

8TH TRANSPORTATION
GROUP



SEP 1968 - SEP 1969

COLONEL GARLAND A. LUDY

COMMANDING

INTRODUCTION

A tour of duty in South Vietnam is sometimes characterized by hard blistering work, sleepless nights, hot and humid weather, and days that blend into weeks and weeks into months. During the 12 month tour the 8th Combat Transportation Group soldier develops and maintains a sense of pride in his work, a lasting brotherhood with his fellow soldiers, and an acute sense of accomplishment of the mission of the United States Army in Vietnam.

The 8th Transportation Group have braved every horror and misfortune of war and weather. They have accomplished the impossible and are continuing to dramatize the professional attitude inherent in the Group.

Because of the continuing need for improved and timely logistical support techniques and information sensitive to the needs and goals of the United States Army Transportation Corps in Vietnam, this History will serve as a model rather than a guide.



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8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)

If one word had to be chosen to typify the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) in the period from 15 September 1968 to 14 September 1969, that word would be: efficiency. The basic mission of line haul throughout the Northern II Corp Tactical Zone actually expanded. Convoys ventured for the first time to exotic places like Cheo Reo, Le Boc, and Kon Bobanh. The enemy continued to apply pressure in the form of ambushes, sniping, and mining incidents. Yet, the 8th Group hauled more cargo, in more diverse form, than in any other twelve-month period since it has been in Vietnam.

The first problem that COL Garland A. Ludy tackled was the high deadline rate on 12 ton semi-trailers. Many of these workhorses had been in use for a year-and-a-half without any type of maintenance being performed on them. The solution was the Central Trailer Maintenance Facility (CTMF). Here, every trailer in the system is inspected, serviced, and refurbished on a quarterly basis. CTMF is headed by a maintenance Warrant officer under the direct supervision of the Group S-4. Physically located in the Charang Valley, just across the road from the Qui Nhon Trailer Transfer Point, personnel from both facilities work hand-in-glove to reduce the number of deadlined trailers. Since the CTMF has been operational, the average number of trailers on deadline each day has decreased from 35 to 8.

During this year, there were four separate events which broadened the 8th Group's area and concept of operations. In early December 1968, the support mission in the Tuy Hoa--Vung Ro Bay area was transferred from the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to the Qui Nhon Support Command. The two truck companies conducting port and beach clearance were attached to the 8th Group. After evaluating this generally disorganized operation, COL Ludy

agreed to the deactivation of the 529th Transportation Company (Light Truck Cargo) in Tuy Hoa, the transfer of its assets (particularly the 2½ ton cargo trucks) to the 545th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo), and the relocation of the 545th from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa. As a result, the mission which had previously been performed by two companies is now done more efficiently by one; an incidental benefit accrued to all 8th Group from the addition of the 545th Trans Co. The unit established a "mini-R&R" center on the beautiful Phu Hiep beach. This facility is used primarily as a reward for outstanding safe driving records, soldiers of the month, re-nelistees, and whomever a commander feels deserves a few days rest.

On the first of January 1969, the 359th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Petroleum) was attached to the 8th Group. The primary mission of this company was the line haul of bulk petroleum forward from Pleiku to Dak To, Polei Djereng, Kontum, and Ban Bleach. However, the erratic nature of the pipeline often requires the tankers to go back to the tank farms in An Khe and Qui Nhon to load their products. The tankers have been smoothly integrated into 8th Group convoys and operational planning. When petroleum commitments are slack, the 359th tractors can be utilized to haul semi-trailers. Contrariwise, when there is a great demand for petroleum, tractors from other medium truck companies can pull additional tankers. Such a situation arose in mid-February when the petroleum stocks in Pleiku reached critical levels. In fact, 25 additional tankers were issued to other 8th Group units from depot stocks. These tankers have remained in the group and provided added flexibility in the movement of bulk petroleum.

In late January and early February, two provisional truck platoons were organized from assets within the Qui Nhon Support Command. Manned entirely by personnel not in line haul units, the complete operation was placed under the control of the 8th Group S-3. The experiment proved that with proper supervision, the transportation capability of a Support Command

could be substantially increased. An outgrowth of this experiment resulted in a heavy-lift platoon being formed and permanently attached to the 8th Group's 54th Battalion. The unit consists of 12 ten ton tractors, 6 twenty-five ton lowboys, and 6 fifty ton tank transporters. Due to the generally slower pace of these vehicles, they form their own convoys and have been known to accumulate 40,000 ton/miles a day.

COL Ludy never hesitated to move units to meet ever changing situations. One of his first acts as Group Commander was to move the 88th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) and the 28th Transportation Platoon (Light Truck) from the 124th Battalion to the 27th Battalion, increasing the utilization of both units and creating a more efficient line haul system. The 505th Transportation Detachment (TTP) in Cha Rang was detached from the 27th Battalion in Phu Thanh and attached to the 54th Battalion also in Cha Rang. The significant decrease in trailer turnaround time bespeaks the intelligent application of unity of command.

In September 1968, the 512th Transportation Company (Light Truck) was sent TDY to Cam Ranh Bay to alleviate a severe backlog of cargo which had developed. In addition to introducing the guntruck to a sister Support Command, the 512th set numerous tonnage records during the 45day period. On a rainy afternoon in Ban Me Thout, the 8th Group convoys met--one having ventured south from Pleiku and the other west from Cam Ranh. This duo resupply of an area well outside the group's normal area of operation vividly demonstrates the versatility of the 8th Group.

On the first of August, the group was finally assigned a helicopter for its exclusive use, albeit on a temporary basis. With a 500 mile line-haul operation and with units spread along the coast of the South China Sea to the Central Highlands, a more welcome addition is hard to imagine.

During this twelve month period, the 8th Group played a pivotal role in the security of the Qui Nhon Defense Installation. As the command and control

element for the largest of 5 sub-installations, the Group was responsible for 49 compounds in a 50 square mile area and 6,000 US troops. This responsibility extended beyond compound defense to include delination of off-limits areas, supervision of clubs and mess associations, and base development. On 1 April 1969, the Defense Installation was reorganized, at COL Ludy's suggestion, to better combat increased enemy sapper activities. Although most information on enemy sapper activities is classified, it is safe to say that the commander's aggressive physical security programs saved numerous lives and much government property.

The activities responsive to the needs and expectations of the men and officers of the 8th Transportation Group have been paramount in the eyes of Colonel Garland A. Ludy. His contagious drive and initiative have spread throughout the entire 8th Transportation Group. He himself has said many times, "The standards can be no higher than those set by the Commanding Officer." The esprit de corps experienced within the Group is one of a brotherhood. It is with deep sincere gratitude, therefore, that we, the men and officers of the 8th Transportation Group proudly recognize the achievements not only of ourselves but also those of COL Garland A. Ludy whose guidance served us instrumentally towards the accomplishment of our mission in the U.S. Army in Vietnam.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO San Francisco 96226

AVCA QN-TG

18 July 1969

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation
Second Oak Leaf Cluster

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

1. The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Transportation Group, is recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation, Second Oak Leaf Cluster, for meritorious service at Qui Nhon, Vietnam, during the period April 1968 to March 1969.
2. Through concerted effort, efficient and effective management, original and inventive thinking, and close supervision, the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Transportation Group achieved widespread and thorough improvements in all areas of command responsibility. The S-1 section devised thorough, concise, understandable, and helpful administrative directives where there were none before. A schedule of semi-annual command inspections was instituted. Because of a lack of experienced administrative personnel throughout the command, the Group S-1 section devised simple checklists that were utilized in effectively and quickly determining the weak areas in administrative functions. The use of these checklists provided a guide to commanders at all levels in upgrading the efficiency of their respective commands. Special court-martial processing time was reduced with a concurrent increase in the accuracy of processing. The security of installations under control of this headquarters was improved and strengthened in all aspects. The S-3 section set new all time records in mission accomplishment and rebuilt the operations center bunker to reduce noise and confusion to an absolute minimum. Through an extremely aggressive program of staff supervision, liaison between subordinate units and support activities, on-the-spot technical assistance, and command maintenance management inspections, the S-4 section was able to reduce the vehicle non-availability rate to half of the previous year's rate. The conception and self-help construction of a central trailer maintenance facility brought about the reduction of the semi-trailer non-availability rate from 25% to 2%, effectively enlarging the critically short fleet of semi-trailers. Incentive awards were established for mess, supply, and maintenance activities, contributing significantly to overall morale, efficiency and mission accomplishment. Although not directly measurable, increase in the level of morale was certainly evidenced by an increase in chapel attendance, brought about by the commander's real concern for the welfare of the men at their places of work. The leadership exerted by the command section and the spontaneous enlivenment of the staff sections, through critical analysis and increased initiative, and measured by a new program of command inspections, have effected improvements, efficiency


AVCA QN-TG

18 July 1969

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation
Second Oak Leaf Cluster

and economy in every area of operation and make the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) most deserving of the Meritorious Unit Citation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



4 Incl

- 1-Narrative of tasks performed
- 2-Unit statistical summary
- 3-Listing of units
- 4-Proposed citation

W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Adjutant

NARRATIVE OF TASKS PERFORMED

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Incl 1


1. The need was recognized in November 1968 to create and schedule semi-annual, inspector-general type command inspections since the previous, last-minute efforts to assist units in successfully passing their inspections resulted in considerable inefficiency and waste of manpower resources, without a corresponding proportion of ratings of outstanding. The schedule was designed to interlock with the annual general inspection of higher headquarters, allowing one month between the two, and giving a command inspection six months later, to preclude degradation of the unit between inspections due to the high personnel turnover rate. With each staff section preparing checklists for their individual areas of interest the S-1 section had to develop checklists for many separate areas of personnel management, administration, funds, postal, military justice, awards, and command interest items. To do this required a monumental study and research program to achieve the proficiency and knowledge required to pass judgement on subordinate unit's administration. So well did this effort succeed that whenever a unit made the corrections recommended by the command inspection team, the unit received satisfactory and commendatory ratings; when a unit failed to make those corrections, it received unsatisfactory ratings in the particular area inspected. The inspection schedule has been projected through December 1969, and the checklists have been sufficiently refined, that the incoming group commander will inherit an invaluable tool to maintain and monitor the high standards established and attained by the present commander.

2. The S-1 section outlined and undertook an extensive program to incorporate and refine the few existing command administrative directives into a system of regulations. The primary purpose was to collect, analyze, edit, and publish concise, comprehensive, easily understandable, and readily available command directives. Each regulation was limited in size and scope to allow complete revision of the directive when alterations were necessary, rather than the publication of numerous change sheets. The regulations set forth the requirements to be met, and do not duplicate the extensive information portions of Department of the Army publications. This set of regulations has materially assisted the subordinate units by reducing time wasted searching out the many requirements put on companies and battalions. The S-1 section produced over 48 regulations, of which only ten had appeared before in any form.

3. Special court-martial processing time was reduced considerably through the development of a viable suspense system, the writing of letters of instruction to trial counsel outlining duties and responsibilities during all phases of a case and appropriate command emphasis. This has removed the factor of processing time from consideration by the commanders in deciding appropriate measures to take in maintaining discipline within a unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TAB A



W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Adjutant

MUC (S-2)


During the period April 1968 to March 1969, the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) played a pivotal role in the Qui Nhon Defense Installation. Additionally, by carefully scrutinizing past convoy ambushes, new techniques and procedures were developed which substantially reduced loss of lives and government property.

The responsibility for compound security and local security for Sub-Installation Bravo was vested in the 8th Group Commander. Sub-Installation Bravo encompassed 49 US Installations and 7,000 US personnel in the Qui Nhon area. In this period there were twelve major sapper attacks on these compounds. Coordination of reaction forces, gunships, artillery, and damage control teams was directed from the 8th Group Tactical Operations Center. On several occasions the immediate deployment reaction forces, carried by 8th Group guntrucks, prevented sapper attacks from turning into disasters. Anticipating a Tet offensive similar to TET 1968, an intensive preparedness program called "Project - No Repeat" was conducted in the sub-installation. Every compound was inspected for adequacy of perimeter, defensive plans, and weapons by a four man team of experts in their respective areas.

During the year, two experimental pieces of equipment were conceived and tested. The first was the "Belch Blaster," a mine sweeping device composed of six DX tires which was pushed ahead of a road clearing vehicle. The Blaster proved especially successful in detonating mines implaced on the shoulder of the road next to the hard surface. In February 1969 several concrete cylinders five feet in diameter were built as protective devices for a .50 caliber machine gun and gunner. The cylinders were to be placed in the beds of task vehicles for convoy security. Although the cylinders themselves proved highly effective at stopping small arms fire, the concept of partially arming a large number of task vehicles was proven inferior to having a smaller number of fully armed guntrucks in every convoy. Presently under development is a portable perimeter scaling device. Well-trained logistical troops are frequently sent on perimeter sweeping patrols on the treacherous Nui Hon Cha mountain. The scaling device allows the patrol to exit the compound at almost any point, thus avoiding the possibility of enemy booby traps at the usual exit points to the mountain.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TAB B


W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Adjutant

1. During the period 1 April 1968 to 31 March 1969 the 8th Transportation Group's attached units transported 39,931 PAX, 1,173,029 short tons of cargo, 29,856,710 gallons of POL and amassed a total of 66,429,808 ton miles over the longest and most perilous main supply route in Vietnam. In order to accomplish these tasks the group convoys fought their way through 28 ambushes which had a total effect of 20 personnel killed, 103 personnel wounded and 130 vehicles destroyed or damaged. The enemy suffered 59 personnel killed, 103 personnel wounded and 3 personnel captured.

Combat Operations Supported.

The results of the 8th March 1968 meeting at Dragon Mountain came to bear during the months of April May and June, and the road side clearance and defoliation of the passes was completed. During this meeting the command element of the Group met with command element of the 4th Infantry Division to improve convoy security on QL 19. Some of the items that were agreed upon, road side clearance, defoliation of the passes, additional air and artillery support and a single coordinator, were established immediately.


On 17 June 1968 the 240th and 239th Quartermaster Detachments were attached to the 8th Transportation Group to enhance control operations procedures and maintenance procedures for the refrigerated vans within the Qui Nhon Support Command. The mission gave the group the responsibility of providing Class I refrigerated van service and ice service to the Qui Nhon Support Command area of operations. In order to improve efficiency, the Group command element recommended that one of the Group's existing medium truck companies be converted to a refrigerated van company and that two detachments be inactivated. This resulted in the existing mission being accomplished with the assets existing within the group with no sufficient reduction in the groups dry cargo capability and a saving to the Qui Nhon Support Command of 22 personnel spaces and 20 5 ton tractors. Additionally the Class I service was drastically improved. The daily refrigerated availability increased from 28 vans of 59 in June to daily availability of 47 of 59 vans in March for an increase of 67 percent.

On 1 December 1968 the 8th Transportation Group was assigned the mission of supporting the Vung Ro Bay - Phu Hiep complex and the 529th Trans Co and the 545th Trans Co were attached to the group. The combined results of both units were approximately 500 short tons of cargo per day in port and beach clearance. Through improved management techniques, improved maintenance procedures and realignment of personnel, the main mission is being accomplished with an equivalent amount of cargo being transported daily with one truck company, resulting in a saving to the government of one light truck company.

On 1 January 1969 the group was given the mission of transporting bulk petroleum in the Qui Nhon Support Command Area of Operation and the 359th Transportation Company was attached. Again a management improvement technique to enhance efficiency and increase availability of equipment was put into effect. Through increased flexibility the group was able to absorb the unit and increase the unit POL carrying capability with only minor adverse effect on the dry cargo capability during the weak POL periods when the pipeline was out. During one such period when the pipeline was out for an extended period of time, the Qui Nhon Support Command issued the group additional tankers to meet the POL crisis.

During the month of March 1969, the group established an all time record of 7,734,554 ton miles. This was accomplished during a period of critical equipment shortages and can only be attributed to improved management techniques and maintenance procedures. The number of vehicles down for maintenance and the number of road side breakdowns has been significantly decreased and turnaround time on semitrailers has also been improving. Some of the major improvements which have affected the semitrailer availability are reduction in number of semitrailers in maintenance, reduction in number of semitrailers being loaded in areas in excess of 24 hours, improved trailer transfer point operations and improved semitrailer operational accountability.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Adjutant

TAB C

In September 1968, 8th Transportation Group Units were experiencing difficulty in maintaining 12 ton semi-trailers due to the lack of adequate facilities and critical shortages of repair parts, resulting in 25% of the trailer fleet being deadlined. Through the Group Commander and his staff's initiative, guidance, and supervision, the 8th Transportation Group Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility (CTMF) was established and built on a self-help basis to provide a facility for emergency and running repairs and the performance of required scheduled services on the 640 trailers authorized.

In conjunction with the establishment of the CTMF, all semi-trailers from units within the group were laterally transferred to the HHD property book, providing an excellent means of accountability.


Under direction of the Group Supply Technician, clerks from the S-4 section were organized into skilled and professional carpenters, electricians, and builders. These men designed and built two 35 feet x 60 feet maintenance sheds in minimal time. The next project was the building of a wash rack with two 20 feet wells providing more than an adequate supply of water so that trailers could be thoroughly cleaned before the scheduled service was performed. These accomplishments provided ideal facilities to perform maintenance and scheduled services on the 8th Group trailer fleet.

Under operational control of Group S-4, the Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility has been so effective in performing its mission that the average monthly deadline rate for the 8th Transportation Group trailer fleet is 2%. Disregarding the initial month of operation (4.4%) when CTMF absorbed existing backlogs, the monthly deadline rate would be 1.5%. This extremely low deadline greatly assisted the 8th Transportation Group recently to haul more ton/miles during one month than ever before, with less equipment.

Through the S-4's efforts, proper utilization and motivation of food service personnel has resulted in the 8th Transportation Group attaining the reputation of having the "Best Mess Halls" in the Qui Nhon Support Command. Realizing the need for a continuing food service training program a 12 Ton S&P trailer became the basis of the 8th Transportation Group's Mobile Cook School. This trailer was enclosed, with shelves, worktables, and other equipment installed. The school moves from one unit mess to another on a weekly basis. The NCOIC moves the school to the preselected unit and locates it as close to the unit mess as possible. The on-the-job training program consists of detailed instruction in the preparation, cooking and serving of the food issued to each unit mess. The method of instruction is informal. The NCOIC selects the food item off the daily menu to be prepared. All steps in preparation and cooking of the item are carefully carried out as prescribed by appropriate recipe. The completed item is then returned to the mess hall and served. One individual from each shift is selected to prepare the item selected. By utilizing this method of instruction, the individual receives training on different items on the menu, the unit benefits from both the product and a more knowledgeable cook, and the individual is not lost for any appreciable length of time. Some of the specialty dishes selected from the menu to be prepared are cream beef, hot cakes, doughnuts, cinnamon rolls and all types of meats and vegetables. The 8th Transportation Group Mobile Cook School has enabled this command to have uniformly high standards throughout the Group. Requests by other organizations for the use of

the school, to provide the same type of training to outlying pump stations and other units operating messes has enabled the entire Qui Nhon Support Command to upgrade their food service program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. Sean O'Donoghue". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

TAB D

W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Adjutant

UNIT STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Part I. Record of absence without leave in relation to unit strength.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
NOT APPLICABLE - THERE WERE NO INSTANCES OF ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE DURING THIS PERIOD			

Part II. Record of punishments under Article 15, UCMJ, in relation to unit strength.


<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
April	76	0	0
May	76	0	0
June	75	0	0
July	78	0	0
August	77	1	1.3%
September	71	0	0
October	72	1	1.39%
November	72	2	2.78%
December	63	2	3.17%
January	59	1	1.79%
February	59	0	0
March	60	1	1.66%

Part III. Record of court-martial convictions in relation to unit strength.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
April	76	0	0
May	76	0	0
June	75	0	0
July	78	0	0
August	77	0	0
September	71	0	0
October	72	0	0
November	72	0	0
December	63	0	0
January	59	1	1.79%
February	59	0	0
March	60	1	1.66%

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Incl #2


W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
LLT, TC
Adjutant

ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS

Part I. Units assigned and recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) (WFN3AA)	1 Apr 68 - 31 Mar 69	Awarded MUC on 1 Mar 67, GO UNK, for period 14 Feb 45 - 1 Mar 46 Awarded MUC (1 OLC) on 4 Mar 69, GO 754, USARV, for period 2 Sep 67 - 31 Mar 68

Part II. Units attached and recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation

NOT APPLICABLE

Part III. Units assigned but not recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation

NOT APPLICABLE

Part IV. Units attached but not recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation

NOT APPLICABLE

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Incl #3


W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Adjutant

PROPOSED CITATION

MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION

BY DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 203, AR 672-5-1, THE MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER IS AWARDED TO THE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT), FOR EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OUTSTANDING SERVICES DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 1968 TO MARCH 1969.

THE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP, DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FROM APRIL 1968 TO MARCH 1969. THE MEMBERS OF THIS UNIT, DEMONSTRATING EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE, INITIATIVE AND CONSUMMATE SKILL, PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT TO UNITS THROUGHOUT THE NORTHERN II CORPS AREA OF OPERATIONS. FIRM, IMAGINATIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL WERE PROVIDED FOR WIDESPREAD UNITS STRUGGLING DAILY WITH THE ENEMY-INFESTED ROADS BETWEEN QUI NHON AND AN KHE, PLEIKU, DAKTO, KONTUM, PHU HIEP, CHEO REO, VUNG RO, TUY HOA AND BONG SON. THROUGH IMAGINATIVE LEADERSHIP AND DEDICATED EFFORT THE WIDELY DIVERGENT MISSIONS OF THE GROUP WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER. THROUGH THE UNRELENTING DETERMINATION, TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND EXEMPLARY COURAGE OF THE MEN OF HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP, THE UNITED STATES MILITARY EFFORT IN RVN WAS MATERIALLY ADVANCED. THEIR RARE TENACITY AND PROFESSIONALISM, MANIFESTED IN STRIVING TO RENDER THE FINEST SUPPORT POSSIBLE, AND THE REMARKABLE PROFICIENCY AND DEVOTION TO DUTY DISPLAYED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICE AND REFLECT DISTINCT CREDIT UPON THEMSELVES AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

INCL #4

8th Group History

Morale and Welfare

It has been said that the 8th Transportation Group is the only unit in Vietnam in which you can earn a Silver Star in the daytime and then return to a hot shower, a good meal, and a clean bed. Despite the fact that the 8th Group line haul system is 500 miles long, the truckers can always get a bed and a hot meal at one of the Groups strategically placed RON facilities in Qui Nhon, Cha Rang, An Khe, Pleiku, or Tuy Hoa. Breakfast takes on a special significance when it is the only meal a man will definitely eat in his company mess hall. Consequently, the "hardened breakfast" concept is almost as important as the hardened guntrucks.

Each of the battalions in the Group has taken special efforts to make life a little more comfortable here in Vietnam. Perhaps, the most reknown facility is the 40' X 60' swimming pool built by the 27th Battalion. The pool has been the scene of numerous pleasant evenings, including the Group's farewell poolside party for BG Darrie H. Richards on 8 June 1969. Although constructed and maintained by the 27th Battalion, the pool is open to all US servicemen in the Phu Thanh Valley. Equally available to neighboring soldiers is the Happy Valley Service Club which serves ice cream or popcorn or barbeques almost every night, along with an assortment of modern sounds. The 5,600 volume library and the air conditioned Educational Center at Camp Vasquez provide all the intellectual stimulation that the combat truckers can squeeze into their busy day. The main branch PX and the ultra-modern six chair barber shop offer some items unattainable in the US--half price stereo equipment and forty cent haircuts.

In the Cha Rang Valley, the 54th Battalion has constructed what is undoubtedly the finest EM Club in the Qui Nhon Support Command. The club features a spacious patio and a serpentine marble bar. All the mess halls in the battalion are equipped with stereo and have screened in terraces for cookouts. The battalion also runs a large, combined snack bar-PX with popcorn and ice cream available at all hours of the day.

"Take the Gospel to the men." This is the motto of the Group Commander and his five dedicated chaplains. Go out to the marshalling areas any morning; if there is not a formal service being conducted, then you'll see the chaplains talking and joking with the men prior to kick-out time. In fact, Chaplain Chapman is seen on convoy so often that he has been mistaken for Convoy Commander by the Security Forces along the road. On the average, the Group Chaplains conduct 16 formal services and 32 "street corner" services each week. The Chapel of the Valley sits on a gentle bluff overlooking Camp Vasquez and the whole Phu Thanh Valley. The beauty of the Chapel caused MG Sampson, Chief of Army Chapels, to state that he wished all his Chapels in the States looked like the Chapel of the Valley.

If ever a command lived by the words: "Take care of your men and they will take care of you" it would be the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport).

From
THE 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
December 1968

U.S. Convoy Uses ARVNs for Guards

One of the Viet Cong's favorite tricks used to be frequent ambushes of 8th Transportation Command convoys running between Qui Nhon and Pleiku.

Not anymore. ARVN soldiers and vehicles have teamed up with the 8th Group on convoy runs to make "double trouble" for any ambushers.

The addition of about 80 trucks of the ARVNs 21st Transportation Battalion to U.S. convoys provides not only greater safety but also incorporates two different yet highly effective, systems of convoy security.

The 8th provides security through the use of heavily armored gun trucks and jeeps.

The ARVNs have a platoon of infantry troops ride in the back of open two-and-a-half ton trucks.

"This infantry element has proved to be highly effective," said Major William K. Coran, a transportation officer serving his second tour in Vietnam, "and the ARVN communications setup is such that they can call in artillery and air support on a moment's notice, and often a spotter plane from the ARVN Air Force will escort them."

The U.S. and Vietnamese elements maintain close communications contact to insure fast, unified action in an emergency.

Major Nguyen Van, the 21st's commander, a graduate of both the Vietnamese Military Academy at Dalat and the Transportation School at Ft. Eustis, Va., explained the inter-unit communications.

He said, "We've been running together almost without a hitch since about February. We use three jeeps for control of our element, with 8th Group sergeants riding along in two of them. Along with a rather sophisticated communications set-up this gives us close coordination with our people in the rear and the 8th's personnel in the lead."

"We've grown up on this road; we know it like the back of our hand," said Captain Bui Van Tru, one of the ARVN's convoy commanders.

The language barrier is not a serious problem.

"I ride with the ARVN's a couple of times each week," stated Sergeant Leroy Blagmon, a convoy veteran from the 8th's 2nd Transportation Company, 27th Transportation Battalion, "and we communicate pretty well. Most of the ARVN officers speak pretty good English, so we can tell each other what we need with little trouble."

U.S. Convoy Uses ARVN's for Guards (continued)

A former commander of the 8th Group summed up his feeling of the American-Vietnamese convoy by saying:

"This program has helped both us and the ARVN's. We're fighting together, both with the same aim - get the cargo to its destination quickly and without loss of life or property. I can tell you one thing - our boys are mighty glad to have those ARVN's along with them when they start down highway 19 each morning."

From
THE 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
January 1969

Silver Star to Log 1LT

A 1st Log convoy commander recently received the nation's third highest valor award the Silver Star, for his heroism when his convoy was ambushed near here.

First Lieutenant Dennis C. Mack was presented the medal by Brigadier General D.H. Richards, Commanding General of Qui Nhon Support Command, at a ceremony at the 88th Transportation Company.

On August 23, Lieutenant Mack was serving as convoy commander on a line haul between here and Pleiku.

As the convoy approached the base of Mang Giang Pass, 15 miles west of An Khe, it was suddenly attacked by a large enemy force.

Instantly exposing himself to deadly enemy fire, Lieutenant Mack directed suppressive fire on the enemy force. Moving along the convoy, he urged the drivers to keep moving out of the kill zone. He also gave aid and comfort to the wounded and personally supervised their evacuation.

A native of Great Falls, Mon., he entered the Army in June 1966 after graduating from Montana State University.

From
THE 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
February 1969

Camp, Memorial Honor Courageous Lieutenant

With the naming of Camp Wilson, the 124th Transportation Battalion has made permanent the memory of a convoy commander who died bravely in an enemy ambush.

First Lieutenant David R. Wilson, who arrived in Vietnam in August 1967, was mortally wounded Jan 31, 1968.

He ". . .unhesitatingly sped into the kill zone, receiving intense enemy fire to lead his men to safety," states the memorial plaque erected at the new camp in his honor.

Lieutenant Wilson was awarded the Silver Star posthumously for his actions.

Brigadier General D. H. Richards, commander of Qui Nhon Support Command, attended the commemoration ceremony as did Colonel Harlan W. Tucker, Pleiku Sub-Area Command commander, and Colonel Garland Ludy, 8th Group Commander, along with other distinguished guests.

From
THE 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIET NAM
REVIEW

February 1969

Novice Driver Wants To Be Professional

PLEIKU - Makeshift bridges linked by a twisted cow path and flanked by dust-filled gulleys - this is the road from here to Dak To.

The route is tackled daily by the "Stickers" of the 359th Transportation Company.

These drivers get the nickname, Stickers, by proving their ability to keep their individual vehicles running smoothly within the convoy.

Drivers must also be careful not to go off the road. This could slow down the convoy, making it easy prey.

The much-travelled road to Dak To is all too familiar to the Stickers of the 359th. But, to less experienced drivers, it offers a distinct and immediate challenge.

One such novice is Blinky, a Private First Class. His type is known as "nonstickers." Veteran drivers still laugh in a friendly way when someone calls him a nonsticker, but it does not bother Blinky. The kidding lets him know that he belongs, but he would rather be a sticker.

Each day's drivers assemble at the marshalling point and listen to instructions that many of them have practically memorized. But, in the early morning light, Blinky still listens to the same briefing he has heard for the last two weeks.

The instructions end with the familiar, "All men will wear flak vests and helmets."

As he walks back to his truck, Blinky does not think about the importance of his job. He does not think about the fact that his cargo is fuel - fuel that powers the helicopter removing a wounded infantryman from a remote battleground. This is fuel for cooking, for tanks and jeeps, and fuel that drives the generators that provide electricity.

Instead, Blinky thinks about the treacherous road to Dak To - a trail with ruts that bounce him out of his seat even though he steadies himself by holding hard to the steering wheel.

Blinky has ground life out of his five-ton tractor each day for the past two weeks. The more experienced men have been driving seven days a week, 52 weeks a year except for R&R. So Blinky does not look forward to getting any time off in the near future.

He does look forward to being a sticker. Even though he has already driven through the An Khe Pass, the Mang Giang Pass and Ambush Alley, and around Dead Man's Curve, he is still a nonsticker.

Blinky knows that for the "professionals" of the 359th there is no substitute for consistent success. One successful run does not make a sticker.

He also knows that the name "professionals" was given to the men of the Company by a former Commanding Officer in recognition of the professional attitude they displayed during last year's Tet Offensive.

Blinky has heard stories about Tet. The convoy making the run from An Khe to Pleiku was ambushed four times in one day - all within a 10-mile stretch of road.

A rocket penetrated a tanker on the first ambush. With the burning rocket still lodged in his fuel tank, the driver risked an explosion by continuing up the road for 30 minutes to get out of the kill zone.

Once out of the first kill zone, the driver pulled to one side of the road to let the convoy pass; then, as fuel poured out of the hole in his tanker where the rocket had entered, he unhooked it from the tractor. Hurrying back to his tractor, he drove it away and thereby saved the tractor from the tanker's roaring flames.

As a new driver, Blinky has been getting a different truck each day. He must learn the idiosyncrasies of each one, so that he can get it in shape for the journey. On the roads that the 359th travels, an inferior truck can be extremely dangerous.

As the convoy rolls along, Blinky must constantly shift gears to keep up with the other trucks. With a full load, he must gear down to slow his vehicle as it races down into gulleys through mists of dust stirred up by the lead trucks.

The fully-loaded tanker pushes the truck forward, but he can't stop without risking jackknifing the vehicle. Ten feet ahead of him, he sees the outline of a roughly hewn lumber bridge.

Clutch in to take advantage of his momentum for the hill he knows is ahead, he races toward the bridge. He feels the lumber bend beneath his wheels.

He crosses the bridge. Now he must shift gears before the vehicle slows down. If he does not get into high gear quickly, he will lose speed and have difficulty climbing the hill.

To keep up with the convoy, he must double shift. Both hands let go of the wheel. The engine rears. The gears catch, and the truck starts its long climb out of the gully's dust.

Once the convoy reaches Dak To, the drivers empty their tankers, grab a quick bite to eat and line up for the trip back to Pleiku.

The return trip requires less shifting of gears since the tankers are empty, but the lightened trucks bounce more over the ruts. This gives Blinky particular trouble.

Halfway back, the door on the passenger side of the truck breaks a hinge as Blinky goes over a rut. The door slips out of its latch and swings crazily back and forth, banging against the side of the cab. He can't stop to repair it. He has to stay with the convoy.

Finally, at Kontum, the convoy pauses. With the help of other drivers and a spare bolt, he fits the door back into position.

As the sun sets, the convoy pulls into Pleiku. But the job is not over. First, he must "top off" as the men refer to the job of refilling their tankers with the next day's fuel load. Then he must go to the motor pool where the drivers fix flat tires and exchange tire frames bent out of shape by the massive load and rough road. In addition, maintenance must be done on the engines and brakes.

Once his chores are completed, Blinky can take consolation in the fact that today he stuck with the convoy. He remembers, however, that in the 359th, one successful run does not make a sticker. He has had successful runs before, but now they are becoming more frequent.

Soon he will have his own truck. But even more important is the fact that soon he will become a full-fledged "professional."

(continued)

From
THE 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
February 1969

Chaplain Is There When Men Need Him

By SP4 Koenig

Chaplain (Captain) John Sheley likes to be where it's happening.

As Chaplain for Qui Nhon Support Command's 124th Transportation Battalion, he is not content to stay behind when men of his unit haul their cargo through Viet Cong-infested territory.

"I want to know what a man is talking about when he tells me that he is afraid," said the Chaplain.

The "Chaplain of the convoys" provides a big boost to the morale of the men he rides with. "It makes me feel better because he's there if you need him," said Specialist 4 Robert Smith, a jeep gunner.

Helping the chaplain, and often riding the treacherous convoy trails with him, are his assistant, Specialist 4 Carl Haaland and his driver, Specialist 4 Warren Evers. The threesome makes an impressive, hard-working team dedicated to serving God and their fellow soldiers.

The chaplain's activities are so diverse that, with the possible exception of Sunday, he knows no "typical days." Sunday might be the exception only because it always begins the same and his pastoral duties do not allow him to ride the convoy.

He begins every Sunday by holding a service on the field where the convoy assembles. There the chaplain circulates among the battle-tested truckers who comprise his congregation.

"Hey, I don't know you," Chaplain Sheley said to a couple of drivers. "How long have you been driving? Two months! I guess the reason I don't know you is that I never see you in church," he remarked in jest laughing.

From the convoy assembly area, Chaplain Sheley returns to his chapel for a more formal Sunday service.

"He is probably the most active man I have seen in my 18 years of service," said Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Bing, commanding officer of the 124th. "He can talk to the men and that makes a difference."

Chaplain Sheley's success and camaraderie with the men does not result from his efforts alone, however. Specialist Haaland, for example, has constructed and stocked a 4,000 volume library for the men of the 124th.

"The books were refused by another unit," said Haaland. "They were being transported back and forth by our convoys. Since nobody wanted them, I claimed them."

Chaplain Is There When Men Need Him (continued)

Haaland also made up a practice exam to assist drivers taking the high school equivalency test.

Another current project of the chaplain's team allows displaced Montagnard tribesmen to help themselves.

"We buy Montagnard wood carvings, baskets and hand woven cloth from the Vietnamese Christian Service Organization in Dak To and Montagnards we meet on the road," said Specialist Evers. "Then we resell it at cost to U.S. troops."

Chaplain Sheley's watchful eye also looks after the welfare of missionaries running a leprosarium in Pleiku and Christian Vietnamese families in the area.

When Chaplain Sheley heard that nine Christian Vietnamese families needed lumber for the construction of a church, he played a major role in obtaining it for them.

Once, while visiting the roughly hewn but beautiful church, the chaplain exclaimed, "The amazing thing is that in the midst of all this war, Christ built his church."

From
THE 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
February 1969

Safety Pays Off

Traveling over 500,000 accident-free miles in II Corps, men of the 54th Transportation Battalion recently received a safety plaque and trophy for their achievements. During November, the trucks of the 54th made daily trips from Qui Nhon to places as distant as Pleiku, 100 miles away, without a mishap.

From
THE 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
March 1969

Best Mess

The 666th Transportation Company, part of the 54th Transportation Battalion, was honored recently with the first presentation of the monthly "Five-Star Best Mess Award" in the support command.

The winning mess was selected by the ACofS Services Food Advisor and two assistants.

Each major command selected their top mess facility, and final judging was left to the Service's office.

From
THE 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW
March 1969

New Truck Has Power to Zap VC

Ingenuity by the commander of the 124th Transportation Battalion here has provided the unit with a revolutionary convoy-protecting truck which features double walls of steel.

Lieutenant Colonel Tom L. Bing, commander of the 124th Transportation Battalion, designed the durable vehicle, which boasts M-60 and 50 caliber machine guns along with the devastating 7.62 caliber mini-gun.

"Mighty-Minny," as the gun truck is called, was constructed by the 64th Transportation Company, commanded by First Lieutenant Raymond L. Gorski Jr.

Original plans for the dual walls called for one-quarter-inch thick steel plates to be placed eight inches apart on the truck bed. The span between the two walls was later increased to 13 inches, enabling the vehicle to serve as a gun truck-wrecker with the addition of six spare tires in the widened area between the plates.

The theory behind Colonel Bing's dual-walled gun box is that incoming B-40 rockets will be detonated on contact with the outer wall.

"Deadly shrapnel will bounce harmlessly off the tough inner walls and spare tires, never reaching the gunners," explained Command Sergeant Major Frederick C. Zirkel of the 124th.

"Steel plate will be more effective against rockets and small arms fire than regular armor plate because armor has a tendency to shatter, but mild steel holds together," said Private First Class Gerald Stoecher, the welder responsible for fusing together the plates.

The hand-picked truck crew is headed by Sergeant Ernest E. Sweatt, who will direct bursts from the mini-gun.

"It will do the job - Charlie won't have much that can bother this new truck," Sergeant Sweatt, a second Vietnam tour transportation sergeant, commented.

'BOUNTY HUNTER' BRINGS SMOKE

QUI NHON - "If it hadn't been for the 'Quad,' we wouldn't be here now," say First Lieutenant Richard Bushong and men of the 8th Transportation Group (Truck) when they talk about the "Bounty Hunter."

The 2½-ton truck, with a four-barrel, 50-caliber machinegun combination mounted on its bed, presents an awesome sight. The 50 caliber system, developed primarily for air defense, is known as the "Quad-50."

It has been found that the electrically fired and aimed system mounted on a small turret can be placed on most vehicles or on the ground.

The men responsible for convoy security in the 8th Group put the weapon on the back of a 2½-ton truck and named it "Bounty Hunter."

In addition to the high rate of fire offered by the Quad-50, the Bounty Hunter has a standard 50 caliber machinegun over the cab manned by Sergeant Rodell Smith, who also doubles as crew chief for the unusual weapons truck.

The second member of the protection team for the 444th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) here is a combination of steel and firepower called the "Psychotic Reaction."

The Psychotic Reaction is a 2½-ton truck that has been beefed up with heavy plating. It provides rear support and protection for its companion in battle, the Bounty Hunter.

Specialist 5 Andrew T. James, crew chief of the Psychotic Reaction, said, "Our job is to back them up, to protect the rear."

Specialist James and the crew of the Reaction have teamed with the Bounty Hunter to gain a reputation among truckers in II Corps. Their skill was demonstrated graphically during a recent enemy ambush when contact lasted nearly half an hour.

When contact was established, the Reaction's machineguns and the turret mounted Quad of the Bounty Hunter started making things uncomfortable for the enemy.

The combination of systematic, electrically-controlled fire from the Bounty Hunter, plus the Reaction's massive machinegun fire, forced the beaten enemy to retreat into the brush.

From THE 1st LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM REVIEW, May 1969

ROAD CONVOYS: LIFELINE TO THE HIGHLANDS

The dimly-outlined 5-ton trucks covered several acres of land. It was dark, still an hour before sunrise, and a single kerosene lamp illuminated the faces of about forty men huddling under a roof suspended on four wooden poles.

The morning was cold, and most of the men were bundled in field jackets or sweaters, sipping hot coffee from paper cups. The murmur of idling engines mingled in the air with scraps of scattered conversations.

First Lieutenant William Hamel, Kansas City, Mo., a convoy commander from the 8th Transportation Group, edged his way through the crowd of soldiers and asked, "Everybody here?" Answered with nods and "Yessirs," he started his briefing.

"We'll be going to Pleiku today," he began. "We should be there about noon." He continued methodically, explaining that intelligence reports showed no signs of enemy activity along the route. "However," he added, "we haven't been hit for four days now. We've got to be ready at all times, particularly when we cross the An Khe and Mang Yang passes." He added that the convoy would carry ammunition for the artillery battalions near Pleiku. The men who had gathered around Lieutenant Hamel shifted quietly, some savoring the last few puffs of cigarettes.

"You've all been on this run before," the lieutenant continued, "but don't forget the safety rules." Then, quickly, he ticked off the 8th Group's "14 Lessons Learned," the combat-proven guidelines for getting trucks and soldiers through an ambush. He concluded, "...and make sure you try to keep your 100-meter interval at all times. You've been pretty good about this, so keep it up. We should be back here some time around 6 this evening."

A short pause, and then he said: "OK, let's get started." The truckers checked their loads to make sure they were properly secured, and Lieutenant Hamel gave the order: "Let's move out."

The scene was the 8th Transportation Group's trailer transfer point, several miles west of Qui Nhon and across from group headquarters on Highway 19. The convoy again was ready to roll.

Convoys, usually comprising 30 to 40 supply trucks and security vehicles, make long treks daily through treacherous mountain passes and return to Qui Nhon. For most of the American units in the northern highlands, the three truck battalions of the 8th Transportation Group haul nearly all supplies. The trucks go to places like Pleiku, Kontum and Dak To near the northwest corner of II Corps. The 8th Group's trucks also travel Highway 1 north to Bong Son and south to Tuy Hoa. Each month the drivers deliver more than 90,000 tons of ammunition, building materials, fuel and other supplies. As a group, the drivers log more than 1 million miles each month.

The 8th Group, commanded by Colonel Garland Ludy, Arlington, Va., has contributed to revised training material for transportation and logistical support in a guerrilla war. The group has compiled an impressive record of minimal delays and setbacks and has developed new techniques which assure better convoy security. Officers of the unit say the lessons the 8th Group has learned and some of the innovations it has introduced are now being included in the lesson plans of the Army Transportation School at Ft. Eustis, Va., and the Combat Development Command at Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Probably the group's most important contributions have been new convoy security techniques which minimize effects of the ambushes and mines that constantly plague the truckers.

In September, 1967, a convoy returning from Pleiku was ambushed about eight miles west of An Khe. In a brief but devastating encounter with a large enemy force, eight men were killed and 19 wounded. The enemy also destroyed 12 trucks and damaged 18. This attack marked the beginning of a concentrated enemy effort to sever allied supply lines linking the coastal supply depots to the Central Highlands. But it also marked the beginning of a concentrated 8th Group effort to prevent additional losses of men and vehicles.

The group adopted the "hardened vehicle" concept, which calls for equipping several vehicles with armor plate and guns. These gun trucks can provide a substantial base of fire against ambushes. The concept originally called for a convoy to be divided into march units of 10 vehicles headed by a radio-equipped gun jeep and a gun truck. An armored truck with a Quad-50 (four 50-caliber machineguns) secured the middle space and a second radio gun jeep brought up the rear.

But experience showed that putting the gun truck in the lead made it more susceptible to land mines and enemy fire. After several days of observation enemy gunners could predict where the gun truck would be in the column and concentrated heavy initial fire on it.

Hoping to provide better security, reconnaissance and control. Colonel Ludy altered this concept in November, 1968. He replaced the lead gun truck with a reconnaissance jeep whose mission is to scout the terrain ahead of the march unit for signs of the enemy and obstacles such as blown bridges. The gun truck remains in the march unit, but varies its position daily so that the enemy cannot anticipate its location. From a position within the column, the gun truck can come to the aid of ambushed vehicles more easily. Finally, a jeep with an M-60 machinegun has been retained, but it roves along the column rather than remaining in one position.

The effectiveness of this plan was shown recently. As a convoy bound for Pleiku neared the crest of the An Khe Pass, one of the trucks stalled while climbing through a U-shaped bend. While the rest of the convoy passed by, the gun truck pulled up behind the disabled vehicle. As the final truck passed out of sight around the next turn, enemy sniper fire crackled from the thickly-covered slopes of the pass. But the gun truck immediately opened fire on the sniper positions, silencing them within minutes. None of the truckers was wounded, and after the driver got his vehicle started, he and the gun truck rejoined the convoy.

"This happens all the time," said one of the men of the "Iron Butterfly," a gun truck involved in many similar incidents. "But the result is always the same. We've got just too much firepower for any sustained attacks on our trucks."

Another piece of equipment developed by the 8th Group is the "Bomb Blaster," a device to detonate mines placed along road shoulders. The narrow highways that cut through the highlands often require the truckers to drive on the road shoulders, a favorite place for the enemy to mine. To blow these mines before vehicles hit them, 8th Group mechanics built, entirely from salvage materials, a detonating device that can be towed. Several heavy wheels, attached to steel rods, trail the vehicle and extend onto the road shoulder. The weight of the device rolling over the dirt shoulders detonates the mines. Shortly after its inaugural test, the bomb blaster blew up a mine along Highway 19.

The exploding mine left a hole 7 feet wide and 5 feet deep, but damaged only the easily replaceable blaster rather than a costly 5-ton truck. More important, there were no personal injuries.

Despite these changes, one thing remains the same--the importance of the individual truckers and mechanics who keep the trucks moving. Sergeant Major David Satinover, Atlantic City, N.J., said of his men:

"They work hard and long. They take pride in what they are doing. They keep the trucks running despite maintenance problems and the constant threat of ambush."

One of the truckers said: "I wouldn't trade my job for anything else here. We've got the best and most dedicated bunch of guys you'll find anywhere in the Army. Besides, the more we work, the faster time goes by."

These truck drivers, with their ambush-spoiling hardened vehicles, have been called "frustrated tankers" by General Creighton W. Abrams, commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. They are pitted daily against the classic obstacles of weather, enemy and terrain. But to supply the fighting units in the northern half of II Corps, the wheels of the 8th Transportation Group roll every day.

THE 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
VIETNAM
REVIEW
May 1969

Qui Nhon - A man sees a lot of Vietnam from the bed of an armor-walled gun truck.

From his high vantage point the machine gunner can see the lead truck a mile up the dusty road and the "tail," his brother gun truck, bringing up the rear a mile back.

On a sharp bend he can see the vital cargo he is protecting - the big drab oil tankers; the heavy flatbed ammo humpers loaded six feet high with mortar rounds and rockets, the trailers stacked tall with C-rations and the deuce-and-a-halves bearing conques full of fresh bread.

His earphones constantly humming, the buck sergeant NGOIC knows what to expect up ahead from information relayed by recon choppers and forward MP armored personnel carriers.

Little Vietnamese hamlets decorate long, dust-choked or mud-clogged convoy roads like tarnished trinkets on a corroded brass chain.

When the brute trucks roll through town, children line the road, ignoring the dust to wave and shout at the men standing tall inside the most colorfully decorated weapon wagon.

A loud, extravagantly designed paint job usually reflects the fighting spirit of the gun truck's crew.

With nothing overhead but the sky, the M-60 gunner watches gunships hovering menacingly over the jungle on either side of the convoy protecting against a possible ambush.

Over the months, the gunner has built a kinship, an unspoken but understood comradeship with the shirtless, tanned, tracked tank crews that sit off the road day after day sharing his mission - convoy protection

He waves a silent salute, and a gunner, poised behind his 40 mm guns, flashes a "V" in exchange.

He has a waving acquaintance with the ARVNs, the Popular Forces and the dark, husky Montagnard Strike Forces spaced out on makeshift compounds and resting under improvised poncho lean-tos on the edge of the jungle.

He tilts his weapon's barrel up over their heads, and meets their toothy grin with a spare can of C-rations, a bar of soap or just a healthy smile.

Occasionally, his convoy pilots past a platoon of resting U.S. infantrymen waiting in a clearing for transportation to their base camp after completing a sweep in enemy territory that crowds in around the convoy route.

These are the guys who need the ammo and food he is protecting. Seeing them sweat-streaked, dirty, stretched out in exhaustion by the roadside, gives meaning and reason to his mission.

Infantry platoons, engineer units, long range recon patrols, landing zone helicopter crews and a myriad of diversified units depend on the unglamorous convoy to bring them their living. And the gun truck is the front line defense of the convoy.

A ride on "Kings of the Roads" gun truck of the 124th Transportation Battalion, 45th General Support Group at Pleiku, is like a brief history lesson on the war in the Central Highlands. A veteran points out past ambush spots and crude cemeteries where some VC paid with their lives for their bouts with the gun trucks.

A veteran of several ambushes, a gunner named Nick, recalls one ambush where his well-armed truck made nine passes through the center of the blazing "kill zone."

"You forget to be scared when the trucks start getting hit. Our driver would go through anything so we just kept our heads low and kept shooting while he kept yelling and swinging back and forth. The truck was hit a few times, but we broke up the ambush and came out of it all right," he recalled.

He recalled an ambush near the notorious An Khe Pass. "Cold Sweat was called in to lay some firepower on a couple of sniper positions. Somewhere on the hillside, several hundred meters to the right of the road, an enemy marksman was harassing the convoy," he explained.

"We pulled into position, fired a few hundred rounds, drew no return fire and advanced to a curve a hundred meters ahead. I signaled to the driver to stop. We fired on the most likely sniper positions. Nothing happened and suddenly I heard an AK-47 cracking. My 60 gunner was down - hit in the shoulder. I yelled to the driver to get moving and saw that he was hit too."

The driver somehow managed to guide the truck out of the kill zone.

The young buck sergeant reflected that he has never figured out how the wounded driver did it. A barrage of fire from other gun trucks finally silenced the sniper.

A man sees a lot of the war, a lot of the country and a lot of the people from the armored bed of a gun truck. He logs thousands of miles on roads, banging his knees against the armor plate that stands between him and the sniper's bullet or the ambusher's rocket.

He sweats in the protection of a flak jacket and steel pot, because he knows his torso jutting above the often extravagantly painted armor walls makes a tempting target for patient snipers.

He keeps his weapon ready, his eyes open. The man in the bed of a gun truck sees a lot of the country - but it's no joy ride.

From
US Army Support Command
LOGMAN
August 1969

Wounded Driver Pilots Guntruck to Silver Star

Wounded twice in the arm and once in the leg, Specialist Four Dallas Mullins relieved a disabled driver and maneuvered an armored guntruck out of an enemy zone of fire.

For saving the lives of his fellow soldiers, the young man earned the Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action.

Heavily armed guntrucks, like the one Specialist Mullins was driving, provide protection for the convoys which must travel over the dangerous highways of the Upper II Corps Tactical Zone.

Feared and hated by the enemy, these trucks are often targets of ambushes.

Specialist Mullins is presently working as a clerk for his unit, the 444th Transportation Company while recovering from the wounds that he received during the incident. If he has his way, he will be "back on the road" soon, he said.

From
US Army Support Command
LOGMAN
August 1969

545th Humps Tonnage Records

Bomb hauling truck drivers of the 545th Transportation Company here have been setting tonnage records one day and breaking them the next for the past couple months.

Operating between Tuy Hoa Air Force Base and Vung Ro Bay, the 545th, commanded by First Lieutenant Brian M. Aspland, operates a total of 56 vehicles over the road, including 5 ton tractors, cargo trucks and 2½ ton. The primary cargo lately has been bombs; however, cement and refrigerator reefer vans are also figured into the total tonnage.

Sergeant First Class Edwin L. Wilhelmsen, said the the tonnage hauled has increased from about 250 tons to over 500 tons per day. And several record days have brought 750 ton loads over the winding 20 mile stretch of Highway 1 from Vung Ro Bay to the air base.

He said his drivers make from two to four "turn-arounds" per day. A "turn-around," he explained, is one complete trip from the ship port at Vung Ro Bay to the bomb pad at Tuy Hoa Air Base and then back to the port.

Driver of the Month for May, SP4 Gary Thompson, said that much of the speed in a turn-around depends upon the skill and cooperation of cargo handlers at the pier where bombs are transferred from ship to truck.

Once the truck bed is loaded and the cargo strapped in place, 545th drivers climb the curving incline leading out of the Vung Ro Bay harbor area. Once at the top he must negotiate "whiplash," a sharply falling series of hairpin corners leading down the backside of the mountain and into the infamous, boulder strewn stretch called "Rocket Chair."

Past the mile-long "Rocket Chair" lowlands, drivers travel a relatively safe road to the air base where the cargo is off-loaded.

A secondary mission of the 545th is providing road security for the section of Highway 1 between the Tuy Hoa - Phu Hiep area and Vung Ro Bay.

Four heavily armed gun trucks and two gun jeeps constantly cruise the highway as defense against ambushes and sniper activity.

THAT'S WHAT MAKES AN 8TH TRANS GROUP MAN

What makes a man in the 8th Group? Guts.

Recently, Colonel Garland A. Ludy, Commander of the 8th Transportation Group, congratulated the men of the 444th Transportation Company for having the raw courage to deliver combat-essential items to areas that couldn't otherwise exist. Three of these men were honored that same evening in front of the entire company for driving 40,000, 30,000 and 20,000 accident-free miles in convoys.

The mileage alone, especially when considering the hazardous driving conditions involved, is astounding.

Take Specialist Four Marlin R. Hill. Is he a special-type person? SP4 Hill doesn't think so. Though he was awarded a Superior Masters Driver's Certificate for driving 40,000 accident-free miles, SP4 Hill accepts this feat as a part of his job. Is there danger involved? To hear him tell it, the hazardous roads and the chance of a devastating ambush are to be expected each day. Accomplishing his mission has become a part of Specialist Hill's way of life.

SP4 Hill talks about himself quite casually, as though he is no one special. But then his buddy, Specialist Four James F. Cowart, feels quite differently. He tells about Specialist Hill's receiving the Driver of the Month Award for December 1968. He also tells about the danger involved in being the driver of a 5-ton tractor, daily traveling the mountainous, winding roads to deliver supplies to the men in Vietnam. Watching the expression on SP4 Hill's face tells it all. There's pride there. And then you realize how high his morale is.

Says Specialist Cowart about Specialist Hill: "He has no protection. He has it rough. A tractor driver must get his load through. You can have ten flat tires in a kill zone and you have to drive on. You have to make it." As Hill relaxes comfortably on his bunk, the pride of the 40,000 miles beams from the smile on his face.

When asked what he thinks about while driving in a convoy, Hill sits up sluggishly, tired from the long hours he has put in. Suddenly he becomes serious. "The same thing as all the other guys. My job. Getting shot at. You're in war. You have to stop and think for yourself. You don't have your parents or your girl to help you. Nam makes you grow up."

And what about Specialist Four James F. Cowart, who received a Superior Master Driver's Certificate for driving 30,000 accident-free miles over dangerous roads in Vietnam? What's he like? He won't tell, but his buddy, SP4 Hill will: "He drives a 'Quad .50.' Without him and the other guys there backing us up, we'd really be in for it during an ambush. We need guys like Cowart in the Quad to make it. They have real guts." Specialist Cowart is sitting there on a footlocker, his mind-thoughts suddenly far off.

So we find out about what each is like from the other. They both have a sense of pride. Both have a high morale. Both have guts. They are typical guys of the 8th Group.

Specialist Cowart's mind-pounding thoughts quickly fade away as he returns to where he's at, and he adds, "Doing what we're doing gives a guy a sense of pride. That's what keeps a guy going. Morale? All we have here is our job. Messing around with the guys. You're with these guys, living with them, fighting with them. And you really hate to see someone get hurt. We care."

Yes. They both have a sense of pride, high morale, guts. They are typical guys of the 444th. They have what makes a man. They are the men in the 8th Transportation Group.

SP4 Earl M. Cohen

COLONEL GARLAND A. LUDY
COMMANDING OFFICER
8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

Legion of Merit

Colonel Garland A. Ludy, 224-52-5234, United States Army, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services while serving as the Commanding Officer of the 8th Transportation Group from 22 September 1968 to 14 September 1969 in connection with military operations against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Ludy, through his unfailing dedication to duty, interest in the welfare of his troops, and enthusiasm and organizational ability, has led the 8th Group in accomplishing consistently higher achievements in the performance of mission.

As Commanding Officer of the 8th Transportation Group, Colonel Ludy was responsible for the overall operation of the command with the largest, most complex line haul operation in the Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Ludy's strict adherence to the concept, "The standards of a command are no higher than the standards of the commanding officer," has enabled him to organize and direct improvements in all areas of 8th Group operations. Operating over an enemy infested road net of 500 miles, 8th Group successfully utilized Colonel Ludy's hardened convoy concept. The continual repositioning of gun trucks in convoys has kept the enemy off balance and has enabled convoys to defend themselves in the first critical minutes of ambushes. Through Colonel Ludy's command guidance, 8th Group was able to average 6,500,000 ton miles per month for the last 6 months. This record average is due largely to Colonel Ludy's personally developed trailer accountability plan which provided maximum availability and utilization of trailer assets.

During his command, Colonel Ludy was charged with additional line haul responsibility which he immediately and effectively organized and implemented. In April 1969, the 8th Group was given both the resources and the responsibility to transport a large backlog of heavy equipment to be hauled to various destinations. Additionally, a requirement to move retrograde heavy equipment into Qui Nhon was invoked. Colonel Ludy organized a heavy lift platoon that transported approximately 6,000 tons over 26,500 miles. Through his aggressive management of 8th Group resources, the backlog of critically needed tanks, armored personnel carriers, materials handling equipment, and other heavy equipment was reduced. In June 1969 when the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline was closed, Colonel Ludy realigned his tanker assets so effectively that 8th Group filled all POL requirements with equipment on hand. This amounts to an average of over 250,000 gallons of POL daily.

While Commanding Officer of the 8th Transportation Group, Colonel Ludy was additionally responsible for 7,000 U. S. troops, 3,000 ARVN troops, and 40,000 civilians in the Phu Thanh Valley, a fifty square mile area. His responsibilities included not only physical and local security, but also the supervision of clubs, messes, morale and welfare activities, and the establishment of off-limits areas. Prior to Tet 1969, Colonel Ludy initiated "Project: "No Repeat" to upgrade the defensive posture of each compound and facility. A special inspection team was formed and all perimeters, weapons, and communications equipment were upgraded for immediate and sustained use. At Colonel Ludy's suggestion, the infrastructure of the entire Qui Nhon Defense Installation was changed in April 1969 to provide increased flexibility and response to intensified enemy sapper activities. His

His personal dedication as an Area Defense Commander was best exemplified when, on one occasion, he immediately departed with reinforcing guntrucks to the scene of an ambush of two night convoys - one U. S. and the other ARVN. For his courageous and selfless action in preventing a major disaster, he was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor. Through such actions and his systematic improvement of installation security, his leadership has prevented enemy penetration of perimeters despite a high concentration of enemy forces in the area.

Ever searching for superior methods to handle the various and complex problems that occur daily in an organization with 2200 personnel operating around the clock, Colonel Ludy successfully utilized and directed staff operations so that each section realized its potential. The full utilization of task resources, for example, was possible only due to his consistent and insistent attention to maintenance and organization. In September 1968, when Colonel Ludy assumed command, 8th Group units were experiencing difficulty in maintaining 12-ton semi-trailers due to lack of adequate facilities and critical shortages of repair parts. At that time, twenty-five (25%) of the Group's trailer fleet was deadlined. Through Colonel Ludy's initiative, guidance, and supervision, the 8th Group established a Central Trailer Maintenance Facility (CTMF). The CTMF was built on a self-help basis to provide a facility for emergency and running repairs and required scheduled services on the 640 semi-trailers authorized. Under Colonel Ludy's guidance, the CTMF was so effective that the average deadline rate for the 8th Group's trailer fleet during his tour was two percent (2%). The increased availability of trailers has resulted in more ton-miles of supplies delivered by the 8th Group during Colonel Ludy's tenure than in any previous period. The fact that this was accomplished with less equipment and less manpower attests to Colonel Ludy's intensely efficient management and control.

Colonel Ludy's command emphasis on materiel readiness, supervised preventive maintenance, and daily motor stables put more 8th Group vehicles on the road daily than in any previous period. The 8th Group average vehicle deadline from September 1967 through June 1968 was fourteen point five percent (14.5%).

During the period September 1968 through June 1969 under Colonel Ludy's command, the deadline rate was six point four percent (6.4%). On 5 October 1968 only eighteen (18) of the seven hundred (700) prime movers of the Group were deadlined, an accomplishment that was noted with pleasure in a letter of 13 October 1968 to Colonel Ludy from the Commanding General of the 1st Logistical Command. Colonel Ludy's command emphasis on readiness was again reflected by the fact that 8th Transportation Group units successfully passed Annual General Inspections and Command Maintenance Inspections conducted by teams from Qui Nhon Support Command, 1st Logistical Command, and United States Army of Vietnam. To insure readiness within the Group, Colonel Ludy carefully planned, selected, and directed a Group Command Inspection Team that performed internal Annual General Inspections and Command Maintenance Materiel Inspections on all units of his command at six (6) month intervals.

Keenly conscious and concerned throughout his tour for the welfare of his troops, Colonel Ludy constantly sought methods for improving living conditions and morale within his command. He personally conducted rigorous and recurring inspections that upgraded the living conditions in all of his areas. Colonel Ludy's absolute insistence on the highest quality of food and mess hall facilities was fully implemented through his program of Best Mess Awards within the Group on a monthly

basis. Each month competitive inspections of mess halls were conducted by Group staff personnel with Colonel Ludy presenting awards to the winning unit. In addition, a mobile cooks school was developed and sent to each unit within the 8th Group, resulting in better prepared and more attractively served meals being available to all 8th Group soldiers.

Colonel Ludy's zeal for the moral and religious program inspired and encouraged the chaplains in going to the men on the convoys and in their living and working areas. Because the drivers could not always attend chapel services, his statement, "We must take the Gospel to the men," resulted in early morning Sunday and weekday services at the truck marshalling areas. One week in November 1968 the Group chaplains conducted 24 services for 453 individuals. Seven months later, there were 46 services for 867 persons in one week. Colonel Ludy's unparalleled support of religious programs gave the 8th Group the highest attendance in the Qui Nhon Support Command.

Colonel Ludy's sensitive consciousness and concentration on all aspects of command responsibility inspired and led members of the 8th Transportation Group to new and higher levels of accomplishment. Setting the example for every officer and non-commissioned officer within the Group, Colonel Ludy's dedication and consistency in following up on each observation and decision provided the highest type of leadership of the 8th Transportation Group and his service to the United States Army.

Information contained in the recommendation has been verified against Colonel Ludy's personnel records and the recommendation is not in contravention of AR 600-31. Colonel Ludy's overall performance of duty was outstanding.

Authorized grade for duty position held - Colonel.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM C. FREEMAN
COMMANDING OFFICER 27TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

Legion of Merit

LTC William C. Freeman distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service not involving aerial flight in connection with military operations against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam for the period 30 August 1968 to 15 August 1969 while serving as Executive Officer with the 394th Transportation Battalion, OIC of Vung Ro Bay and later as Commanding Officer of the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck). While serving as Battalion Executive Officer with the 394th Transportation Battalion he displayed exceptionally outstanding traits of leadership, efficiency and a spirited "can do" attitude. LTC Freeman's first major accomplishment was the forming of a Battalion CMMI Team which enabled the battalion to maintain a low deadline rate. This Inspection Team caused their mission accomplishment to be one of an enviable feat in that their unit was able to utilize every possible resource, therefore insuring they would never be faced with a mission failure. LTC Freeman contributed significantly to every aspect of the 394th Transportation Battalion's activity. Administratively, LTC Freeman saw to a high level of performance from the personnel of the Battalion Staff. He was very active in Civil Affairs and was the primary impetus for the Battalion's exceptional Civil Affairs Program. LTC Freeman exhibited a sense of pride in each task he undertook. In late December of 1968, LTC Freeman (then Major) was promoted to his present grade. Then as OIC of Vung Ro Bay, LTC Freeman was very instrumental in forming a well co-ordinated defense of the Port area. Additionally, he was instrumental in forming the organizational structure that operates Vung Ro Bay this date. In February, LTC Freeman was selected as the Commanding Officer of the 27th Transportation Battalion. Through his unfailing dedication to duty, drive, enthusiasm he led the 27th Transportation Battalion to consistently high achievements in both the performance of mission and the welfare of the troops. The battalion manifested a "can do" attitude. During the period cited, the 27th Transportation Battalion hauled 276,000 tons of general supplies, Class V and Class I cargo through the Central Highlands in the Republic of Vietnam, traversing a total of 3,350,000 miles through rugged jungle and mountain roadways common to the region. Although this battalion encountered enemy ambushes and sniper incidents, losses were minimal and this unit has never failed to complete its assigned mission. In the field of maintenance, LTC Freeman significantly improved the material posture of the battalion. Through his personal attention to maintenance, the vehicle deadline rate of the Battalion was lowered to the commendable average figure of 5.1% for his six months of command. Despite the increasing demand, upon his time and energy, of the organizational and maintenance problems inherent in the 24 hour operation of a battalion size unit over bad roads and under frequent enemy harassment, LTC Freeman found opportunity to personally supervise the development and organization of the Camp Vasquez Guard Force in order to improve the compound's defense posture while reducing the number of guards required per day.

Constantly mindful of the morale and welfare of his men, LTC Freeman vigorously supported activities that would boost troop morale. He monitored the development and construction of projects such as the Education Center, Battalion Officer's Lounge, and Battalion Class VI store. His latest construction project was the completion of a modern barber shop which boasts of facilities comparable to barber shops in CONUS.

The 27th Transportation Battalion performed line haul missions for the 8th Transportation Group to Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, Bong Son, An Khe, and Dak To or any other required location. To improve convoy procedures and to maintain high morale he personally took to the road, to learn first hand the conditions under which his men worked and frequently accompanied them over enemy infested routes where dynamic and effective leadership was a necessity. Through LTC Freeman's personal interest in the welfare of his men and his workable open-door policy, congressional, special interest inquiries or IG cases were non-existent.

His leadership enabled the battalion to successfully pass 1 AGI and five CMMI's with no unsatisfactory units while at the same time operating line-haul operations around the clock under prohibited weather and road conditions. Under difficult tactical situations he constantly strived for better management of personnel and utilization of resources. Throughout his tenure as commander, the 27th Transportation Battalion overcame the disadvantages of long lines of supply, bad weather, ambushes and enemy harassment to constantly improve in readiness posture, mission capability and morale. He astutely surmounted extremely adverse conditions to consistently obtain outstanding results.

His skill as a coordinator and administrator plus his mission oriented outlook and ability to make timely sound decisions for the benefit of the command and its customers have earned the respect and admiration of superiors and subordinates alike. His willingness to seek and discharge responsibility beyond the requirements of his assignments plus his outstanding performance in every field of endeavor have made a significant contribution to United States and Free World Forces efforts within this command reflect great credit upon himself, this command, and the United States Army.

Information contained in this recommendation has been verified against the individual's personnel records and this recommendation is not in contravention with AR 600-31.

Officer's overall manner of performance has been outstanding.

Authorized grade for duty position held - Lieutenant Colonel.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM R. SARBER
COMMANDING OFFICER, 54TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

Legion of Merit

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Sarber, 0146-22-6361 United States Army, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service while serving as Commanding Officer of the 54th Transportation Battalion from 8 January 1969 to 11 October 1969. The unit was involved in military operations against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. Through his unfailing dedication to duty, interest in the welfare of his troops, enthusiasm and organizational ability, LTC Sarber's leadership enabled the 54th Transportation Battalion to excel in the performance of its mission.

During his tenure, he sought and accepted several important changes in the battalion mission, changes which measurably improved motor transport in the 8th Transportation Group's 500 mile roadnet of operations. A heavy lift platoon consisting of ten ton tractors, 50 ton trailers and 25 ton trailers was assigned to battalion control. In five months of constant operations, the platoon amassed a total of one million ton-miles, a performance which was recognized by a personal visit to the platoon by the Support Command Commanding General. The administration, operation and maintenance of this unique unit bore the unmistakable stamp of LTC Sarber's perceptive attention and direction. The movement of high-priority outsized and overweight cargo from the Pleiku area became streamlined and effective.


The battalion also took responsibility for all aspects of the Qui Nhon Trailer Transfer Point and in doing so became the very heart of the group line haul mission. In supervising the physical doubling of the Trailer Transfer Point area, the relocation and rebuilding of the operations office, the design of the new traffic pattern and the concept and details of a trailer accounting system, LTC Sarber's sure hand and rich depth of experience and insight insured that the Trailer Transfer Point's current measure of success is remarkable. Whether the shuttle tractors are provided by the Korean contractor or the military, the end result of smooth trailer transfer revolves around the Qui Nhon Trailer Transfer Point. Coordination with the two line haul battalions and over a dozen loading offices was a task which LTC Sarber's diplomacy and tact brought to a continuing high level of efficiency.

Because of the vital impact of the mess halls, LTC Sarber displayed an emphatic interest in this area, and he insisted that each unit operate a first rate mess hall. Due to the command emphasis placed in this area, battalion units won three (3) first place, one (1) second place and one (1) thire place 8th Group Best Mess Awards. In addition, one of the units was selected for the Qui Nhon Support Command Best Mess Award. These awards are only indications of the daily excellence of the food service in the 54th Transportation Battalion.

The battalion's briefing breakfast with visiting General Officers and dignitaries, has become a high point on the Qui Nhon Support Command's tour itinerary. These breakfasts, rotated through the battalion's three stereo-equipped mess halls on a few hours notice, are proof that LTC Sarber's standards are equal to the closest and sternest scrutiny.

Knowing the importance of a good maintenance program, LTC Sarber initiated an aggressive and comprehensive preventive maintenance program in the 54th Transportation Battalion. The battalion deadline rate dropped from 17.8% during the corresponding period the previous year to 6.4% under LTC Sarber.

8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP
15 September 1969



In an effort to make conditions better for the men in the battalion, LTC Sarber pursued a policy of upgrading the living conditions on the compound. Among the many accomplishments in this area were the construction of the battalion recreation pad to be used for basketball, volleyball and tennis, the completion of the Officers' Club, the doubling of the perimeter lighting, and the building of patios for two mess halls.

LTC Sarber's continuing command emphasis on safety produced tangible results. The assigned companies earned four (4) 100,000 mile and one 200,000 mile accident free awards while over 300 men earned individual safety awards ranging from 5,000 to 30,000 accident free miles.

His consuming interest in safety was apparent to each of his supervisory personnel as he personally gave a safety briefing to assembled convoy supervisors at 0530 each and every morning during his period of command. The effect of this program of leadership by example was clear as the number of motor vehicle accidents dropped from 114 during the corresponding period of the previous year to 60 during LTC Sarber's tour.

During the period of LTC Sarber's command, the 54th Transportation Battalion experienced 14 ambushes. The professional reaction and high spirit of the battalion's control elements, drivers, and gunners are a high tribute. Although support troops are not usually concerned with confronting the enemy, the 54th Transportation Battalion met this challenge with distinction. LTC Sarber's supremely reasoned approach to both administrative and tactical requirements produced a motor transport battalion operation which was widely recognized as a keystone of the vitally important Qui Non Support Command mission.

Through his initiative and his exemplary leadership, he has materially contributed to the counterinsurgency effort in the Republic of Vietnam. This Officer's records have been screened and this action is not in contravention of AR 600-31. LTC Sarber's performance of duty has been outstanding in every respect. The authorized grade for the duty position held Lieutenant Colonel.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TOM L. BING
COMMANDING OFFICER 124TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

Legion of Merit

For outstandingly meritorious service not involving participation in aerial flight in connection with military operations against a hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam, LTC Tom L. Bing, 410-30-5079, United States Army, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of his duties during the period 10 October 1968 to 27 June 1969 while serving as Commanding Officer, 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck). After assuming command on 10 October 1968, LTC Bing expended immeasurable amounts of time and effort in the successful discharge of his key position.

The 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck) plays the pivotal role in motor transportation throughout the Central Highlands. A composite battalion of great flexibility, LTC Bing's command met the dual challenges of the 8th Group line haul system and critical combat support for the 4th Infantry Division. Composed of two medium truck companies (cargo), one medium truck company (petroleum), one light truck company, the GOER Provisional Company, and a truck terminal, all classes of cargo were hauled from Ben Het to Ban Me Thout, from the South China Sea to the Cambodian border, over the same treacherous roads on which the French Group Mobil 100 was annihilated sixteen years ago. Wherever his convoys went, there too was LTC Bing. During the Siege of Ben Het (May - June 1969), LTC Bing coordinated US resupply efforts to the beleaguered garrison. His combat truckers were the first convoy able to punch through three enemy regiments to deliver vitally needed 175mm ammunition to the firebase. Without LTC Bing's personal innovation to the 8th Group "Hardened Vehicle Concept," those convoys traveling to Ben Het would never have been able to penetrate the determined enemy blockade. Immediately upon his arrival in Pleiku, he began designing and experimenting with a double-hull gun-truck intended to prevent B-40 rockets from penetrating the gunners' positions. An added benefit from double hulling guntrucks was that the space between the armor plating proved ideal for carrying spare tires, thus increasing the truck maintenance capability. However, his most unusual accomplishment was in arming the guntrucks with mini-guns. When LTC Bing's convoys left Dak To for Ben Het, never before had a transportation unit possessed such awesome firepower. The mounting of the mini-guns on vehicles presented innumerable technical problems, but almost every night during November and December 1968, one found LTC Bing in the motor pool: designing, tinkering, encouraging. Prophetically, men of the 124th Transportation Battalion are alive to talk about the Ben Het convoys today because LTC Bing spent those long evenings with his mini-guns.

In the same manner that LTC Bing's bold combat leadership insured timely delivery of "beans and bullets" to the most remote outposts, his incisive management techniques made optimum utilization of limited equipment and personnel. In the winter of 1968, task and control vehicles were in such short supply that virtually all the battalion's administrative jeeps and 2½ ton trucks were committed to meet the mission. By February, the equipment was available, but men were not. Again, the cargo was delivered even when it meant, as it often did, that First Sergeants drove 5-ton tractors and company commanders served as shuttle NCO's. Yet, somehow LTC Bing developed during the same period a compound that was the envy of Pleiku. Starting with only bare buildings and four inches of mud, Camp Wilson was transformed into a painted, landscaped, spotless military compound. An

inclosed 600-seat theater, semi-private billets, and expansive library now vie with a complete club system for the truck drivers' limited leisure time. LTC Bing strove for battalion unity. To this end, he moved two of his units into Camp Wilson, masterly allocating buildings and facilities. The then abandoned Bien Ho contonment area was redesigned as a textbook convoy marshalling area. As many as four hundred vehicles of the 8th Transportation Group, the 4th Division, and the 937th Engineer Group were daily molded into convoys under supervision of the 124th Transportation Battalion.

The extent to which resupply in the Central Highlands depended on LTC Bing is reflected in the 370,004,800 ton miles and the 27,600,600 gallons of POL hauled by his battalion during his command. With the enthusiastic support of the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, LTC Bing established a trailer transfer point at Camp Enari, the division base camp. The effect of this boldly controversial move will be felt as long as the US Army remains in RVN. This trailer transfer point cuts down the turnaround time for every 12-ton semi-trailer destined for Camp Enari by 24 hours. Additionally, the battalion's local shuttle was decreased by 50% through this innovation.

During LTC Bing's eight-and-one-half months of command, his units successfully passed four 8th Group CMMI's, four 1st Log CMMI's, eleven 8th Group Command Inspections, and four QNSC AGI's.

Perhaps the most striking example of LTC Bing's personal leadership qualities is the remarkably high number of his junior officers who have decided to make the Army a career after service in his battalion. LTC Bing's achievements are outstanding and in keeping with the highest traditions of military service, reflecting great credit upon himself, his command, and the United States Army. I strongly recommend LTC Tom Bing for the Legion of Merit.

The information contained in this recommendation has been verified against LTC Bing's personnel records and this recommendation is not in contravention of AR 600-31. LTC Bing's overall performance of duty has been outstanding.

Authorized grade for duty position held - Lieutenant Colonel.

AWARDS PRESENTED IN 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP

1 October 1968 - 31 August 1969

	AM	PH	AGM/S	ACM/V	BS/S	BS/V	SS	LOM	TOTAL
OCT	0	3	7	0	12	2	0	0	24
NOV	0	3	22	5	13	6	0	1	50
DEC	0	3	15	2	8	15	3	0	46
JAN	0	10	13	0	6	5	0	0	34
FEB	0	7	14	6	17	4	0	0	48
MAR	2	18	15	0	18	7	0	0	60
APR	0	1	4	5	16	8	1	0	35
MAY	2	8	18	4	13	5	1	0	51
JUN	4	2	34	0	38	4	0	0	82
JUL	0	4	13	0	31	2	0	0	50
AUG	1	3	46	1	32	7	1	0	91
TOT	9	62	201	23	204	65	6	1	571

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
GOER TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (PROVISIONAL)
APO San Francisco 96318

1. The GOER Trans Co (Prov) was organized in the Republic of Vietnam on 1 September 1966, by General Order Number 120, Headquarters U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO SF 96238. The unit was assigned to the 27th Transportation Battalion, APO SF 96226, and moved up to Pleiku, to be utilized there. The personnel were assigned from available resources within the Country.
2. Prior to the formation of the unit two (2) GOER vehicles, a cargo and a tanker arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, about 15 July 1966. After a short period of operation in the Cam Ranh Bay area, those two (2) vehicles were shipped to the Pleiku area via Qui Nhon. The two (2) GOER vehicles arrived in Pleiku on 24 August 1966. The first GOER Company initiated training on this date and continued until 11 September 1966, when the unit became operational. Seventeen (17) GOER vehicles arrived at Qui Nhon from USAREUR on 4 September 1966, and were convoyed to Pleiku on 8 September 1966.
3. The GOER Transportation Company (Prov) was committed from 11 September thru 20 September 1966, to provide direct support to the 4th Infantry Division. The monsoon weather existed throughout this period, and the GOER vehicles were the only vehicles which consistently hauled all classes of supplies into the Division Base Camp, under their own power. Two (2) GOER vehicles were on an extended dispatch to the 4th Infantry Division Base Camp, for the purpose of hauling water and rations because of existing poor weather and terrain conditions. After this the unit vehicles were used to support the 6th of the 14th Artillery. The vehicles were operated between Pleiku, Jackson Hole, Oasis, Duc To, Dakto, Kentum and Pole D' Jersey. During the monsoon seasons of 1966 and 1967 the GOER vehicles hauled all classes of cargo on roads that were totally impassable to conventional vehicles and in many cases impassable to track vehicles.
4. On 28 December 1966, the GOER Transportation Company (Prov) was reassigned to a FSA when employed. In late January 1967, meetings were held in Qui Nhon to set up a Table of Distribution and Allowance for the GOER Transportation Company (Prov).
5. On 2 February 1967, a TDA was drafted and sent forward. The TDA was not approved, or really it was not given a number so it is a proposed TDA. Several times people have tried to get the TDA approved even the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in Vietnam but nothing has been done yet.
6. On 17 February 1967, the GOER Transportation Company (Prov) was assigned to the Pleiku-Sub-Area Command with special instructions that all personnel replacements and promotions will be provided by the 8th Group, until an authorized TDA/TOE is approved. On 24 February 1967, the unit was attached to the 45th General Support Group (the unit that makes up the Pleiku-Sub-Area Command). On 26 February 1967, with an effective date of 17 February 1967, the 45th GS Group reassigned the unit to the 88th Supply & Service Battalion, in Pleiku, with the same special instructions for the 8th TC Group.
7. On 5 November 1967, the GOER Transportation Company (Prov) began its move to Chau Lai. The move was completed in four (4) days and covered 206 miles. The unit was attached to the 80th General Support Group (Forward), and established its

base camp in Chu Lai. During the first part of the unit stay in Chu Lai area the commitments were between Chu Lai and Hill 63 in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). From 25 November 1967, until 10 February 1968, the unit based a platoon at Hill 29, base camp of the 1st Armored Cavalry, and from this location commitments were accepted to remote fire bases throughout the area.

8. The GOER Transportation Company (Prov) arrived at My Truy (Utah Beach) on 22 March 1968, and was used for beach clearance over soft sand which was virtually impassable for any vehicle but a GOER. The unit operated from the beach to storage areas in Quan Tri, Dong Ha, Camp Evans, LZ Jane, LZ Sharon and LZ Betty. During this time the GOER's were called upon by the 101st (Airborne) to move troops from their base camp to forward areas. The GOER vehicles moved with ease over the soft sand where a conventional truck could not go, thus saving the troops a long tiring march. During frequent probing action on the perimeter, the GOER vehicles were used to rapidly shuttle small reaction forces across the sand to repel the attacks.

9. On 10 May 1968, the GOER Transportation Company (Prov) returned to its home station of Pleiku, and were assigned to the 124th Transportation Battalion (Trk). On 18 May 1968, GOER's were committed in support of the 5th of the 16th Artillery, participating in Operation Mathew near Dak Lo, Kontum to Poli Kleng, carrying all classes of supplies in support of the 3rd of the 4th Infantry Division, and later to support this unit at the Oasis, the Goers again succeeded.

10. About 10 July 1968, the GOER unit received a commitment to support the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division at the Oasis. At the end of July the 2nd Brigade moved farther south, and the 3rd Brigade moved to the Oasis from Kontum. From August thru October 1968, the GOER vehicles and troops worked out of the Oasis, but were not used very much. The 1968 monsoon season in the Central Highland was light, and thus most of the conventional vehicles could have done the job.

11. At the end of August the 1st Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division at Dak To needed GOER's, so they were sent to haul to Ben Het. The road to Ben Het was not completed so all that they could do was run from the ASP to Hook Pad. About two & a half weeks later they came home.

12. About 24 October 1968, the GOER Transportation Company (Prov) was told to hold a stand down to get ready to move. The unit was to be in Da Nang on 5 November 1968. All vehicles and personnel were called in. Seven (7) days later the unit was set. 5 November 1968 passed, a new date of 9 November 1968 was set to leave Pleiku. On 8 November 1968, the unit was completely packed and ready to go out the gate, but no good. On 10 November 1968, the GOER's went back to the Oasis and Dak To. First Lieutenant Preble had joined the unit on 3 November 1968, for the move, took the First Platoon to Dak To. A couple of days later the 4th Infantry Division needed the GOER's in Kontum to haul class five to Poli Kleng. The unit had three locations in the field plus a base station at Pleiku. The vehicles hauled tons of cargo over the dirty dusty roads which are bad for the vehicles.

13. On 1 December 1968, all personnel and vehicles were again called back to base camp. On 8 December 1968, at 1300 hours the unit left Camp Wilson, Pleiku for Qui Nhon RVN, and at LST. The last of the unit closed Qui Nhon on 9 December 1968. The unit could not move all the equipment on one LST. The two (2) 12 ton Shop Vans and one (1) GOER had to come to Chu Lai on an LCU. The roof of one (1) 12 ton Shop Trailer was torn in trying to load it on the LST. The unit left one (1) GOER Cargo and two (2) GOER Tankers in Pleiku. On 10 December 1968, at 1500 hours the unit arrived in Chu Lai. On 12 December 1968, the entire unit moved to Hill 29, to set up a base camp. On 14 December 1968, the First Platoon and 1LT Preble moved to Hill 63, to do the hauling.

14. The GOER Transportation Company (Prov) personnel are assigned to the 541st Transportation Company (Lt Trk) in Pleiku (part of the 124th Battalion) and were attached to the 80th General Support Group (Forwarded).
15. The 124th Battalion Commander LTC Tom L. Bing, has sent a letter to DA asking this unit be given a Unit Identification Code, and have DA approve it.
16. On 15 Feb 69, all personnel and vehicles returned to Pleiku. At this time the unit was deactivated and the personnel, except the mechanics were transferred to units within the 124th Transportation Battalion.
17. On 24 Mar 69, CW-2 Martin and the six (6) remaining mechanics were assigned the task of rebuilding the remaining GOER's. The project was started on 28 Mar 69 and completed on 26 Jul 69.
18. On 26 July 69, five drivers and two NCO's were picked from units within the 124th Transportation Battalion and the ~~driver~~ driver training program began.
19. On 1 Aug 69, GOER personnel were assigned to HHD, 124th Transportation Battalion.
20. On 4 Aug 69, utilization of GOER's in support of 4th Infantry Division was directed. Five Cargo Transporters and two Tankers were dispatched to the 4th Infantry Division to transport fuel and supplies during monsoon season.

SECURITY

The 8th Transportation Group (MT) has taken a unique approach to convoy security, necessitated by the tactical situation in the Northern II Corp Tactical Zone, RVN. On 2 September 1967, a major ambush to an 8th Group convoy demonstrated that a convoy must be able to defend itself and return suppressive fire in the first critical minutes of an ambush. The best that can be expected from tactical forces is an effective reaction in 10 minutes; however, well planned ambushes have accomplished their objectives by that time. Consequently, the "Hardened Vehicle Concept" was implemented and subsequently modified by the "Ludy Concept". All task vehicles in line haul operations have armor plating in the doors of the cab and control jeeps are equipped with MRO armor plating kits, AN-VRC-46 radios and M-60 machine guns. Additionally, one gun truck accompanies each ten task vehicles per convoy. The essence of a gun truck is an armor plated bed with intensive firepower. Most gun trucks are equipped with 2 M-60 and 1 50 caliber machine gun, although some gun trucks utilize miniguns. Salvaged APC hulls have been mounted on the beds of 5 ton cargo trucks. Experimentation and innovation have marked the development of gun trucks.

The "Ludy Concept" deals with the arrangement of vehicles within the convoy. Until Colonel Garland A. Ludy assumed command of the Group in September 1968, a gun truck led each march unit or serial. The enemy had grown accustomed to this arrangement and invariably attacked the fourth or fifth vehicle. The poor quality roads prevented the lead gun truck from turning around and it was rendered almost useless. Now a task vehicle leads 8th Group convoys and the position of the gun trucks is varied daily so that enemy can never make precise plans regarding which to attack. Since September, 1967 the group has been involved in 57 ambushes. Sniper incidents occur two to three times a week. The worth of gun trucks in saving human lives and vital supplies has been documented time and time again. Their presence alone has been a significant morale booster for the combat truckers.

Although the 8th Group delivers cargo to such remote places as Polei Djereng and Cheo Reo, only in one instance has off-loading been hampered by enemy activity at the consignee's sites. During the Siege of Ben Het (May - June 1969) the arrival of an 8th Group convoy at this isolated firebase always occasioned an enemy mortar barrage. As a result of the herculean resupply effort at Ben Het, six semitrailers and two tractors were lost to enemy action.

One of the most dangerous missions engaged in by the group is the night convoy activity between the Cha Rang Valley and the Qui Nhon loading sites. Night loading convoys have been engaged in two ambushes and nine sniper incidents in 1969 alone. Extra security and close coordination with Popular - Regional Force units have diminished enemy harassment of night convoys in recent months.

Most of 8th Group's prime movers and personnel are located in three major compounds: Camp Vasquez in Phu Thanh; Camp Addison in Cha Rang; and Camp Wilson in Pleiku. Enemy sniper activities have only infrequently been directed against these facilities and task vehicles have never been singled out as prime targets of enemy sapper activity. Intense command emphasis has always been placed on compound security by the Group Commander and this is a major factor in minimizing enemy sapper attacks.

8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

AMBUSH

These ambush instructions have been developed from lessons learned in Vietnam by the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport). Your mission and your life may depend upon how well you learn these lessons.

1. KEEP WEAPON READY TO FIRE.
2. BE ALERT FOR CHANGES IN FAMILIAR SCENES ALONG ROUTE.
3. USE YOUR WEAPON, RETURN FIRE IMMEDIATELY.
4. NOTIFY SECURITY FORCE BY RADIO, CALL - CONTACT, CONTACT, CONTACT.
5. CONTINUE MOVING, MAINTAINING INTERVAL IF POSSIBLE.
6. TRACK VEHICLES AHEAD TO PREVENT FURTHER DETONATION OF MINES.
7. DON'T ENTER KILL ZONE IF POSSIBLE.
8. IF DISABLED AND CONVOY IS MOVING THROUGH KILL ZONE, MOUNT A PASSING VEHICLE.
9. PROVIDE FLANKING SUPPORT FIRE INTO KILL ZONE.
10. GUN TRUCKS APPLY MAXIMUM BASE OF FIRE. FIGHT AS A TEAM. DEPLOY UPON COMMAND.
11. PRIME TARGETS ARE: ENEMY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS POSITIONS, ENEMY MORTAR, ROCKET POSITIONS AND ASSAULTING GROUND TROOPS.
12. STAY ON HARD SURFACE.
13. CEASE FIRE ON SIGNAL.
14. REMEMBER DETAILS.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

4 January 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush


Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238


At approximately 031725 January 1969, an 8th Transportation Group convoy under the control of Lt. Frank, 88th Transportation Company, 27th Transportation Battalion proceeding west to An Khe on QL 19 was attacked by an estimated VC/NVA platoon with B-40 rockets, automatic weapons and small arms approximately 1 kilometer west of Bridge 19 (Vic BR510460). The kill zone has been estimated to have been 500 meters. The convoy consisted of 09 5 ton tractors with trailers, 01 5 ton tractor without trailer, 01 lowboy, 02 gun trucks and 01 gun jeep. Prior to departure from Qui Nhon, the convoy commander permitted 07 Han Jin cargo trucks to fall in behind the convoy. As soon as the convoy came under enemy fire, the 8th Group drivers quickly proceeded out of the kill zone. Due to the drivers' quick reaction, there were no casualties in that portion of the convoy. However, 05 5 ton tractors and 01 gun truck were damaged. On the other hand, the drivers of three trucks of the Han Jin portion of the convoy were hit in the kill zone. One was killed and two were seriously wounded. As Lt. Frank's gun jeep came up from the last spot in the column to aid the Han Jin vehicles, it was hit by a B-40 rocket killing the driver and wounding Lt. Frank and his machine gunner. A convoy gun truck moved into the kill zone and laid down a suppressive base of fire. Three of the gunners in the gun crew were slightly wounded in the ensuing action. In the meantime, an APC moved in from Bridge 19 and fired at an enemy position on the south side of the road. Also, an 8th Group quad-fifty, and gun truck came back from the thruput convoy and entered the kill zone to lay a suppressive base of fire on the rocket and automatic weapons positions. The MP's sent into the kill zone a V-100 armored car and a gun jeep. The gun truck with the wounded crew then turned to silence small arms fire from the north side of the road. Within twenty minutes, gunships arrived and expended. Artillery was also brought to bear on the enemy positions. Dustoff arrived and evacuated the most seriously wounded. Results: 01 US KIA (88th Trans Co); 05 US WHA (88th Trans Co); 01 Han Jin driver KIA; and 02 Han Jin drivers WHA. Five 5 ton tractors from the 88th Trans Co and one gun truck from the 28th Light Truck Platoon were damaged. One ½ ton truck from the 88th Trans Co was destroyed. At least three Han Jin trucks were damaged.

TEL: PT 786/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY.
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY


T. G. STEVENS
Major, TC



BN 19

700 m

200 m

BALDY

SLIGHT ELEVATION

ELEVATION

MOUNTAIN

- Han Jin
- SWAMP
- Enemy Machine Gun Position (Est)
- Gun Jeep
- EST Enemy Position (individual)

VEHICLES CLEAR KILL-ZONE

X X X

X ⊗ X X ⊗

X X X

- -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

16 January 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238


At approximately 150000 January 1969, an 8th Transportation Group convoy under the control of Lt. Shelley, 512th Transportation Company, 54th Transportation Battalion proceeding west to An Khe on QL 19 was attacked by an estimated VC/NVA platoon with B-40 rockets, automatic weapons and small arms approximately 100 meters west of Bridge 18. (Vic BR539461). The kill zone has been estimated to have been 500 meters. The convoy consisted of 05 2½ ton cargos, 47 5 ton cargos, 04 Han Jin reefers, 02 gun jeeps, 07 gun trucks and 01 maintenance truck. The enemy attacked the rear of the first serial of the convoy from the north side of the road. Five vehicles were in the kill zone at the time the attack was initiated. The driver of the first vehicle was killed causing his vehicle to veer off to the south side of the road. The remaining vehicles cleared the kill zone. The remainder of the serial was stopped at Bridge 17. The convoy commander brought three gun trucks and three gun jeeps into the kill zone to return fire. A reaction force of 6 APC's and 2 gun ships were on the scene within 5 minutes. Results: 01 US KIA (54th Trans Bn); 02 US WHA (54th Trans Bn); 02 vehicles heavily damaged and 05 vehicles damaged. Enemy suffered 02 KIA's.

TEL: PT 786/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

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T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC



- ⊗ Gun Jeep
- Cargo
- ⊗ Gun Truck

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

On 140925 February 1969, a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy proceeding west to Pleiku was attacked on both sides of the road with rockets, satchel charges, automatic weapons and small arms by approximately 50 NVA troops along a 400 meter kill zone $\frac{1}{4}$ mile west of Bridge 19 (vic BR515461). The convoy consisted of 34 5 ton cargos, 7 $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton cargos, 5 Han Jin reefers, 3 Han Jin dry vans, 5 gun trucks and 4 gun jeeps. The 5 ton cargo truck and the gun truck that were in the kill zone at the onset were heavily damaged by the rockets and satchel charges. Immediately two more gun trucks and two gun jeeps proceeded into the kill zone and laid down a suppressive base of fire-especially to the south of the road where the main enemy force was located. Gunships arrived on the scene within 10 minutes and the infantry arrived in approximately 15 minutes. Contact was broken at 1005 hours. The results were as follows: 1 US KIA; 7 US WIA; 1 PF KIA; 5 enemy KIA; 3 POW CIA. In addition to the vehicles previously mentioned as heavily damaged, two 5 ton cargo trucks, one $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton cargo truck, one gun truck and one $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicle were also damaged.


TEL: PT 786/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY

T. G. Stevens
T. G. STEVENS
Major, TC

-  Gun Truck
-  Cargo Truck
-  APC
-  Gun Jeep



N ↑





LT Shelley


301 


B-40

BRIDGE 20
2 MILES

M112 

EVE OF
DESTRUCTION 

APC'S 

103 

IRON
BUTTERFLY 

ACE
OF
SPADES 

BUNNY
HUNTER 



8-16
Personnel

XA

X
B-40


X

X
B-40

BRIDGE 19
2 MILES →

X
HA

1/2 MILE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

23 February 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush


Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238


On 231305 February 1969, a 27th Transportation Battalion convoy under the control of 1LT Bushong, 444th Transportation Company, proceeding west on Highway 19 to Pleiku was attacked by an estimated NVA/VC platoon along both sides of a 400 meter kill zone with mortars, rockets, automatic weapons and small arms midway between Bridge 17 and Bridge 18 (vic BR550461). The convoy consisted of 1 quad-fifty, 4 gun trucks, 4 gun jeeps, 4-5 ton cargo trucks, 3-2½ ton cargo trucks, 6 reefers, 29 tankers, 3 bobtails, 7 Han Jin reefers, 1 wrecker and 2 maintenance trucks. Three tankers, a gun jeep, a quad fifty and a gun truck were in the kill zone when the attack commenced. While the tankers proceeded out of the kill zone, the convoy security vehicles laid down a suppressive base of fire on the enemy positions. Within 15 minutes two more gun trucks from the 88th Transportation Company arrived and proceeded to the flanks of the kill zone where they laid down additional fire support. Artillery and gunships were also employed against the enemy positions. Contact was broken after 25 minutes. The results were as follows: 4 US WIA; 2 EN KIA; 2 EN (probable KIA); 2 US tractors, 2 US tankers, 1 gun jeep and 1 quad-fifty damaged.

TEL: PT 786/179

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY


T. G. STEVENS
Major, TC



↑ FIRE RECEIVED FROM
 ↑↑ INTENSE FIRE RECEIVED FROM
 X- BODY
 ⊠ GUN JEEP

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

6 March 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush


Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

On 041723 March 1968, a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy under the control of Lt. Hutchins, 512th Transportation Company, proceeding east on QL 19 to Qui Nhon from Pleiku was attacked from the north side of the road in the vicinity of BR 617 467. The enemy employed automatic weapons and rockets in a 300 to 400 meter kill zone. The convoy consisted of 27-5 ton cargo vehicles, 10-2½ ton cargo vehicles, 1 maintenance truck, 3-5 ton tractors with stake and platform semi-trailers, 4 gun trucks and 1 gun jeep. The enemy initiated the attack against the lead cargo vehicle with a B-40 rocket which missed the target. This vehicle and the 4 vehicles immediately behind were engaged with automatic weapons as they cleared the kill zone. The sixth vehicle, a gun truck, stopped in the kill zone to return fire. Two additional gun trucks were ordered forward to assist. The remainder of the convoy did not enter the kill zone. Gun ship arrived within minutes and friendly ground troops were stationed on strong points in the area. The results were: Friendly - 10 US WHA and 5 vehicles damaged; Enemy - 3 KIA.

TEL: PT 785/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY


T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

6 March 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush


Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

On 051020 March 1969, a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy under the control of Lt. Shelley, 523rd Transportation Company, proceeding west on QL 19 was ambushed from the south side of the road by a reinforced platoon size enemy force in the vicinity of BR 232 506. The enemy employed AK 47's and B-40 rockets in a kill zone 300 to 400 meters long. The vehicles could not clear the kill zone because of a stopped Vietnamese truck blocking the road. The vehicles stopped and the drivers dismounted their vehicles and proceeded to return fire. Five NVA were observed in full field gear near the pipeline. Gunships arrived in the area at 051030 Mar 69 and immediately brought fire upon the enemy positions. Contact was broken at 1040 hours and the convoy moved out at 1050 hours. The convoy consisted of 16 - 5 ton cargos, 3 - 2½ ton cargos, 4 gun trucks and 2 gun jeeps. Results were: Friendly - 1 US WHA; Enemy - Unknown. Damage to equipment - 1 vehicle M54, 5 ton, 523rd Trans Co, #311, with a ruptured gas tank and a flat tire.


TEL: PT 785/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY


T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC

300 METERS



- | | |
|--|-------------|
| | Cargo Truck |
| | Gun Truck |
| | Gun Jeep |
| | Drivers |
| | NVA |

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

27 March 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush


Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238



At 242215 March 1969, a convoy from the 54th Transportation Battalion under the control of SSG Willie Sandfer was ambushed at CR 003 274 by a VC force originally estimated at 40-50, but more probably about ten (10). The convoy consisted of one (1) gun truck, one (1) administrative jeep and four (4) cargo trucks. The enemy used small arms, B-40's and hand grenades. The kill zone was approximately 250 meters. Gunships were requested immediately by the 8th Transportation Group, but denied by FSCC. The enemy broke contact at 2230 hours, approximately the same time SPOOKY arrived on the scene. There were 2 US KIA; 2 US WHA. ARVN losses included 1 KIA, 7 WHA and 7 vehicles damaged. One (1) US administrative jeep was destroyed and one (1) gun truck and two (2) cargo trucks were moderately damaged. Enemy losses are unknown.

TEL: PT 786/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY


T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

25 June 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

On 241800 June 1969, an ammunition resupply convoy of the 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck), commanded by Cpt Richard G. Steeves, was ambushed by an estimated reinforced NVA platoon between Dak To and Ben Het at grid coordinates YB 918 258. Intense enemy fire plagued the convoy from the above location all the way to Ben Het, a distance of approximately 6,000 meters. The convoy consisted of eight 5 ton tractors and semitrailers, two bobtails, one wrecker, one gun jeep and three gun trucks. A 2½ ton truck from the 1/92 Artillery accompanied the convoy. There are no military police operating in this area. The convoy had left Pleiku on 23 June 1969, but was unable to get clearance to proceed out of Dak To until late in the afternoon of the 24th. All 8th Group vehicles had armor plating and all drivers were wearing steel helmets and flak jackets. Prior to the ambush, convoy speed was 25 to 30 MPH and the 100 meter interval was maintained as well as possible over the unpaved road.

The terrain in the area is rolling to hilly. Heavy vegetation is within ten meters of the road in some places and as far back as 200 meters in others. The enemy opened fire from prepared positions on both sides of the road with small arms, automatic weapons, rockets, mortars and artillery. The gun trucks immediately returned fire with 50 caliber and M-60 machine guns and M-79's, enabling the convoy to run the kill zone to Ben Het. The reaction of the convoy personnel was highly commendable.

Clearance for the convoy to leave Dak To was given by Colonel Weyand, Senior American Advisor to the 24th STZ. Air cover was provided by gunships from the 52nd Aviation Battalion. However, they were unable to fire due to the proximity of ARVN ground forces. The roadside had been continuously swept with artillery from Dak To. There were 4 battalions of ARVN infantry, 2 squadrons of ARVN Cav and 2 companies of CIDG forces in the area of the ambush. Heavy fire was returned by several of the ARVN tanks. Communications between the convoy and the Senior American Advisor were good. Enemy and ARVN losses are unknown at the present time. US losses included 1 KIA and 5 WIA from the 8th Group. One 5 ton tractor and

AVCA QN-TG-3

25 June 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

semitrailer was damaged severely, but recovered the next day. Most of the other vehicles on the convoy received minor damage from small arms and shrapnel. These losses will not effect the capability of the unit to perform its mission. The artillery firebase at Ben Hot has been the object of intense enemy activity in recent weeks.


TEL: PT 785/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY

T.G. Stevens
T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC

WOOD LINE - 100 METERS OFF ROAD.
 BRUSH & GRASS - 2-3' TO EDGE OF ROAD.



OLD BAY

X X X X

BEN

HET

BURNED ENGINE

CRATER

FUR STRIP

X X X X

SIX

1ST Ambush
 AK-47 ENGR
 B-40
 FRENCH

DONKID TRUCK

GUN JEEP WAS
 LEAD VEHICLE.
 HAD FLAT TIRE.
 POSITION

FB
 B

X 6,000 METER KILL ZONE
 824 122 mm MORTARS
 ON RETURN TRIP - 2ND Ambush

1ST Ambush

2ND Ambush
 RETURN TRIP

○ Auto Weapons (AK-47)

○ NONE → ⊗ B-40's

X → X - MORTARS

□ - GUN JEEP


▭ - LOAD

◊ - WRECKER

▧ - BOBTAIL

◄ - GUN TRUCK

⊕ - 2nd Ion



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

13 August 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

At 121715 August 1969 a recovery mission of the 54th Transportation Battalion (Truck), 545th Transportation Company, was ambushed just south of Phu Heip on QL 1 (CQ 229 290) by an estimated NVA company size unit. The enemy used claymore mines, small arms, automatic weapons and M-79's.

The mission consisted of one (1) wrecker and one (1) gun jeep. The gun jeep had armor plating and all personnel were wearing flak jackets and steel pots in accordance with existing directives. The terrain in that area is a rocky mountain on the west of the road and rice paddies on the east. The enemy started firing as close as 20 meters from fixed positions, on the west side of the road. Two gun trucks from the 545th Transportation Company responded to the call of "contact" and the company commander, 1LT Brian Aspland, accompanied the second gun truck to the ambush.

Organic weapons employed against the enemy consisted of .50 caliber machine guns, M-60 machine guns, M-79's and M-16's. The road was closed as a result of this action. Helicopter gunships arrived approximately 20 minutes after the initial contact.


The results of the ambush were two (2) US KIA, five (5) US WIA and two (2) vehicles damaged.

TEL: PT 705/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY


T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC



- ⊗ Gun Jeep
- ⊗ Gun Truck
- ⊗ Wrecker
- ♀ Auto Weapons

ROK
MORTAR

PIPELINE

BY-PASS

GS WRECKER

PIPELINE

GLORY STOMPER II

Sgt Westfield

ACE

BOSS

PLAYBOY

CLAYMORE
MINES

AW

AW

AW

QL #1

N

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TG-3

24 August 1969

SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
APO 96238

At 231045 August 1969, a resupply convoy from the 124th Transportation Battalion (Truck), commanded by 1Lt Timothy D. Runkle and the rear section of a resupply convoy from the 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck), commanded by 1Lt Robert S. Bourne were ambushed as the two convoys passed each other approximately 1½ miles east of Bridge #25 on QL 19. The period of contact was approximately fifteen (15) minutes. The enemy force, estimated to be an NVA platoon of thirty five to forty men, utilized RPG's, mortars, small arms and automatic weapons as they fired from prepared positions approximately 100 meters from the highway and from both sides of the road. The terrain in the area consists of rolling hills with dense, heavy foliage.

The 124th Transportation Battalion convoy consisted of two (2) gun jeeps, three (3) gun trucks, one (1) 2½ ton cargo truck, four (4) bobtail tractors, thirteen (13) tankers and one (1) Han Jin van. The convoy was traveling from Pleiku to Qui Nhon at 25 MPH. There were three (3) personnel from the 124th Battalion wounded, one of which was in a hardened vehicle. There were twelve vehicles damaged from this battalion; one (1) gun truck, five (5) 5 ton tractors and six (6) 5,000 gallon tankers. This will reduce this unit's POL capability by 10%.

The 27th Transportation Battalion convoy consisted of fifteen (15) POL tankers, two (2) reefers, two (2) gun trucks and one (1) gun jeep. The convoy was traveling from Qui Nhon to Pleiku at 25 MPH. Three (3) men were slightly wounded. Two (2) received first aid and continued with the convoy. One (1) man received minor shrapnel wounds to the face and was evacuated by dust-off, treated and returned to his unit. One (1) 5 ton tractor and one (1) 5,000 gallon tanker were totally destroyed. Two (2) 5,000 gallon tankers and three (3) 5 ton tractors were lightly damaged. This will reduce this unit's present POL capability by 20%.

All US vehicles were armor plated. The drivers were wearing flak jackets and steel helmets in accordance with existing directives. Both convoys maintained an interval of 100 meters. Both convoys included 50 cal machine guns, M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers and M-16 rifles as organic weapons. Reaction forces included elements from the 4th Division, gun ships and MP's. The road in the area was briefly closed.

AVCA QN-TG-3
SUBJECT: Synopsis of Ambush

27 August 1969

8th Transportation Group personnel reacted promptly and correctly in accordance with existing procedures, repelled the initial attack, cleared the kill zone and continued on in a quick, outstanding manner during and immediately after this ambush.

TEL: PT 785/779

/s/Garland A. Ludy
/t/GARLAND A. LUDY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

A TRUE COPY

T.G. Stevens

T.G. STEVENS
Major, TC

40-50 VC & NVA
WITH ROCKETS - MORTARS

TREE LINE

150 METERS

1/2 Ton
Haw. Jin
TANKER } SIDE
BY
SIDE

QUIN
TRK

QUIN
TRK

TANK

ARC

0774
Refer

600 METER

KILL ZONE


BLACK
HAWK
1 MILE

124
TANKER

1ST 3
TANKER

LZ - SHULER
& MILES

TREE LINE



H O L Y F A M I L Y H O S P I T A L

B E N H - V I E N T H A N H - G I A

Q U I - N H O N
S. Vietnam

OCT 15th 1968

Colonel Ludy, C.O. & All
8th Transportation Group

Dear Colonel Ludy & All

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and all those who so generously contributed to the donation of \$754.92 received for our school of nursing.

Thanks to you all, I am able to purchase a slide projector, and the various series of medical slides (500 of them) from Ciba. Co., plus other valuable teaching aids.


I sincerely thank you on behalf of the present class of students and all the others to come, who will also benefit by your wonderful help.

May God bless you and reward your generosity. Be assured of my prayers.

Sincerely,

/s/Sister Theresa Dion & Students
Catholic Relief Services
Holy Family Hospital
APO SF 96238

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

HANJIN TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.
P.O. BOX 389 CENTRAL. SEOUL. KOREA
CABLE: HJTRANSCO. TEL. 23-7123-8

~~LAND-AIR-WATER-TRANSPORTATION-STEVEDORING~~

Colonel Garland A. Ludy
Commanding Officer
8th US Transportation Group
APO 96238

6 January 1969

Dear Colonel Ludy:

On behalf of the families of the victims and members of my company, I would like to express our deepest appreciation for the friendly support that the members of your command rendered to us during the recent An Khe ambush accident.

Without their prompt protection for our convoy drivers rendered under the heavy enemy fire concentration with complete disregard of their own safety, our casualties would have been undoubtedly far greater.


It is also with deep sorrow that I learned of the loss of a soldier and several casualties. Please convey our deepest sympathy to the family of the deceased.

In the shadow of our sorrow, we renew our determination to promote our existing comradeship and do our best to accomplish our joint mission in the course of our common goal.

Sincerely,

/s/ C. H. Cho
/t/ C. H. CHO
President

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO San Francisco 96238

AVCA QN-DC

12 January 1969

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group
APO 96226


1. The Commanding General has asked me to forward the inclosed letter from MR. C. H. Cho, President of Han Jin Transportation Co. and to convey his appreciation to members of your command.
2. The letter clearly indicates the devotion to duty by your command which is in the highest tradition of the military forces.

1 Incl
as

/s/Alvin Hulsey
/t/ALVIN HULSEY
Colonel, QMC
Deputy Commander

Copy Furn:
Dir/Trans

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO San Francisco 96238

AVCA QN-CG

5 March 1969

SUBJECT: Commendation of the 54th Transportation Battalion

THRU: Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group
APO 96226

TO: Commanding Officer
54th Transportation Battalion
APO 96226


1. It is with pleasure that I forward the following message from the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command:

"The members of the 54th Transportation Battalion are to be congratulated for their prompt and correct action during the ambush which took place on 14 February 1969, 3 kilometers east of An Khe on Highway 19. Their highly effective response to the enemy attack was in the highest traditions of logistical support and the 1st Logistical Command. Their outstanding efforts are greatly appreciated."

2. I, too appreciate the outstanding contribution you are making under such conditions. Please be sure that all concerned are made aware of the above message.

/s/D. H. Richards
/t/D. H. RICHARDS
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96250

AVBE-CG

5 April 1969

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation


THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
APO 96384

TO: Commanding General
Qui Nhon Support Command
APO 96238

1. I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the outstanding support rendered the 173d Airborne Brigade by the Qui Nhon Support Command.
2. The logistical support has always been timely and expeditious. Not one combat operation from fire-team to multi-battalion level has been delayed or diminished in scope due to a lack of needed supplies. The success of the recent deployment of the 4th Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry to Qui Nhon was greatly facilitated by the spirit and attitude of the members of your command who assisted its planning and execution.
3. The assistance provided the Brigade's Poor Man's R&R program has been outstanding. The facilities, services and personnel made available by your command in the support of this program has been a magnificent contribution to the morale of the Combat Sky Soldier.

/s/John W. Barnes
/t/JOHN W. BARNES
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
Office of the ACofS, Transportation
APO 96384

AVCA GT-R

18 April 1969

Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group (MT)
APO 96226


Dear Gar:

1. The selection of SP/4 David W. Tanner of your Group as the 1st Logistical Command's Soldier of the Month affords me a welcome opportunity to express my appreciation to you and all members of your command for the outstanding highway transportation support which the 8th Group provides within the II CTZ. The selection of SP/4 Tanner as our Soldier of the Month is a tribute not only to him, but to the professional competence and soldierly qualities of all members of your command.
2. Your mission of providing transportation support to northern II CTZ is one of the most important in Vietnam today. The 8th Transportation Group has an outstanding reputation for accomplishing its mission despite enemy ambushes, sniping and mining, and the difficulties of terrain and distances over which the Group operates.
3. Your command is daily carrying the Transportation Banner into the heart of the combat zone and adding laurels to an already proud tradition. Congratulations on a job well done.

Sincerely,

/s/Joseph A. Walsh
/t/JOSEPH A. WALSH
COL, GS
ACofS, Transportation

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 45TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP
APO San Francisco 96318

AVCA QN-PK-CO

4 May 1969

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

THRU: Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group
APO 96226


TO: LTC Tom L. Bing
124th Transportation Bn
APO 96318

1. Upon my departure from this command I wish to commend you for the cooperation and support you and the men of the 124th Transportation Battalion have provided to the 45th General Support Group in the performance of a mission which often was most difficult.
2. The success achieved in providing logistical support to approximately 37,000 divisional and non-divisional troops in the Central Highlands of Vietnam was in large measure due to your ingenuity, dedication to duty and desire to see that the transportation task was well performed. The outstanding performance of your men, often under the most severe and dangerous circumstances, can be attributed directly to your exceptional leadership and the sense of urgency you imparted to your troops.
3. Additionally, I extend my thanks for the cooperation you have rendered to me personally. Even though your organization is not an integral part of the 45th General Support Group, your participation in the activities of the Group and the Pleiku military community as a whole have been of the highest order.
4. Again, my most sincere thanks for a job well done. I wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

TEL: PKU 3336/2020

/s/Harlan W. Tucker
/t/HARLAN W. TUCKER
COL, QMC
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

AVCA QN-AG (5 Apr 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 14 May 1969

TO: Commanding Officer, 8th Transportation Group, APO 96226

1. The excellent rapport created by the close working relationship between the 173d Airborne Brigade and this command has once again proven invaluable in the accomplishment of our mission.
2. The true spirit of the professional soldier is evidenced by the high compliments made by Major General Heiser and Brigadier General Barnes. All personnel can feel proud of their contribution and I personally thank each and everyone for a job well done.

TEL: QN 2441

/s/D. H. Richards
/t/D. H. RICHARDS
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"

Patrick M. Klein
PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

AVCA QN-TTCM (14 Jun 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: An Khe VC Ambush

18 June 1969

DA, Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command, APO 96238


TO: Commanding General, U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238

1. The close support and cooperation demonstrated by members of the 54th Transportation Battalion when the Han Jin vehicles came under attack in the ambush of 13 June is commendable.

2. I wish to add the appreciation of this command to that expressed by MR. H.B. Kim. It is this spirit of comradeship exhibited between US military personnel and the Korean contractor's employees which has typified and guaranteed the success of our effort.

/s/John E. Truog
/t/JOHN E. TRUOG
Colonel, TC
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"



PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

AVCA QN-CG (14 Jun 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: An Khe VC Ambush Report

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 26 Jun 69

TO: Commanding Officer, 8th Transportation Group, APO 96226

1. I wish to add my personal congratulations to those of Mr. Kim and Colonel Truog. The prompt, aggressive action taken by the men from the 54th Transportation Battalion, working side by side with the Han Jin employees in fighting off the enemy ambush and in rescuing the wounded, is an act in which your unit can take justifiable pride.


2. Let us all strive to continue and further develop the sense of close cooperation, trust and teamwork among Allied nations that this incident so well exemplifies.

TEL: QNL 2907

2 Incl
nc

/s/Albert E. Hunter
/t/ALBERT E. HUNTER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO San Francisco 96238

AVCA QN-CG

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Convoy Discipline

Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group (MT)
APO 96226

1. Message 11845 AVCA CG HEISER SENDS, 17 July 1969, subject as above, from MG Joseph M. Heiser Jr., Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, is quoted for your information:

"1. I have just read the spot report of the latest enemy attack on one of your convoys. Once again the men of your command have proven their ability to discipline themselves, keep moving and avoid loss of life and equipment."


"2. All concerned are to be commended. Please give them my personal appreciation and ask their continued fine efforts in combat support."

2. I should like to add my congratulations to those of MG Heiser for the continued outstanding accomplishment of a most difficult task under combat conditions.

TEL: QNL 2907

/s/Albert E. Hunter
/t/ALBERT E. HUNTER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 299TH ENGINEER BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO 96238

EGCD-CO

23 July 1969

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

THRU: Commanding General
Qui Nhon Support Command
APO 96238

THRU: Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group
APO 96238

TO: Commanding Officer
124th Transportation Battalion
APO 96318

1. In behalf of the officers and men of the 299th Engineer Battalion (C) and the 15th Engineer Company (LE), I wish to commend you and your command for the excellent support rendered this battalion during the "seige" of Dak To and in its relocation to the An Khe and Qui Nhon areas. Over two hundred fifty vehicles and trailers were required to complete the relocation.

2. Two unit moves of Company B and Company C were successfully completed under the control of the 124th Transportation Battalion. Both companies were moved from Kontum to Qui Nhon in one days time, a distance of over one hundred miles through potentially hostile territory. Company C remained overnight at Qui Nhon at Company B's new compound and continued an additional sixty miles to Bong Son, completing two flawlessly conducted unit moves.

3. The movement of the remainder of the battalion was postponed in early May because of the sudden intensification of enemy activity in northern Kontum Province. The decision, made at higher headquarters, was not made until considerable vital transportation assets were tied up in the initial phases of an intricate plan to move the remainder of the 299th Engineer Battalion (C) and the 15th Engineer Company (LE). When it became apparent that the postponement would be indefinite, these assets were pulled out. In middle July when the decision was finally made to move the remainder of the battalion, your battalion reacted quickly and efficiently to our needs. In less than 96 hours after receiving work of the decision, the last vehicles closed into An Khe and Qui Nhon.

EGCD-CO
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation


23 July 1969

4. During May and early June the 299th Engineer Battalion (C) and the 15th Engineer Company (LE), the primary defenders of Dak To Fire Base 1, were subject to almost daily intensive mortar and rocket attacks during day light and frequent mortar and sapper attacks at night. When your daily supply convoys were forced to remain over night, the men of the 124th Transportation volunteered themselves and their gun trucks to fight along side the men of the 299th along the perimeter. This not only greatly increased the defensive posture, but a deep sense of comradeship was developed between the two units as these men worked and fought together. The bravery and dedication of your men is deeply appreciated.

5. It is deeply gratifying that all the support rendered to the 299th Engineer Battalion (C) and the 15th Engineer Company (LE) was provided by a unit whose standards of professionalism and duty are of such high caliber. The responsiveness to our movement requirements under a continually changing situation can be directly attributed to the technical proficiency and dedication of your officers and men. The skills, energies, and experience of the 124th Transportation Battalion contributed to a highly successful effort. Please convey to all the members of your command the thanks for a job well done.

/s/Robert L. Ackerson
/t/ROBERT L. ACKERSON
LTC, CE
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
LLT, TC

AVCA QN-AG (23 Jul 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 27 July 1969

THRU: Commanding Officer, 8th Transportation Group, APO 96226

TO: Commanding Officer, 124th Transportation Battalion, APO 96318


1. The compliments of LTC Ackerson reflect the success of the dedicated and determined efforts of this command to provide the finest of logistical support.

2. Through the professional knowledge and attitude of each individual within your organization, your command has met and overcome the many and varied day to day challenges. Your continuous excellence in past performance only causes me to have greater confidence in your future endeavors.

3. I wish to commend every individual within your group for his contribution toward the establishment of this command's reputation for its "can do" attitude and, more important, for its "can do" ability.

/s/Albert E. Hunter
/t/ALBERT E. HUNTER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO San Francisco 96238

AVCA QN-POL

2 September 1969


SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

Commanding Officer
8th Transportation Group
APO 96226

1. During the period of 13 June 1969 to 29 July 1969 the petroleum pipeline between Qui Nhon and An Khe was inoperative. As a result, all replenishment of bulk fuels at An Khe, as well as a large percent of that at Pleiku, had to be linehauled via 5,000 gallon tankers.
2. The 8th Transportation Group was responsible for accomplishing this vital mission. By professionally managing its assets the 8th Group moved a total of 6,112,000 gallons of fuel from Qui Nhon to An Khe and Pleiku, thus maintaining on-hand balances above the safety level throughout the 56 day period.
3. The performance and sense of responsibility of each individual involved in this vital mission is commendable.
4. I wish to express my appreciation and congratulations to the 8th Transportation Group for another job well done.

/s/Albert E. Hunter
/t/ALBERT E. HUNTER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"


PATRICK M. KLEIN
1LT, TC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

REGULATION
NUMBER 55-1

1 March 1969

TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL

Tactical Convoy Operations

1. PURPOSE: To establish policies and procedures for the conduct of convoy operations in a hostile zone or area subject to enemy ambush, sniper fire or mines.
2. SCOPE: The provisions of this regulation are applicable to all units assigned, attached or under the operational control of the 8th Transportation Group (MT).
3. GENERAL: Guidance contained herein will apply in most situations. In those cases where a different or unusual situation is encountered, subordinate units are expected to exercise initiative and sound judgement in selecting a course of action which will insure mission accomplishment with a minimum danger to personnel and equipment. Effective movement results from commanders' establishing complete movement plans and exercising control during the entire move.
4. DEFINITION:
 - a. Open Column - is considered as 100-200 meter interval between vehicles and is particularly applicable to tactical moves which are made in daylight.
 - b. Closed Column - is considered as being 25 meter interval between vehicles and is generally used at night during blackout conditions or to reduce road speed.
 - c. Convoy Commander - as used in this regulation is understood to include serial or march commanders or those officers and NCO's in charge of convoy movements.
 - d. Convoys are defined as five or more vehicles with or without trailers traveling together to constitute a controlled movement.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES:
 - a. Group S-3 will maintain liaison with higher and adjacent headquarters to include dissemination of intelligence information as received.
 - b. Battalions will:
 - (1) Obtain convoy clearance.
 - (2) Insure that convoy commanders receive the necessary support to comply with the directives contained herein.

This regulation supercedes that portion of Annex "A" to the 8th Group Field SOP which deals with Convoy Operations.

c. Commanding Officer, subordinate units will:

- (1) Implement directives of higher headquarters.
- (2) Train personnel in the techniques of motor transport.
- (3) Insure that all convoy personnel have necessary weapons, protective gear, C-rations and overnight gear prior to dispatch.
- (4) Insure that malaria tablets are taken.
- (5) Insure that each gun truck has 2 litters and a first aid container.

d. The convoy commander is responsible for the security of the convoy in its entirety and will:

- (1) Obtain the latest intelligence information from battalion S-2/3 prior to departure and disseminate to march unit commanders.
- (2) Obtain information from S-2/3 concerning coordination with tactical combat units providing route security along the main supply route.
- (3) Instruct march unit commanders on convoy speed, interval, uniform and communications as well as emphasize the actions to be taken if the convoy encounters an ambush, sniper fire or mines.
- (4) Coordinate with any security elements provided the convoy and mount aircraft marker panels on vehicles as required. The minimum requirements for panel markers in this command are the first and last vehicles of each convoy.
- (5) Be responsible for the conduct and appearance of all personnel involved in the convoy. Brief all personnel from the standard 8th Group Convoy Briefing Chart. This chart includes briefing items such as follows:
 - (a) Route of march.
 - (b) Speed limits.
 - (c) Traffic regulations applicable enroute.
 - (d) Control procedures to be used.
 - (e) Critical points enroute.
 - (f) Procedures in event of hostile fire, mines and sniper.
 - (g) "Cluster of the Day" and actions to be taken upon observing cluster.
 - (h) Driver responsibilities.
 - (i) Chain of Command.

8th Trans Gp Regulation 55-1

(j) The fourteen points of ambush, which are as follows:

1. Keep weapon ready to fire.
2. Be alert for changes in familiar scenes along route.
3. Use your weapon, return fire immediately.
4. Notify security force by radio, call - contact, contact,
contact.
5. Continue moving, maintaining interval if possible.
6. Track vehicles ahead to prevent further detonation of mines.
7. Don't enter kill zone if possible.
8. If disabled and convoy is moving through kill zone, mount
a passing vehicle.
9. Provide flanking support fire into kill zone.
10. Gun trucks apply maximum base of fire. Fight as a team.
Deploy upon command.
11. Prime targets are: Enemy automatic weapons positions,
enemy mortar, rocket positions and assaulting ground troops.
12. Stay on hard surfaces.
13. Cease fire on signal.
14. Remember details.

(6) Know his locations at all times while in convoy.

(7) Be thoroughly familiar with the convoy route and all check points.

(8) Be in possession of the following information before departing.

- convoy.
- (a) The names of the officers and NCOs who will be supervising the
 - (b) The complete makeup of the convoy.
 - (c) The Start Point and Release Point.
 - (d) The names of the drivers and the bumper numbers of the trucks.
 - (e) A map of the route traveled.

(9) Comply with instructions received from the tactical commander along
the route.

(10) Maintain contact depending on communications equipment available with both unit operations section and the security forces responsible for the area through which the convoy is moving. When only one frequency is available, the convoy commander must remain in contact with security forces. A convoy will not move unless the radio frequencies of the responsible tactical units are known. In addition, the convoy commander shall insure that all road, tactical, emergency and medical frequencies are current and available to all control elements within the convoy.

(11) Closely supervise the off-loading of convoy vehicles at destination. Cargo must be off-loaded expeditiously to minimize turnaround time and vehicle RON. Close supervision by officer and NCO personnel will also prevent improper unloading and the resultant damage to cargo and equipment.

(12) Check to determine if loads are secure prior to convoy movement.

(13) Insure that Chain-of-Command has been established and each man in the convoy is aware of the Chain-of-Command.

6. CONVOY OPERATIONS:

a. Organization and operation of convoys are the responsibility of the operating unit. Techniques and guidance published in FM 55-35 and TM 21-305 as modified herein will be employed. Briefing of convoy personnel as described in para 5d (5) will be given prior to crossing Start Point.

b. The type of convoy will be specified by the Battalion to operating units at the time commitment is assigned.

c. Convoy schedules will be maintained enroute as closely as safe operating practices permit. At least a fifteen (15) minute time gap will be maintained between convoys.

d. Serials should not number more than 35 task vehicles. There should be a ten (10) minute gap between serials.

e. Unit integrity will be maintained whenever possible.

f. Maximum speed of convoy pace-setting vehicles will not exceed 15 MPH in built up areas and 25 MPH on the open road. Catch up speed for vehicles will be established on the basis of traffic, road, weather conditions and local posted limits, but will not exceed 35 MPH.

g. All convoy operations will be vigorously supervised by officers and non-commissioned officers, to include the performance of required before, at the halt, and after operation preventive maintenance services on vehicles.

h. At all times during a tactical march, the policy is to KEEP MOVING. This policy is paramount because the safe delivery of cargo and/or personnel is the mission of this unit.

i. Halts will be scheduled by battalion commitment directive and only as the tactical situation may permit and as maintenance and refueling requirements dictate.

j. Recovery of disabled vehicles will be accomplished as expeditiously as possible. Battalions will establish procedures to utilize organic recovery vehicles and those belonging to other support units if necessary. Those vehicles which cannot be repaired in a short period of time will be towed to the nearest strong point and the location reported to the responsible recovery unit.

k. Each convoy will include a minimum of the following type vehicles:

<u>SECURITY VEHICLES</u>	<u>RATIO PER TASK VEHICLE IN MARCH UNIT</u>
1. Radio Gun Jeep	1 per 10
2. Gun Truck	1 per 10
3. Maintenance Vehicles	1 per convoy

(Maintenance vehicles must have tires, jack, lug wrench, oil, water, fuel, tools and tow bars)

NOTE: All gun jeeps and gun trucks will carry at least 1 each M-79 grenade launcher in addition to their assigned automatic weapons.

l. Gun trucks will not lead march units and their position in the unit will be varied daily. Gun trucks are positioned so as to protect vehicles in convoy to their front.

m. The passenger cab floors and the area under seats of all vehicles in convoy will be sandbagged to provide protection against mines and other shrapnel-producing devices. Personnel riding in vehicles must keep arms and legs inside to achieve maximum protection from sandbags. As an additional precaution, a heavy rubber mat is recommended for placement over the sandbags to reduce fragments such as stones, sand, shrapnel and pieces of bag.

n. Each driver will be equipped with and/or wear the following gear:

- (1) Individual weapon.
- (2) Helmet, steel, w/liner & camouflage cover.
- (3) Vest, armored.
- (4) Belt, pistol with ammo pouches.
- (5) First aid pouches.
- (6) Canteen (full)
- (7) Sleeping equipment
- (8) Protective mask

c. All personnel involved in local/line haul truck operations will wear flak jacket and steel helmet w/liner and camouflage cover while engaged in motor operations outside the cantonment area. Exceptions to this paragraph will be approved in writing by this headquarters.

p. The following basic load of ammunition will be carried (these are minimum figures and will not be considered as restricting additions):

Pistol Cal .45	3 clips (7 rounds each)
Rifle, M-16	10 Magazines (18 rounds each)
Rifle, M-14	10 Magazines (20 rounds each)
Machine Gun, Cal .50, M-2	2,100 rounds
Grenade Launcher M-79	21 rounds (16 HE and 5 MP)
Machine Gun, M-60	880 rounds

q. Only when it is the intention of convoy personnel to fire on hostile forces will a round be inserted in the chamber.

r. Daytime vehicular interval will be 100 meters. A vehicular interval of not less than 25 meters will be maintained when the column is at the halt if the space situation permits, but in all instances a sufficient interval shall be left in order to permit a vehicle to pull around the vehicle in front of it and to permit intermittent traffic to pass.

7. ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF AMBUSH, SNIPER FIRE OR MINE:

a. Ambushes:

(1) When a convoy encounters sniper fire, an ambush or mines it should KEEP MOVING if at all possible.

(2) The security forces will be contacted by radio immediately.

(3) All vehicles which are beyond the "kill zone" will continue moving toward their destination.

(4) If unavoidably stopped in the "kill zone", personnel must dismount, take up covered and concealed positions, and lay down a heavy volume of return fire only on active enemy targets, staying in close proximity to their vehicles. In no case will convoy personnel close with or attempt to pursue the enemy as this will interfere with the tactical reaction plan. Convoy personnel will cease fire upon arrival of tactical security elements to allow tactical vehicles and personnel freedom of movement against enemy forces. Convoy control personnel will insure that traffic begins to move as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(5) Those vehicles which have not yet entered the "kill zone" will halt at 100 meter intervals, dismount and defend as described in para 8a (4) above, firing only if the enemy targets are visible.

(6) If the tactical situation permits move disabled vehicles off the road.

b. Mining Incidents:

(1) If mines are encountered, the convoy commander must, in conjunction with the tactical commander, quickly determine a course of action. While a single mine should not delay an entire convoy, vehicles must not enter an area known to be heavily mined.

(2) If the convoy is halted by mines, the convoy commander will immediately alert the security forces and disperse his personnel around the vehicles in preparation for an attack.

c. Sniper Fire:

(1) If the convoy or a segment of the convoy receives sniper fire, fire should be returned and vehicles will continue moving.

(2) The convoy commander will attempt to determine the location of the sniper fire and report it to the tactical forces securing that portion of the route.

8. GENERAL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES:

a. Good convoy discipline and continuous driver training will reduce the possibility and/or effectiveness of enemy action against convoys.

b. Drivers should track the vehicles ahead when these vehicles are in sight. This will reduce the possibility of detonating a pressure-activated mine which the vehicle ahead may have missed. Conversely, old tracks should be avoided because the Viet Cong commonly place mines in old tracks.

c. Speed generates carelessness. The enemy relies on careless drivers in his employment of mines.

d. Key personnel, who are prime targets for command detonated mines, must avoid congregating in one vehicle or location within the convoy.

e. Drivers should avoid carelessly driving over wooden sticks or other debris on the road. Pieces of wood (board or bamboo) on a roadway may indicate the presence of pressure activated mines or other explosive devices.

f. Vehicle operators should be alert for changes in familiar scenes, evidence of apparent road repairs, new fill or paving, road patches, mud smears, grass, dirt, dung or other substances on road. Such areas should be evidence of enemy handiwork.

g. To avoid accidents at halts the posting of road guards at the front and rear of each column is required.

h. Rest halts should be avoided except at terminals or at locations where maximum security is afforded.

i. Each convoy commander will make such coordination as necessary with escort or at critical points in sufficient time to prevent any delay of the convoy.

Where unforeseen delays or route changes occur, the convoy commander will expeditiously notify his battalion headquarters which will pass this information to the Group Operations Section. Information will include the cause, location (grid coordinates), alternate routes available and other pertinent data.

9. ENROUTE TECHNIQUES: (Supplemental to Paragraph 7).

a. The convoy commander as the senior officer/NCO in column is responsible for safe and proper convoy operation. Escorting military police have NO operational control over the convoy nor should they be considered as "pace-setters."

b. Local traffic regulations and control devices will be respected when the convoy is proceeding without traffic escort, road guides, or the assistance of military police.

c. A convoy will not pass another moving vehicle without obtaining permission from who lead convoy commander. If permission is granted, passing will not occur until the entire convoy being passed has halted.

d. Convoys will operate with headlights on during the daylight hours, as well as at night.

e. If canvas is required, all straps and ropes will be securely tied, front and rear flaps will be used and secured.

f. Under normal circumstances a task vehicle will not pass another task vehicle.

10. SUPERVISION: Officer and NCO participation in convoy operations will be at the discretion of the Battalion Commander. In no case will Officer and NCO supervision of individual convoys be in less proportion than that provided in the unit TOE, i.e., squad, platoon and company.

11. REPORTS: Convoy commanders will render reports required in 8th Group Regulations 55-5 and 335-4.

AVCA QN-TG-3
FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Asst Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

CHANGE 1
REGULATION
NUMBER 55-1

21 March 1969

ADDED:

5. d(14) Each convoy commander will insure that control vehicles carry a sufficient supply of the "Cluster of the Day" that is used to stop firing. In the event the gun ships arrive on the scene prior to the arrival of the combat forces, or the combat forces do not arrive, the convoy commander or his assistant may give the order to use the "cluster" in order to stop all firing.

AVCA QN-TG-3
FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. SEAN O'DONOGUE
1LT, TC
Asst Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

CHANGE 2
REGULATION
NUMBER 55-1

18 April 1969

ADD:

5 b (3). Insure that convoy commander and all convoy control personnel have in their possession a complete, updated copy of the 8th Transportation Group's SOI.

5 b (4). Insure that all control personnel, to include gun truck commanders, have in their possession a topographic map of the route of travel.

AVCA QN-TG-3
FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
1LT, TC
Asst Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

CHANGE 3
REGULATION
NUMBER 55-1

21 June 1969

TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL

Tactical Convoy Operations

Presently Roads:

6. f. Maximum speed of convoy * * * * but will not exceed 35 MPH.

Change to Read:

6. f. Maximum speed of convoy * * * * but will not exceed 30 MPH.

AVCA QN-TG-3
FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. SEAN O'DONOGHUE
LLT, TC
Asst Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

CHANGE 4
REGULATION
NUMBER 55-1

9 July 1969

TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL

Tactical Convoy Operations

Change the following to read:

6. d. All march units will have a minimum of two control vehicles and will not exceed 20 task vehicles without the approval of Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group. A requirement imposed by a tactical commander to move a march unit exceeding 25 task vehicles is considered a significant deviation. These deviations will be reported to Headquarters 8th Transportation Group.

AVCA QN-TG-3
FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN S. MAYNARD
1LT, TC
Asst Adjutant

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION HISTORY CONT.

5. Installed a phone in S-3 billets.
6. Installed Class C phones in personnel section replacing field replacing field phones.
7. Assisted 27th Bn commo in obtaining an SB-22 for their Bn Guard House.
 - a. Improved Guard House operations
 - 1) Guard House can more efficiently control guards on post.
 - 2) Guard House is able to reach guards much faster because is now a direct line from the Guard House to any post.
 - b. Guard House and posts are now not dependent upon the COMET switchboard.
8. HHD 8th Gp commo relieved 27th Trans Bn commo of the obligation for upkeep of all telephone lines except those directly connected to the Bn or units of the Bn.
9. Policed useless Comet WD-1 wire from 8th Transportation Group.
10. Installed telephone in barber shop.
11. Strung wire for better alert bunker communications.
12. Installed AN/VRC-49 in bunker.
13. Installed two 80 foot antennas for operations bunker.
14. Moved antenna pole in front of Hq 8th Gp operations bunker for better reception.
15. Installed a TT line between 8th Group S-3 and Pleiku (124th S-3).
16. Installed a speech plus circuit between the 54th Bn. and Hq 8th Gp.
17. ROK Compound-convoy security, net #1.
18. Expanded SOI's/SSI's:
 - a. Convoy control net Hwy 1 (North and South).
 - b. Convoy control net Hwy 19.
 - c. Gunship fire control freq.
 - d. Hwy #21 emergency net.
 - e. Phu Yen province freqs.
 - f. Panel code.
 - g. Ground air visual signals.
19. Improved SOI's to meet 101st RR standards.
20. Published a radio instruction booklet for drivers.
21. Issued a new SSI. instruction booklet for drivers.
22. Wrote desk SOP's.
23. Set up public address systems for Group ceremonies.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION HISTORY CONT.

24. Installed ringer from personnel section to Adjutant's office.
25. Mounted antennas on 40 foot poles in Tuy Hoa for better reception.
26. Installed new SB-86/PT.
27. Installed radio mounts in jeeps belonging to S-3 and S-4.
28. Installed Single Side-Band radio in commo building, giving access to Qui Nhon, Pleiku, Vung Ro Bay and Tuy Hoa.
29. Connected secure (crypto) equipment to teletype equipment. Secure teletype line in operation from Hq 8th Trans Gp comcenter to Hq QNSUPCOM comcenter.
30. Removed excess and unneeded equipment from AN/VRC-26 radio shelter. Installed operational teletype equipment.
31. Improved operational ability of comcenter by constructing and mounting a double latched chainlink fence door, pigeon holes to expedite the handling of messages and an adequate filing system for the comcenter.
32. Improved filing system according to AR 345-215.
 - a. TM's, SB's, Cir's, SOP's, Reg's.
 - b. Management files.
33. Constructed bridge for truck.
34. Repaired the bunker in the secure area.
35. Built storage shed next to generator.
36. Built concrete floor in the storage shed.
37. Put new roofs on the commo shop and the generator shed.
38. Painted the commo shop and repaired the screens.

This last year has been characterized by significant improvements in existing communications as well as by efforts to establish additional modes of communications. The attempts at broadening the facilities have been largely successful, and have resulted in a comprehensive and effective communications center. Consideration has been given to the 8th Transportation Group compound, to the units of the 8th Group located in outlying locations, and to Hq, USASUPCOM in Qui Nhon. The attention given these areas has resulted in a smooth flow of information between these elements, without which the mission of the 8th Trans Group may have been seriously impaired. And though MAJ Long and MSG Garcia have been directly responsible for these advances, they are attributable, in a larger sense, to the demand for and example of excellence set by the Group Commander, Colonel Garland A. Ludy.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTIONS
8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION HISTORY

3 September 69

During the period dating from 14 September 68 to 14 September 69, the 8th Transportation Group communications section, under the direction of MAJ Glenn W. Long and MSG Jose S. Garcia, initiated a variety of projects. These projects ranged in scope from improvements of this section's immediate area to a general upgrading of communications for the entire 8th Group Command. The projects included efforts to maximize communications efficiency between the various sections within this compound and Headquarters, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon.

As Headquarter's communications section, this section has provided assistance to its various subordinate units. This assistance has taken the form of organizational and administrative advice, equipment installation and maintenance, and periodic inspections to insure equipment serviceability.

This communications section has played a significant role in the mission of the 8th Transportation Group as the largest line haul unit in Vietnam. It has improved the SOI's, eliminating some code words, thus increasing transmission security, and generally upgraded convoy communications. MSG Garcia was given the responsibility of establishing a radio control net at the Korean Cavalry Regiment to provide additional security for convoys between Qui Nhon and Bridge 17 (east of An Khe). MSG Garcia's efforts have resulted in the saving of untold lives and the avoidance of painful injuries due to ambushes.

To insure an efficient handling of communications for 8th Group, the communications section has maintained a policy of cross-training personnel. This also insures a smooth transition when personnel leave the section. In addition, the section has a carefully selected number of MOS's so that all facets of communications, operation, installation, and maintenance are handled by personnel who have been trained in those areas. To achieve an even smoother operation, the section has recently adopted a task assignment roster delegating specific tasks to each member of the section.

The following is a list of the 8th Transportation Group communications section's accomplishments during the past year:

1. Laid power cable from 5KW generator to Group Commander's trailer for auxillary power supply.
2. Constructed two terminal boards:
 - a. One adjacent to the 8th Gp CP.
 - b. One in the HHD 8th Gp commo shop.
3. Strung new cables and lines to facilitate the telephones connected to the Hq 8th Trans Swbd, COMET.
 - a. 100 pr cable from terminal board adjacent the 8th Gp CP to terminal board in commo building.
 - b. 25 pr cable to HHD 27th Trans Bn.
 - c. WD-1 (commo) wire to other offices/qtrs requiring COMET swbd services.
4. Installed a hot line between SPO and 8th Group S-3.

IMPACT OF ENEMY ACTION

The purpose of this chart is two fold.

a. It will summarize the extent of our losses.

b. It will portray where/when/why we are taking these losses. On 2 September 1967, enemy forces initiated an effort to stop or reduce supplies moving into the Central Highlands via QL 19.

His initial attempt was directed at an 8th Transportation Group convoy returning from Pleiku. The ambush that occurred at 1855 hours, 2 September 1967, was a great success for "Charlie". It was a well planned, well executed ambush in generally the same area where the French Mobile Group 100 was decimated shortly after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Since September 1968 a total of 26 ambushes have been attempted against convoys.

Although the 8th Transportation Group has been successful in retaliating against hostile forces as a result of the development and employment of certain techniques and equipment, I do not believe that success can be measured by "kill ratio" alone, considering the fact that some of the ambushes were poorly planned, poorly timed and poorly executed by inexperienced people. The results of the Group's efforts might be termed lucky and could account for the success in retaliation. The real success or failure of the hostile actions against convoys must be considered in the light of impact on our primary mission.

Because of the enemy activity several major changes have occurred in 8th Transportation Group operations.

1. Tactical commanders reduced the operating hours on the road.

2. 8th Group dedicated approximately 10% of the task resources (men and equipment) to convoy security.

In addition to the 26 ambushes, there have been a total of 86 other incidents i.e., 8 mining incidents, 67 sniper incidents, 6 bridges blown and 5 other incidents including road closures due to enemy activity, mortar attacks etc.

All these incidents have accounted for a total of 19 US KIA, 109 US WIA vs 17 NVA/VC KIA, unknown NVA/VC WIA and 3 NVA/VC POW.

The number of vehicles that have been damaged or destroyed has been a total of 201.

The losses of men and equipment of the 8th Transportation Group to security requirements, casualties and battle losses surpasses the capabilities of two truck companies.

Each action that the enemy initiates in his attempts to interdict the LOC's cuts the operating time further from minutes, to hours, to closure for the day. This results in loaded vehicles unable to reach the consignee or empty vehicles unable to return for loads.

These incidents have directly resulted in the RON of more than 2,505 vehicles which represents a total of more than 23,824 short tons that have not been moved forward.

The tonnage lost due to security, casualties, battle losses, cargo losses, shortened operating hours, more frequent RON's from a multitude of related items, is nearly impossible to compute.

Against a very determined enemy, as history has proven him to be, the security that the convoy can provide is not adequate, nor can it be made adequate within the resources of the 8th Transportation Group. Lasting security for transportation must be in the form of a special combined arms team organized and trained to accompany and protect convoys through insecure areas.

8TH GROUP S-4 ACTIVITIES

I. STAFF S-4 ORGANIZATION

1. The staff S-4 consists of three functional staff elements. These are maintenance, supply, and food service.
2. The staff S-4 organization and its three operational elements supervises the logistical support of the three truck battalions organic to the 8th Transportation Group. These battalions are composed of three headquarters detachments, five light truck companies (two 2½ ton and three 5 ton companies), one light truck platoon, seven medium truck companies, and three trailer transfer points.
3. In addition to the above units the staff S-4 section supervises the Group Headquarters Detachment Supply operation and twelve organizational messes.
4. In September 1968 the S-4 section was organized to conform more closely to the structure of the TOE for the section. The S-4 and his supply section moved from the headquarters building to the quonset already occupied by the maintenance section. This allows the S-4 Officer to have all of his personnel under one roof thereby affording better coordination and economy of operations.

II. STAFF S-4 RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The S-4 advises the Group Commander on all matters relative to material and services within the command. These areas include the status of supplies, equipment, real estate, base development, maintenance, material readiness, and troopmesses and facilities.
2. The S-4 acts as liaison between support activities and the Group and its assigned units. This function includes ascertaining availability of equipment, coordinating port arrivals and the release of equipment, assistance in forecasting the commands future equipment requirements, and integrating the Group's logistical mission requirements with overall support current and future logistical programming.
3. The Group Maintenance Section is responsible for the maintenance of vehicles assigned to the RHD. A dispatch office, maintenance bay, and repair parts supply office were established in the area previously occupied by the 58th Transportation Company.
4. The Maintenance Section supervises subordinate units prescribed lead of repair parts thereby causing parts authorized to be stocked to increase sharply and eliminate many outdated parts. A close liaison is maintained with the DS and GS units to insure expeditious handling of demands for critical parts.
5. The Supply Section assists the subordinate units in obtaining many items of supply and equipment. Liaison is maintained with the ACoS

Supply and the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon to achieve this objective.

III. CENTRAL TRAILER MAINTENANCE FACILITY

In November 1968 the S-4, 8th Transportation Group received the responsibility of maintaining all semi-trailers within the group. A new and unique agency known as the Central Trailer Maintenance Facility was established. CW2 Donald W Widman was chosen as the first maintenance officer to be assigned the task. An area was acquired in the Cha Rang Valley area on Highway QL-19 across from the 505th Transportation Detachment. The area was prepared for the construction of the 8th Transportation Group Central Trailer Maintenance Facility. Two maintenance shops providing ten bays were constructed through self help labor. Two twenty foot wells were dug to provide water for the wash rack. The perimeter was secured by a new fence. The facility became operational in mid-November 1968. Lighting for the perimeter was complete in early April 1969. An additional shed was constructed to shelter spare parts and equipment from the elements. During the period between December 1968 and July 1969 the CTMF completed 6405 repair jobs and performed 485 scheduled services. As a result of the Annual General Inspection given the HHD, 8th Trans Group in February 1969, the property book formerly maintained in the S-4 office for centralized semi-trailer accountability was consolidated into the HHD Property book. The administration of registration numbers and daily trailer count is maintained in the S-4 section to enable the organization to more effectively account for the trailers, the daily deadline maintenance report, and the daily postings made to the semi-trailer master listing. This list now indicates the most recent time each trailer has been in CTMF. With this system of cross reference between registration numbers and organizational administration numbers verification can be easily made. The semi-trailer master listing is further verified weekly against the trailer cards in the S-3 Operations Office.

IV. SPECIAL STUDIES AND PROJECTS.

1. In December 1968 surveys were conducted to update contonment mess equipment and modernize all mess halls within the 8th Group. Much equipment has been acquired. Completed work order requests and kitchen layouts have been submitted to the Director of Support Survices in Qui Nhon. The last mess hall to become operational was the 359th Trans Co in Pleiku. Some of the material for this mess and also the 669th Trans Co were on requisition for over six months. Prior to the issue of the ice machines, mixers, steam tables, freezers, and reefers, the units had been using TOE equipment to operate the mess. By 5 September all critical items of equipment had been issued by the depot.
2. During February 1969 the Group Food Service Section gave instruction to all mess personnel in the preparation of hot rolls and pastry. The Group used the food service trailer for this purpose. It was decided to remodel the trailer and equip it for OJT cooking classes which were initiated in April.

3. The food service advisor was assigned the responsibility for sanitation inspection of all open messes in Sub-sector Bravo to improve standards of sanitation.

4. A program was initiated in March 1969 to raise the standards of all local national barber shops operated in the battalions areas. Strict sanitation inspections have been conducted, these were initiated in April 1969.

5. During March a requirement was placed on the Group Maintenance Section to establish the cost of organizational maintenance on tractors used to move POL during the month of February. It was discovered that \$4,062 was required for parts and 235.7 hours of labor at \$3.00 per hour resulting in a cost of \$4,769.00. This does not include the cost of fuel or operators pay.

6. Classes were conducted in February to provide instruction on maintenance, operation, and care and cleaning of the Mack Diesel engine. The classes were given to drivers at motor stables and to maintenance personnel at special sessions. Classes were presented by the MACK representative Mr Bresler. A study was made on the requirement for major component replacements for the Mack diesel. It was discovered that the Group has had to replace 107 engines, 58 transmissions, and 136 transfers in the period October through April. Of the engines replaced, twelve were attributed to MOGAS contamination in the diesel fuel supply at An Kne.

7. A memorial to the men of the 8th Transportation Group who were killed while serving in the Republic of Vietnam was built under the direction of CW2 T.O. Martin. The memorial was dedicated in a ceremony on 3 September 1969.

V. INSPECTIONS

1. In February the HHD, 8th Transportation Group was inspected by the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, IG. All phases of the S-4 operations were found to be satisfactory.

2. The S-4 section established guidelines, schedules, and checklists needed to perform its part of the Group Command inspections initiated in October 1968. The section has conducted more than 24 supply and ammunition inspections, maintenance inspections, and mess inspections.

3. In November the Group Maintenance Section instituted a CMMI team from resources available within the Group. The team has made over 20 CMMI inspections in addition to the Command Inspections. Courtesy visits are made at the request of the battalion commanders.

4. In December the Group Maintenance Section established procedures for a quarterly award to be presented to the unit with the best maintenance. The battalions each select a representative company. The unit scoring the highest in a competitive CMMI given by the Maintenance Section is declared the winner for that quarter. The winning unit for the second quarter FY 69 was the 563rd Transportation Company, for the 3rd quarter the 545th Transportation Company, and for the 4th quarter FY 69 the 545th again won.

5. In January the criteria for the award of the 8th Group Best Supply Activity was established. Each battalion selects a representative company which are then given a competitive inspection by Group Supply personnel. The 359th Transportation Company and HHD, 27th Transportation Battalion won the award for the third and fourth quarter 1969 respectively.

6. The 8th Transportation Group Three Star Best Mess Award was presented to units within the Group as follows:

October 1968	523rd Trans Co.
November 1968	666th Trans Co.
December 1968	512th Trans Co.
January 1969	666th Trans Co.
February 1969	597th Trans Co.
March 1969	666th Trans Co.
April 1969	64th Trans Co.
May 1969	HHD, 8th Trans Gp
June 1969	88th Trans Co.
July 1969	88th Trans Co.
August 1969	88th Trans Co.

The Qui Nhon Support Command Four Star Best Mess Award was presented to the 666th Transportation Company in January 1969 and the 88th Transportation Company in August 1969.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES.

1. In mid-November 1968 it was decided the Group would deactivate one light truck company in the Qui Nhon area. Careful consideration was given to the 666th Transportation Company and the 58th Transportation Company. On the basis of mileage and age of the 58th Transportation Company's fleet, it was decided that the 58th TC would be deactivated. The property books were zeroed as of 1 December 1968 and destroyed.

2. In early December 1968, the Group was assigned two new units located in the Tuy Hoa - Vung Ro Bay area. It was known at the time of assignment the 529th Transportation Company was to be deactivated immediately. A comparison of facilities, organization, physical location, and equipment indicated the 529th TC to be more desirable for retention than the 545th TC. The 529th TC was redesignated the 545th Transportation Company in Tuy Hoa and the unit at Vung Ro Bay was closed out. All equipment from the deactivation was disposed of in accordance with existing regulations.

3. Effective 1 January 1969 the Group received the 359th Transportation Company located in Pleiku. The unit is a medium fuel tanker company. With the assignment a new critically controlled item (ie 5000 gallon Tank Semi-trailer) was added to the Group Equipment Lists.

4. On 5 June 1969, the 666th Transportation Company of the 54th Transportation Battalion was transferred to the Da Nang Support Command for additional transportation support in I Corp Tactical area.

5. Examples of items obtained for 8th Group units are as follows:

a. Vehicles:

(1) The conversion of 5 ton tractors from Multifuel to Diesel by replacement.

(2) The following vehicles have been received by the Group during the period of this report.

(a) Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	49 each
(b) Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, Cargo	91 each
(c) Truck, 5 ton, Cargo	26 each
(d) Truck, Tractor, 5 ton	120 each
(e) Semi-trailer, 12 ton, S&P	188 each
(f) Semi-trailer, 5000 gal Tanker	42 each

(3) Other items obtained by the 8th Gp S-4 for its subordinate units in large quantities are:

(a) Penepime (dust palletizer)	640 BBL
(b) Paint (mised colors)	2,870 GL
(c) Lumber for construction	28,000 Bd Ft
(d) Carbon Steel (Armor Plate) 3/8"x 30"x 30'	229,400 Lbs 200 Sheets
(e) Tires	1,600 (conservative estimate)
(f) Tubes	3,000 (" ")

VII PERSONNEL CHANGES

1. In September 1968, Captain Robert P. Coleman was assigned as Group S-4. He had previously been the Maintenance Officer.

2. CW3 Glenn C. Slagle was assigned as Unit Supply Technician on October 1968. He replaced CW3 Lucian G. Normand who rotated to CONNS.

3. In mid October MSG Robert W. Beebe was assigned as Group Maintenance NCO replacing SFC Donell D. Fletcher who rotated to CONNS.

4. CW4 Thomas J. Snyder was assigned as Group Maintenance Officer in November 1968.

5. SFC Oscar Daise was assigned as Food Service NCO in November 1968.

6. In January 1969 MSG Alfred J. Locastro was assigned as Group Food Service Advisor.

7. SFC Alvin Thomson was assigned as Supply NCO in February.

8. MSG L.C. Harris joined the S-4 section in February replacing MSG Rober Beebe who rotated to CONNS.

9. CW2 Donald King was assigned as OIC of the Central Trailer Maintenance Facility in May 1969.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

CHANGE 5
REGULATION
NUMBER 55-1

7 August 1969

TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL

Tactical Convoy Operations

ADD:

5 d (14) Perform these additional duties:

(a) Insure that the convoy commander at the terminal end of the line haul operations, contacts the battalion S-3 responsible for control of the area of operation.

(b) Initial contact will be made by radio requesting any RON facilities or any aid needed to include POL, maintenance and messing.

(c) At all times when at the terminal of a line haul, the convoy commander and control personnel will request permission to enter the net in the effected area of operations. They will monitor the net at all times, except when all vehicles are secured in appropriate motor pools for the night.


AVCA QN-TG-3
FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN S. MAYNARD
1LT, TC
Asst Adjutant

IMPACT OF ENEMY ACTION

FROM 1 Sep 68 TO 31 Aug 69

NUMBER OF VEHICLES ROK (Remaining Over Night)	2,505
NUMBER OF SHORT TONS CAPABILITY LOST DUE TO ROK	23,824




	AMBUSHES	26
X	MINING INCIDENTS	8
O	SNIPER INCIDENTS	39
*	BRIDGES BLOWN	6
	OTHER	5

CASUALTIES		KIA	WIA	POW
US		19	109	0
EN		17	Unk	3

EQUIPMENT	
VEHICLES DAMAGED / DESTROYED	201

TON - MILES



MILLIONS

10. CW2 Orcl B. Forrest was assigned as the Food Service Advisor replacing MSG Locastro who was transferred to Qui Nhon Support Command.

11. CW2 T.O. Martin replaced CW3 Slagle, who completed his tour, as the Supply Technician for the Group.

12. SFC James Webb became Supply NCO in mid-July 1969.

13. Captain Robert P. Coleman completed his tour in August 1969 and was replaced as S-4 by Captain Robert M. Weiss

VIII. ANALYSIS OF DEADLINE PERCENTAGES FOR THE PERIOD MAY 68 to AUG 69

1. During October, November, and December 1968 the Group was in the process of washing out old vehicles. Vehicle density was low causing any deadline to raise the percentage an appreciable amount.

2. In February 1969 the Group drew 80 Tankers to substitute for pipeline operations. During February and March the Group hauled more ton miles of cargo than ever before. With the decreased maintenance time more failures resulted.


3. The 88th Transportation Company at An Khe had twelve trucks down for engines due to contaminated fuel. The Group had a total of twenty-five trucks down for engines in April. There were no engines in Vietnam at that time. Twenty-five engines were flown into Phu Cat to rectify this critical situation.

4. The 512th Transportation Company with its heavy lift platoon has been a constant maintenance problem. It has reached a low of 10% deadline only twice since April 1969.

EIGHTH TRANSPORTATION GROUP

DEADLINE PERCENTAGES

MAY 68 - AUG 69



SAFETY - 12 MONTH HISTORY

The 8th Transportation Group averages one and a half to two million road miles every month. 8th Group vehicles operate on hazardous and treacherous roads, consisting of winding, narrow mountain passes, congested and populated areas with a tremendous amount of Vietnamese traffic naturally contributing to motor vehicle accidents. A particularly pressing problem is the fact that Vietnamese civilians have not yet adapted themselves to traffic and highway conditions. They do not know proper driving techniques and also walk out in the roadways without even looking to see if vehicles are approaching them. Ten percent of 8th Group accidents involve Local National personnel.

In order to perform our mission, convoys must move seven days a week with drivers getting up at 0400 and not returning till 1800 or 1900 hours; sometimes they must remain overnight. After the convoy, return there is always the all-important vehicle maintenance to be performed and then cleaning of weapons and then perhaps a letter to home and then to bed. At 4 a.m. the next morning the cycle repeats itself.

In addition to the roadway being hazardous, each driver must also contend with the weather conditions. Half of the year he is plagued with monsoon rains, mud and washed out roads. The other half of the year he must contend with the ungodly, stifling heat under a tropical sun.

Operating under such adverse conditions as mentioned above, it is apparent that much has had to be done in order to reduce the accident rate and accident potential. An average month will produce anywhere between 10 to 35 accidents in varying degrees of severity; from creased fenders to total losses. Moreover, an average of five personnel are injured accidentally each month, primarily from vehicle accidents. The following is a breakdown of the accident and injury rate:

<u>ACCIDENT RATE</u>				<u>INJURY RATE</u>			
Sep	22.0	Mar	15.2	Sep	165.3	Mar	142.9
Oct	12.0	Apr	12.6	Oct	32.0	Apr	71.5
Nov	8.5	May	10.7	Nov	109.1	May	100.02
Dec	14.2	Jun	11.7	Dec	92.3	Jun	40.50
Jan	17.9	Jul	10.6	Jan	209.5	Jul	64.20
Feb	13.3	Aug	8.3	Feb	110.8	Aug	66.77

AMV EXPECTANCY RATE 10 PER MILLION MILES
 PI EXPECTANCY RATE 45 PER MILLION MAN-DAYS

8th Group traveled 13,001,982 miles during FY 69. The cost of such accidental losses is staggering. During six months of operations alone, the dollar value has reached \$600,000, and this does not include hidden costs that cannot be computed, such as loss of experienced personnel, administration, and the supreme commodity -- time.

During the month of October there was a complete reorganization of the 8th Group Safety Program. A full-time safety officer was assigned and the staff responsibility for safety was removed from the S-4 and transferred to the S-1. In July the safety officer was attached to the S-3 in order to be more closely allied with the group operations. The mission of the safety officer is to find new ways of reducing the accident rate and to try and find the answer to why the accident rate is well above the expectancy rate.

Several programs have been instituted at this and higher levels to give rewards to safe drivers that are meaningful to them. Higher headquarters issue safety certificates and PX Gift Certificates up to \$23.00 for a reward. Trophies are also presented to units for accident-free performance. Over 1,100 such awards have been presented in the past six months.

To a driver, perhaps the most meaningful reward is time off. In order to give a reward of this type a policy of giving an entire unit a day off for every 150,000 accident-free miles established. It was intended that this reward would encourage the drivers themselves to actively participate in the safety program through self-supervision. It has proven to be a definite morale booster and has managed to elicit more active driver response; no one in the safety program is more vital than the driver. To date, several units have become eligible for this award. Some several times, the 444th Transportation Company has amassed over 500,000 accident-free miles.

The most recent incentive award is the establishment of the 8th Transportation Group Mini-R&R Center, located at Tuy Hoa. The criteria for drivers to become eligible for this three-day R&R is 30,000 accident-free miles. An average of ten drivers become eligible for this award monthly. Due to relocation of the company in Tuy Hoa the R&R Center is temporarily closed but will reopen soon.


A study was made of the locations of accidents for the first six months of 1969. The locations were plotted on a map and revealed that the overwhelming majority occurred in built-up and city areas and a very minor portion occurred at night. As a result of this study, an 8th Transportation Group Safety Patrol was established to operate in the Qui Nhon and Pleiku area. A senior NCO is in charge and can issue 8th Group "traffic tickets" to 8th Group drivers who are observed violating traffic regulations or operating their vehicles in an unsafe manner. The primary mission of the patrol however is to be a deterrent to unsafe driving, rather than issuing tickets. The mere presence of the marked patrol serves as a constant reminder to drivers of all units utilizing the highway to drive safely. Since its inception, the number of accidents occurring in these areas has been cut in half.

An 8th Transportation Group Regulation, 385-1, has been written, dealing with safety. It contains the specific policies to be followed by subordinate units of 8th Group. It has established the safety awards program, proper safety procedures for daily operations, and sets forth accident reporting procedures.

The most recent safety campaign is maximum utilization of safety posters and signs. Each battalion has used their imagination and has produced original ideas for safety posters. These signs have been strategically placed where drivers cannot avoid seeing them, i.e. motor pool entrances, TTP's and entrances and exits of compounds.

ACCIDENT RATE

1968 - - - - 1969



8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP
15 September 1968

