta, moved in 143 commercial buses and trucks. The trip of 530 miles involved three overnight stops. Had the exigencies of the war required the repeated employment of motor carriers to effect troop unit movements, the experience gained from these trials would have been of great value.

The commercial motor carriers long had complained against the uneven regulations of the states affecting the sizes and weights of vehicles moving over their highways, and particularly against the regulations of certain states, which seemed unnecessarily restrictive. When emergency movements of war materials were held up at state borders because the trucks were too large or too heavily loaded, the problem became a practical one for the War Department. The Interstate Commerce Commission had made an exhaustive study of this subject, and rendered a report in 1940, but no action had been taken. A series of discussions arranged by the Transportation Commissioner, Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, resulted in a plan to approach the Governors of the states which were most troublesome, and from a standpoint of national necessity solicit their intervention in the direction of a relaxation of the restrictions. This program produced slow and uneven, but helpful results.

When war came, motor problems of another nature crowded to the fore. In view of the large number of nested vehicles moving overseas, steps were taken to develop methods of nesting which would make most economical use of ship space. Measures were taken also to assure that set-up vehicles and other automotive equipment passing through the ports were given the tests and servicing necessary to prepare such equipment for immediate employment upon arrival overseas. Each division or higher unit and each corps area, port of embarkation or similar administrative headquarters provided with a general staff was required to designate an Assistant G-4, to be known as the "Automotive Officer", who would be responsible to the commander for automotive training and maintenance.³³ A study was undertaken looking to the greater standardization of chassis. It thus appears that, up to the reorganization which took place on March 9, 1942, the Transportation Branch of G-4 viewed its responsibilities in relation to both highway traffic and the organic motor equipment of the Army in a very broad way.

Air Transportation.

The G-4 interest in air transportation was made a matter of record in a memorandum from the Adjutant General, April 12, 1941, addressed jointly to G-3 and G-4, charging the former with “policies pertaining to foreign air lines and the determination of the necessity for the construction of aviation facilities in foreign countries”, and G-4 with responsibility for “General Staff matters pertaining to commercial air transportation and facilities within the continental limits of the United States and its possessions.”³⁴ Accordingly, when the Civil Aeronautics Board in April and May invited the Secretary of War to submit comments or recommendations upon certain applications for certificates to operate air services, the matters were referred to G-4 and recommendations were prepared in the Transportation Branch.

The Air Corps found itself out of sympathy with this procedure, and recommended that responsibility in connection with matters pertaining to commercial air transportation be transferred to it. The Transportation Branch vigorously opposed this, and in a memorandum of May 27, 1941, sent to the Chief of Staff over the signature of the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, it pointed out that, while not concerned with technical developments, G-4 was concerned with the “utilization and control of all means of transportation”, and that in view of the growing activity in air transport, control of it should rest in G-4.³⁴ This point of view prevailed, and held good against growing pressure for more than a year.

A natural result of this attitude was the inclusion of a “Motor and Air Unit” in the first organization chart of the new Transportation Branch, issued May 26, 1941. There was little activity in this field, however, and reference to air disappeared from the organization chart until after our entry into the war. On December 23, 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, requested the Chief of Transportation Branch to establish an Air Section, “so that routine procedure is set up for utilizing commercial air lines and available planes of the Air Corps for emergency transportation of supplies, equipment and personnel”. The G-4 memorandum added: “This will require a very active and energetic handling as the Air Corps supplies are not only extremely critical, but must move fast if they are to accomplish the purpose.” An Air Section was established forthwith.

The President, on December 14, 1941, by Executive Order issued pursuant to Public Law No. 328, 77th Congress, approved December 8, 1941, directed the Secretary of Commerce “to exercise his control and jurisdiction over civil aviation, in accordance with the requirements for the successful prosecution of the war as may be requested by the Secretary of War”. In the light of this Order is to be read a further note from G-4 to the Transportation Branch, January 8, 1942, which said in part: “The central office recommended in our joint Memorandum for the Control of Civil Aeronautics will be established in the Department of Commerce under General Connolly on January 15, 1942. Please arrange to detail officers to operate the G-4 functions of the office; namely, the establishment of priorities and assignment of space, on a 24-hour basis.” An officer

from the Transportation Branch was included in the personnel list of the "Military Director of Civil Aviation", issued on the day the office began functioning.

On January 18, 1942, G-4 requested the Adjutant General to notify the commanders of field forces, armies, corps areas, and the chiefs of services and other War Department agencies, regarding the establishment of this new office, and that "The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, is charged with establishing priorities of space assignments for personnel and cargo on domestic air carriers". The records indicate that G-4, through the Transportation Branch, also obtained space from the Air Corps Ferry Command and established priorities for Army missions proceeding overseas by air. In Directive No. 3, issued by the Military Director of Civil Aviation on February 5, 1942, certain "Priority classes" were set forth for the White House, Army, Navy and other federal agencies covering certain categories of both personnel and freight. The Directive provided that when a particular case was not clearly covered by a directive, the government agency concerned would establish the priority through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

The war brought a quick appreciation of the importance of air transport and the necessity of building up the air transport fleet. After the reorganization of March 9, 1942, both the Transportation Service, S.O.S., and the Air Transport Command, A. A. F., undertook studies of requirements and service potentialities, and began to assemble staffs for the administration of air transport matters. This dual development was cut short by an agreement between the commanding generals of the Services of Supply and the Army Air Forces in June 1942, to the effect that the Air Forces would take over the air transport function, including priorities on commercial lines.

EMERGENCY IN THE PACIFIC

Notwithstanding the preparations made in anticipation of war, when the event came it precipitated many new problems. Ships which had put to sea were recalled and some cargoes were unloaded. Lend-lease supplies which were on the docks, and some which were in the ships' holds, had to be held pending determination of our ability to spare them for allied countries in view of our own new requirements. Ships scheduled for early sailing had to be held up for arming and degaussing. Convoy arrangements were slow because of the limited number of escort vessels available to the Navy. These circumstances, plus the impetuosity of shippers in moving supplies to the seaboard and the inadequacy of the traffic control arrangements then in effect, resulted in a certain amount of confusion and congestion at the principal ports, and necessitated vigorous counter measures.

While this was true on both Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the situation was especially acute in the latter case. On the one hand there were fewer large ports on the western seaboard, and their capacity for handling export traffic was much less than in the east. On the other hand, the

swiftness and decisiveness of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the destruction or neutralization of so much of our naval power, and the relatively unprotected state of our other widespread bases in the Pacific, threw upon the Pacific coast ports and the transcontinental rail lines a burden of unprecedented dimensions. Here then was an immediate and supreme test for the entire shipping organization of the Army, and particularly for G-4, which assumed the ultimate responsibility for dealing with the problem.

The principal burden of the westbound traffic upsurge fell upon San Francisco. That was the chief shipping port for Hawaii and the Far East; it was also the headquarters of the Western Defense Command and site of a general depot. By the end of December the number of

To understand the importance of and the unremitting pressure upon the port of San Francisco, some idea of what was going on in the Pacific Theaters is necessary. It is necessary, also, to bear in mind that San Francisco was the chief west coast port of the Navy, which shared the facilities about half-and-half with the Army.

Hawaiian Requirements.

Following the Japanese attack, the Hawaiian Department immediately came forward with heavy demands; repair of bomb damage had to be effected, new defenses built and the garrisons greatly strengthened. Every effort was bent toward dispatching three fast ships (Matsonia,

A memorandum to Colonel Gross from the Deputy Chief of the Transportation Branch, dated January 27, 1942, paraphrased a radiogram received from Honolulu in which the requirements of the Hawaiian Islands for military and civilian purposes during the ensuing three months were

Defense of the Philippines

The increasing tension in relations with Japan resulted in a decision in mid-October 1941 to speed up the augmentation of strengthen the Philippines. The plan was to forward about 500,000 measurement tons of freight and about 20,000 troops as quickly as the supplies and men could be assembled and shipping provided. On October 18th a meeting of representatives of all supply services was held in the offices of the Transportation Branch, G-4, the urgency of the situation was stressed and general plans for effecting the movement were outlined. The Transportation Branch assigned an officer to follow through on these arrangements, and requested the Quartermaster General to designate an individual to give special attention to the coordination of freight and shipping, in order to carry out the assignment with the utmost speed and efficiency.

Production lags and commitments in other directions made it difficult for most of the supply services to make allocations to the Philippine Department promptly. There were motors aplenty, but little weight cargo to balance the lightness of the vehicles. Steps were taken to bring Army transports into position for this movement as promptly as possible. Additional vessels were chartered and space was booked on commercial sailings as rapidly as the cargo became available. Shipments were scheduled from San Francisco, Seattle, Portland (Oregon), New Orleans and Charleston, (S.C.). The bulk of the movement began in mid-November and was expected to continue into January.

When word of the attack on Pearl Harbor was received, six troop ships and nine cargo vessels in the Philippine service were at sea. Word was flashed to them to proceed to the nearest friendly port. Four of the troop ships returned to San Francisco and two eventually reached

Following the Japanese invasion of the islands, many attempts were made to land troops and supplies in the Philippines, but there was insufficient naval and air strength to successfully cope with the Japanese blockade, and only three vessels which were dispatched from Australia were successful in reaching their destination. The amount of supplies which could be flown in was too small to appreciably affect the course of events.

New Pacific Bases.

The necessity of constructing bases and establishing forces in the South and Southwest Pacific, including the air ferry route from Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand, presented a tremendous transportation problem. The scarcity of ships, the great distances to be covered, the

The importance of Australia as the southern anchor of the United Nations' defense in the Pacific was quickly apparent as the hope of holding the Philippines faded. The limited military resources of Australia itself, and the steady southward surge of the Japanese, called for immediate large movements of American troops and supplies and created a major transportation crisis. Studies prepared in the Transportation Branch disclosed that by using the large, fast British liners, troop requirements could be met, but that to obtain the necessary cargo ships, certain Army and lend-lease programs in the Atlantic would have to be curtailed. On at least two occasions, once in the middle of January and again in mid-February, the problem was carried to the White House, in order that maximum contributions of ships might be obtained from the

The fact that ships sailed for Australia from the east as well as the west coast, and the scarcity of escort vessels, made convoy arrangements difficult. On December 26, 1941, after a conference with Navy officials, Colonel Gross reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,

Even when the utmost had been accomplished in the assignment of ships to the Australian run and the arrangement of convoys, the tonnage which could be lifted fell far short of the amounts requested. In addition to strictly military supplies, a great amount of construction material and

equipment was sought. In a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated January 8, 1942, G-4 pointed out that shipping space would not be available for many months for transporting the construction materials and equipment requested, and urged that less elaborate construction undertakings be planned and that Australian and East Indian resources be used as far as possible.³⁶

The demand for airplanes in Australia was especially urgent in view of threatened Japanese invasion. On January 8, 1942, G-3 drafted a radiogram to the U. S. Commander stating that Air Forces requirements which had been submitted evidently were based on long range planning, and that "our critical shortage in shipping definitely limits for the present the dispatch of personnel and supplies to those absolutely necessary for effective air and anti-air operations of the immediate future". On January 28th the Chief of Staff assured the Australian Minister in the United States that the War Department had sent or was sending to Australia every fighter airplane for which shipping space was available. The Transportation Branch exploited every possible means of placing more planes on the ships which sailed. Also, more ships gradually became available for the service, so that on February 9th the Assistant Chief of Staff was able to state, for the moment at least: "There is more than adequate space available for all planes scheduled for shipment to Pacific stations during February."³⁷

Added to the other handicaps were the delays arising from slow discharge in the Australian ports. There was a shortage of labor, and a high degree of unionization rendered it practically impossible to increase the rate of discharge by native longshoremen. Dispatch of a port battalion from the United States was recommended by G-4 on January 26, 1942, and a movement order for the 394th was issued on February 7th. About this time also the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Australia was informed of assignment to him of a "Quartermaster" to assist in supply and transportation matters, and other experienced transportation officers. In transmitting this information, the Chief of Staff referred to the critical shipping situation, and stated his desire that the new staff give prompt attention to a survey of port and warehouse facilities, a survey of the items of supply which could be procured locally, the chartering of boats in the Australian area for coastwise service to relieve American shipping of this burden, the expediting of the handling of American vessels in Australian ports, and liaison with the Maritime Commission representative in Australia to insure the effective use of returning ships for lifting strategic imports.³⁸

In the early stages of the build-up of the United States Army Forces in Australia, certain weaknesses in shipping procedure showed up, which the Transportation Branch took steps to overcome. In a telegram to the New York and San Francisco ports of embarkation, sent February 17, 1942, reference was made to a report from Australia indicating that cargoes had been arriving in badly scrambled condition, which, because of the scarcity of small vessels for transshipment and lack of dock space for storing, was causing considerable difficulty and delay.

Sometimes troop units and their organizational equipment arrived at destination in separate convoys. The ports were urged to employ "unit loading" whenever possible, to take such steps as they could to insure that organizational equipment arrived at the port of embarkation with the

troops and was clearly marked, and in cases where these conditions were not fulfilled before arrival at the port, to take such remedial steps as could be taken.

The problems arising in connection with the movement of troops and supplies to Australia were repeated and sometimes multiplied in establishing and maintaining new bases in the South Pacific Area. Here the Navy was in command and a degree of understanding and coordination exceeding anything hitherto achieved had to be worked out between the two services. This is well illustrated by events connected with the sailing of Army forces for the occupation of New Caledonia. The troops themselves sailed from New York in January 23, 1942, most of their equipment and supplies were shipped from west coast ports, and both were to be landed

Alaska.

Unlike events in the South and Southwest Pacific, which broke with startling suddenness, the developments in Alaska were gradual, although naturally greatly intensified after we became belligerents. The strengthening of our North Pacific flank began soon after the Nazi conquest of western Europe, and was prompted largely by the uncertainty of Russia's place in the alignment of nations. In August 1940 the Transportation unit of G-4 arranged a meeting with Dr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the noted Arctic explorer, in order to obtain the benefit of his knowledge of conditions and his views regarding possible developments in our northern territory. Dr. Stefansson's experience, which was sought on several occasions thereafter, was of value particularly as regards to the interior of Alaska.

From a transportation standpoint the increased military importance of Alaska was first reflected in the establishment of a port organization at Seattle in January 1941, in order to relieve San Francisco of the burden of supplying the Alaskan Department and to shorten the sea route.

Improvements in port facilities at Seward at the southern terminus of the Alaskan Railroad, as well as other ports were studied, and the construction of a new port at Whittier on a branch of the railway was advocated. The acquisition of a goodly number of small boats for service in Alaskan harbors and coastal waters was approved. The possibility of using Prince Rupert, B. C., as an outlet for troops and supplies moving northward was studied, but the question was held in abeyance until after we entered the war.

The outbreak of war in the Pacific precipitated many developments which the Transportation Branch had considered as possibilities. Very promptly, upon urgent request of the Quartermaster General, a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of Interior was prepared, requesting the latter to instruct the manager of the Alaskan Railroad to carry out such instructions as might be issued by the Western Defense Command relative to the movement of traffic over the facilities of the railroad (which included port installations), and to advise him of the intentions of the War Department to augment the existing facilities.³⁹ The Seattle Port of Embarkation was

authorized to open sub-ports at Prince Rupert, Juneau and Skagway, and a barge line between Seattle and its sub-ports was initiated.

The depletion of our naval strength by the disaster at Pearl Harbor created a doubt in the minds of some as to our ability to retain control of the Gulf of Alaska, and led to speculation as to how our defense of that territory could be maintained if the port at Seward, Anchorage and Whittier should be lost. The barge line on the sheltered waterway was a partial answer to this question, but its limitations were recognized. The proposal for an international highway from a point on the Canadian National Railway to Fairbanks was revived, and, War Department opposition to this proposal having been removed, the project made rapid progress. Construction was begun in the spring of 1942 and the road, commonly known as the Alcan Highway, was opened for through traffic before the following winter. A proposal to construct a railroad approximately paralleling the highway also was considered, but it did not materialize, primarily because of the time element and the large amount of steel which it would deflect from other essential industries, including that of shipbuilding.

MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

Obviously the foregoing is only a sketch, intended to show the general scope and nature of the activities of the Transportation Branch. Broadly it is to be kept in mind that all changes in War Department policies and procedures relating to transportation, and all major operating developments, were initiated or reviewed in this branch prior to consideration by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. A few such matters, which have not been included in the above discussion, are mentioned below.

The Transportation Branch concerned itself with the many proposals before Congress which might affect the transportation interests of the War Department. For example, active support was given to the bill which was under consideration during the summer of 1941, to authorize

The supervision which the Transportation Branch undertook to exercise over ports of embarkation and other activities in the field was not of the arm-chair variety. As the increase in the staff made field trips possible, an extensive program of inspections was undertaken, covering both installations under construction and installations in operation.

Particularly after we entered the war, security considerations required attention. Commanders of ports were instructed to withhold from both military and civilian passengers the names of vessels and sailing dates. One interesting aspect was the necessity of providing foreign currencies for officers moving overseas, since their applications to the banks had the effect of indicating the approximate time and the destination of troop movements. Code markings for overseas freight shipments were initiated.

In peacetime supplies were shipped overseas by the ports of embarkation as they were sent forward by the supply arms and services. Shipping was adequate and the question of priority of movement did not arise frequently. However, the ports undertook to follow such requests for preferred handling as were made by the procuring services or by the commanders of overseas departments. After the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision of the United States to strengthen the overseas department and extend its outlying bases, this situation was changed.

Shipping became increasingly scarce and the volume of freight to be moved grew rapidly, so that a backlog was built up at the ports. The Quartermaster General recommended that priority lists be established, and G-4 acted accordingly. In March 1941 the overseas departments were informed that the priorities which they had submitted for war reserve included so many articles in the first category that shipment of even this freight would be delayed, while no priorities had been set up for articles for current consumption; and that the War Department henceforth would

The priority lists, which were prepared thereafter in the Transportation Branch of G-4 on a semi-monthly basis, took into account requests received from the department commanders and from the supply arms and services, as well as suggestions from the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Copies were sent by G-4 to the Quartermaster General, the port commanders, and the department commanders. Soon after we entered the war the arrangements for overseas supply underwent extensive revision, provision being made for automatic shipment by the ports of certain classes of supplies, while other classes were to be shipped upon requisition of the theater commanders.⁴² It was recognized, however, that under the pressure of conditions then existing, it still was necessary for the War Department to publish priorities so that the ports

Overseas commanders complained that ship's manifests did not contain sufficient information to enable them to analyze the cargo after the manifests had been received by air mail, and to promptly locate critical items upon arrival of the ships. The Quartermaster General accordingly was instructed to see that the ports of embarkation obtained the necessary equipment and personnel to enable them to prepare detailed manifests prior to the vessels sailing. In addition to the assistance which this manifest would give to the ship's master and the overseas commanders, it was expected also to serve the port of embarkation as a basis for dispatching replacement supplies in case the vessel should be lost.

The provision of landing boats for troops and equipment used in amphibious operations was a Navy responsibility, but since Army forces usually were involved in such operations the War Department had a direct interest. Colonel Ross attended meetings of the Navy's Auxiliary Vessels Board. A note in the G-4 files., dated October 19, 1941, states that Colonel Ross had been requested informally by the Board to furnish it with a list of the "critical loads of the Army necessary for the Navy to handle in amphibian operations and to indicate whether such loads must be handled in the initial phase or subsequent thereto."

The need for a large number of port battalions for overseas service was foreseen when we entered the war. The task of activating and training then fell upon the established ports of embarkation. The necessity for special training for the officers of such units was recognized and plans were discussed in an endorsement of January 8, 1942, from Colonel Gross to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. In a memorandum to port commanders written February 23, 1942, Colonel

Gross warned that when such officers and units had been trained and ordered overseas, no requests would be entertained for the transfer of key personnel from the units to the port organizations in this country.

ANNEX I

ANNEX II

Officer Personnel
TRANSPORTATION BRANCH
Supply Division (G-4), General Staff
February 21, 1942

Col. C. P. Gross, Chief of Branch
Col. A. L. Hamblen, Deputy Chief of Branch

Exec. & Admin Section

Hodson
Soule
Harder

Port & Water Section

Ross
Wylie
Koch
Vissering
Worthington
Meyer
Farr
Poorman
Bryan
Dingle
Palmerlee, A. S.
Palmerlee, T. R.

Air Priorities & Assignment Section

Williams
Teberg
Conine
Miller
Arnold

Defense Aid Section

Coe
Mathews

Planning Section

Stokes
Tank
Shuman

Movement Section

Black
Duerr
Schiska
Yost, L. A.
Luongo
Bigbee
Newland
Cress

Rail Section

McIntyre
Kreidel
Brisbane
Greiner

Motor Section

Shugg
Heyduck

Coon
Bell
Dixon

van den Berg
Smuck
Weaver
Kates
Yost, L. B.
Wetzel

ANNEX III

Functions of
TRANSPORTATION BRANCH
Supply Division (G-4), General Staff

January 19, 1942

TRANSPORTATION BRANCH: G-4 functions pertaining to all forms of transportation, ports of embarkation, and staging areas, except construction thereat.

Planning Section: Transportation planning and preparation of statistical data in connection with the execution of war plans and defense projects. Coordination of plans pertaining to the several sections of the Branch.

Port and Water Section: Research and development of water transportation and ports of embarkation. Supervision of field activities to include aid in command of ports of embarkation, maintenance, operation, and allocation of service troops thereat. Determination of current and projected needs of water transportation, all classes. Announcement of priorities of shipments pertaining to overseas theaters, departments, and bases. Preparation of statistical data pertaining to overseas shipments.

Movement Section: Takes appropriate action to insure provision of transportation means by land and air for troops, arms and ammunition transferred or moved under War Dept. orders. Traces

and reports daily the movement or projected movement of troops, arms, and ammunition transported under War Dept. orders by land, sea, and air from point of origin to destination.

Defense Aid Section: Coordination of defense aid activities relating to transportation for all recipients of Defense Aid, except the United Kingdom and including US Military Missions.

Rail Section: Research and development of rail transportation. Priorities of rail shipments, Availability of rail transportation. Supervision of field activities and coordination thereof with American Association of Railroads. Ammunition terminals. Preparation of statistical data pertaining to rail shipment.

Motor Section: Requirements as to types, quantities, and procurement of motor vehicles, equipment and supplies. Expenditure programs. Controlled items. Present and future availability. Tables of Allowances in collaboration with the Supply Branch. Distribution, issue and maintenance of vehicles, equipment and supplies. Disposition and use of service troops in supply and maintenance. Location, allocation, and use of storage facilities. Supervision of depot operations. Traffic control and coordination with civilian traffic authorities. Coordination of technical training activities

Legal and Fiscal Section: Prepares studies and actions pertaining to matters and legislation in connection with transportation function of the Branch. Coordination of fiscal matters and budget estimates of the Transportation Supply Division.

Note: The above is taken from a functional chart issued by G-4. There is no evidence that the Legal and Fiscal Section was activated.

FOOTNOTE PAGE

¹ AR 10-15, Section I, Paragraph 11c, August 18, 1936

² In the Initial Directive for the Organization of the Services of Supply, March 9, 1942, the term "Transportation Division", was used, but very shortly the designation was changed to "Transportation Service", and eventually, as functions were added, to "Transportation Corps".

³ The pertinent regulations were AR 10-15, AR 30-5, AR 30-905.

⁴ Because of its scope, the full text of the memorandum of January 23, 1941 is given in Annex IV. The quotation is from The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended, Section 5.

⁵ AR 30-1110

- ⁶ Jurisdiction over United States Army Transport Service, Lt. Colonel Keyes to General Tyner, G-4/29717-35.
- ⁷ AG 612 (12-16-41)MB-D-M. Under the Initial Directives for the Organization of the Services of Supply, March 9, 1942, the ports of embarkation and their staging areas were placed under the control of the new Transportation Division.
- ⁸ See memorandum of July 26, 1940, from the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-03, file G-4/30557-11.
- ⁹ See memorandum G-4 to TAG, April 5, 1941, file G-4/30557-11 and G-4 to G-3, April 7, 1941, file G-3/19152 (2-28-41)
- ¹⁰ The file leaves doubt as to whether this memorandum was delivered to the Chief of Staff, but the fact that it was signed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, indicates that the substance was approved.
- ¹¹ File G-4/29717-81
- ¹² According to a statement prepared in the Transportation Branch of G-4, on October 10, 1941, the Navy on that date had 11 combat loaders already converted and expected to convert 6 more of its own transports and 10 of the Army's, making a total of 27, all to be ready by June 30, 1942.
- ¹³ Files G-4/29717-51, QM 570 T-W-C(Army Transports).
- ¹⁴ The ship designated to retain its Navy crew was scheduled for conversion to a combat loader, and as such would be crewed by the Navy.
- ¹⁵ File G-4/29717-51
- ¹⁶ Files G-4/29367-102, QM 544.2T-CT, Foreign Registry.
- ¹⁷ See memorandum from G-4 to Chief of Staff, July 9, 1942, file G-4/29717-26.
- ¹⁸ It is interesting as a reflection of the expanding program to note that, as compared with this figure of 2,317,900 DWT (say, 4,600,000 MT), an estimate of total overseas tonnage for the fiscal year 1942 prepared two months later in the office of the Quartermaster General, with the cooperation of the supply arms and services, arrived at a figure of 8,600,000 MT.
- ¹⁹ File G-4/29717-86
- ²⁰ File G-4/33473

- ²¹ File G-4/29717-116
- ²² File G-4/29717-116
- ²³ File G-4/29717-26
- ²⁴ See memorandum from Lt. Colonel R. H. Wylie to Colonel Gross, reporting on the meeting. This problem of balancing the fleet as between troop carriers, dry cargo ships and tankers was a continuing one. First the heavy losses of freighters and tankers due to concentrated submarine activities in the Atlantic disturbed the planned equilibrium. Then when losses had been reduced by anti-submarine measures, the rapidly mounting output of cargo vessels placed that type of shipping ahead of others. An extensive program of conversions from freighters to troopships then was launched. An effective balance was accomplished late in 1943.
- ²⁵ Memorandum to Chief of Construction and Real Estate Branch, File G-4/32582-8
- ²⁶ File G-4/33618-3.
- ²⁷ AR 30-905 required War Department shippers to obtain routing orders from the Quartermaster General for all shipments of 2 carloads or more.
- ²⁸ On March 2, 1942, Colonel Gross stated in a memorandum to Brigadier Kerr of the British Army Mission: "It is apparent, I think, that the British Mission can no longer enjoy the large bank of cars in ports and vicinity to which they have been accustomed before the war declaration." Brigadier Kerr was requested to exert his influence to reduce the flow of cars to the ports to accord with the shipping available.
- ²⁹ The requirements of the circular had not been made fully effective up to this time. The Association of American Railroads recommended the extension of the same control to shipments moving to inland destination, but the Transportation Branch did not consider this necessary. See letter from Deputy Chief of Staff to J. J. Pelley, President of A.A.R., January 31, 1942, File G-4/33827-3.
- ³⁰ Memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, to Chief of Ordnance, December 30, 1941, file G-4/33858.
- ³¹ War Department Circular No. 269, December 26, 1941.
- ³² Memorandum to Colonel Mallon, Executive Officer of G-4, April 5, 1941.
- ³³ AG 210.61 Gen. Staff (1-18-42) MT-M-D, January 21, 1942.

- ³⁴ AG 312.33 (3-31-41) M-D.
- ³⁵ File G-4/32910.
- ³⁶ File G-4/33861
- ³⁷ Memorandum to General Harmon from General Somervell, Shipment of Airplanes.
- ³⁸ See letter of February 6, 1942.
- ³⁹ Letter dated December 20, 1941, file, G-4/33820.
- ⁴⁰ An outline of the development of this proposal from 1930 is given in a memorandum from Captain C. R. Weaver of the Transportation Branch to Colonel Gross, December 8, 1941, and a memorandum from Colonel Gross to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, December 10th. The latter memorandum indicates that Colonel Gross was then opposed to the highway on the ground that it was expected to require two years for completion.
- ⁴¹ Memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, to Adjutant General, March 17, 1941, File G-4/32742.
- ⁴² AG 400 (1017-42) MSC-D-M, January 22, 1942.
- ⁴³ Memorandum from Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, to the Adjutant General et al., January 31, 1942, File G-4/32742. (See especially note for the record only).