

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

HENRY HERMANN BOLZ, JR., Brigadier General,

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 30 January 1923, Decatur, Illinois

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE: Over 29 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 30 September 1975

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Transportation School, Basic and Advanced Courses
The Command and General Staff College
The Armed Forces Staff College
The National War College

EDUCATION DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS Degree - Military Science
University of Michigan - MS Degree - Mechanical Engineering

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (Last 10 Years)

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENTS</u>
Feb 66	Aug 68	J-4 Pacific Operations Br, OJCS
Jul 69	Jan 70	CO, 507 th TC Grp, USARV
Jan 70	Jul 70	Dir, TMA, MACV
Aug 70	Jun 73	PM, Adv Aerial Systems, AVSCOM
Jul 73	May 74	Exec Dir, Quality Assurance, DSA
May 74	Sep 75	CG, Def Contr Admin Svc, NYC

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	4 Jun 46
ILT	16 Dec 47
CPT	22 Nov 50
MAJ	13 May 58
LTC	21 Dec 62
COL	12 Mar 68
BG	1 Jun 71

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Legion of Merit w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Aviator Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION USMA (Class of 46)



-
-

INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

Interview with **Brigadier General (Ret) Henry H. Bolz, Jr.**

[CPT Janice N. Ott conducted the interview of BG (Ret) Henry H. Bolz, Jr., on 4 Sep 1985. The record does not indicate where the interview took place. This interview took place before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of East and West Germany. Page numbers mentioned in the abstract refer to the hardcopy interview and not the on-line version.]

General Bolz began the interview by outlining his responsibilities as the Transportation Officer for the Berlin Brigade; he was responsible for the rail operation and an aviation detachment, and was also involved in procurement and tripartite contingency planning. He went on to explain how the military staff in Berlin was organized, to include the way in which the Army interacted with the State Department.

Officers in Berlin sometimes faced unique challenges from a political standpoint. One of the primary tasks General Bolz faced when he arrived in Berlin was to restore the reputation of the Transportation Corps that was tarnished when his predecessor unwittingly became involved in an international spy scandal. This discussion begins on page 3.

On page 5, General Bolz explained how the train operation between Berlin and West Germany was organized. He then discussed some of the special problems encountered by American trains travelling through East Germany. Two important ideas discussed by General Bolz were the attempted modification to the access agreement established between the United States and USSR, and the idea of sovereignty of U.S. equipment (territory/vessel) in a hostile environment. He also pointed out that the U.S. probably experienced being held hostage for the first time when the Communists detained U.S. trains suspected of having refugees onboard.

Next, on page 9, General Bolz discussed several aspects of the international occupation of Berlin to include British and French policy towards the Russians in comparison with U.S. policy, and the protocol involved in working with several organizations. He continued by explaining the way the State Department worked with the military to solve problems in Berlin.

On page 11, General Bolz began a discussion of the impact of the building of the Wall had on transportation in Berlin. He noted that it resulted in an increase of refugees on the trains, and that traffic to and from Berlin rose two-or-three-fold after a program was

established to encourage American soldiers stationed in West Germany to visit Berlin to see the Wall. He also noted that his aviation detachment temporarily operated an airlift to an island in Berlin after the Communist built another wall around it and that the building of the Wall between East and West Berlin set the stage for a much cooler stage of the Cold War.

General Bolz discussed lessons learned during his tenure in Berlin beginning on page 12. He specifically mentions communications and control, political lessons and relations with the State Department. Missions that stand out in his mind as having gone particularly well include:

the way his train commanders handled their duties; the fact that he was able to do his part in carrying out national policy in a successful manner and the fact that his staff restored the reputation of the Transportation Corps.

Interview:

Brigadier General (Ret) Henry H. Bolz, Jr.

CPT Ott: Berlin is the only city in the world where democratic and communistic governments coexist. Because of this, the military transportation system in Berlin is heavily influenced by world politics. General Bolz served as the Transportation Officer for the Berlin Brigade from 1963 to 1965. General, what was the scope of your responsibilities as the Transportation Officer for the Berlin Brigade?

BG Bolz: Generally, it was exactly the same as any other transportation officer on any other post, camp, or station in the United States, or for that matter, overseas. Basically, the mission was to move people and things. We did that routinely. However, there were some additional responsibilities that were a little unique. I think one of those was the fact that we were involved with a rail operation. We ran passenger trains to and from Berlin, to Frankfurt in West Germany, and also to Bremerhaven on a daily basis. We also ran three freight trains a month, as the traffic required. We were one of the few areas in the world that was involved in a fairly extensive rail operation. Now, we did not man the engines, we did not man the tracks, nor were we responsible for the maintenance of the roadbed or anything like that. But we controlled the schedule and controlled the rail movements in and out of Berlin. That was fairly unique.

Another aspect was the fact that I had an aviation detachment consisting basically of H-13 and UH-1 helicopters for support of the Berlin Brigade and for other routine aspects in and around Berlin. That was not necessarily unique, but I think it was somewhat unique in that most aviation detachments, at that particular time, were constituted as a separate detachment, either reporting to the Brigade Commander, or under the

operational control of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. In this particular case, we were involved with the maintenance of all the aircraft and, also, the routine day-to-day operation of the aircraft. That was fairly unique, I think, to the transportation position.

I was also involved in procurement there. I think that was very unique to a normal transportation officer's functions, in that we budgeted for and ran capital programs for all of our equipment and vehicles. We actually purchased those. We sent out for bids, we received bids, we opened bids, and purchased all of our own vehicles. They happened to be German vehicles, as a matter of fact, because Berlin was, and still is, an occupied area, a remnant of World War II.

The legal basis, the legal foundation, for our presence in Berlin is that of an occupying power. As such, there are certain rules and limitations under which the Germans must operate. Among those, they must pay for everything that goes on in Berlin as far as the day-to-day operations. We actually made up a budget every year. This budget was in Deutsch Marks. We defended the budget locally to ensure its propriety. We then carried the budget to Bonn, to the US Embassy, and there the US Embassy established a budgetary review committee. We defended the budget before that committee in Bonn. Then, and only then, was the budget approved in coordination with the Germans. We then got the resources to run the operation. The procurement aspect was a fairly substantial part of the thing, mostly in the procurement of vehicles, but also in the procurement of other services, such as rail, for example.

Then, we were involved, and this of course is at a fairly low level since I was a lieutenant colonel at the time, in tripartite contingency planning with the French and the British for contingency planning for those operations that might affect the three countries. There was also a certain amount of quadripartite contingency planning. There are still contingency plans for airlift to Berlin, should that ever happen again, where the West Germans are involved. It was contingency planning at a level that one normally doesn't find, I think, at a normal post, camp, or station.

The other unique aspect was the fact that the transportation officer also was a member of the US Commander's staff, at least in some degree a part of his staff, in addition to reporting to the Commander of the Berlin Brigade.

CPT Ott: Since this was a highly visible and sensitive position, how were you prepared or how did you prepare yourself for the job?

BG Bolz: I was prepared by the Army school system and the experience that one picks up. And I guess, at this particular time, I must have had probably eighteen years of service or so. I had been to the Transportation Basic Course, the Advanced Course, and the Command and General Staff College so that there was no specific preparation. I think this tends to be true for the entire Army. There is very little advantage that one has in preparing for a specific job. The only exception that I can figure is when I was sent to get my Masters at Michigan in mechanical engineering; it was for the specific purpose of teaching in the Department of Mechanics at West Point. I knew that I was

going to be teaching thermodynamics and fluid mechanics so I could prepare myself specifically. But that's a luxury that one usually does not have in the service and one has to depend on the general educational background that you get from the service schools. In my case, I think there were overtones of more ethical issues. I could probably say that I was about as well prepared from a two-room parochial school for my first eight grades of education as almost any other thing. What I'm saying is that this particular job, like most, just required a very general sort of a background. I was blessed with the fact that I had gone to those schools and, consequently, I don't think I had a really difficult time in assuming the responsibilities in Berlin.

CPT Ott: What was the concept of transportation support in Berlin and how did it work?

BG Bolz: Basically, I reported to the Commanding General of the Berlin Brigade. The Berlin Brigade is the single largest Army unit in Berlin. There are, of course, some intelligence activities there, but the single biggest unit there is the Berlin Brigade. It's a tactical brigade and I was a special staff officer on that brigade staff. Now the Berlin Brigade is somewhat unique in itself because it has a group of technical service officers, a technical staff that probably is much more extensive than one we'd find in a normal brigade. In other words, we had Chemical, Ordnance, Medical, Transportation, Signal, and Quartermaster, the gamut of technical service officers, as a part of the special staff. The transportation support basically was that of being a part of this staff of the tactical brigade, in which I reported primarily to the Chief of Staff, attended his weekly staff meetings. The Chief of Staff was my rating officer, which, of course, is vital in any situations. You have to know whom you're working for. My reviewing officer was the commanding general of the brigade. That was the routine transportation function, the way we were organized. The transportation support flowed through that particular chain of command.

On the other hand, I was what might be called an agent for the US Commander of Berlin. He is a two-star officer and the Berlin Brigade is under him, but he is in a dual-hatted role where he actually is also the head of the State Department organization in Berlin. A minister just below the ambassadorial rank heads up the State Department organization. So the US Commander in Berlin actually looked to two people, the brigade commander for the tactical-administrative support, and his minister, his deputy, in the US mission in Berlin. The minister through his staff ran all the political aspects of the situation there. I was concerned, as a transportation officer, with matters of access, principally rail access, but there were other matters that became involved in my functions. In matters of access, I was very often called into the US Commander's office and into the US mission State Department end of the thing, and spent a great deal of my time and effort there. It made a unique personal dilemma for the transportation officer there in that the routine aspects, the "easy aspects" of the job, were part of the Berlin Brigade. This is where my OER, the efficiency report, was made up. I would say that the great bulk of my time, the great bulk of my effort, the great bulk of the risk, if there was any involved in this particular job, lay with the US Commander in Berlin. Of course, he was not in my OER channel, so that was a dilemma as long as I was there, but it was never any problem. I think many officers have to serve in a dual-hatted sort of

role and this was another one of those, but I think there always are certain risks that one takes, career-wise, in spending too much time away from their rating officer.

CPT Ott: What special problems did you encounter in Berlin that transportation officers elsewhere do not encounter?

BG Bolz: I alluded to the fact that the rail operations were unique, and the air operations in that environment were something. I think that perhaps I ought to digress here and mention something. When you say special problems, I think whenever you go into any sort of assignment, there's a certain aura about the position, there's a certain historical imperative that drives that particular position, and I think mine happened to be very, very unique. I probably should digress here a bit because at that particular time, as there is today, here we are in the very first part of September 1985, we were hearing about spy stories in East Germany and West Germany. At that particular time, England was rocked by a scandal. I think the name of the person involved was Profurm. It disrupted, apparently, much of the intelligence services throughout Western Europe at that particular time. People were very sensitive, very touchy, about this matter of intelligence activities. It just so happened that my predecessor in Berlin, a full colonel at the time, unfortunately got tied up in what became, I'm certain, a very personal and tragic sort of problem. At least this is what was reported to me when I went to Berlin. He had become involved in a personal liaison with a young, female German who unfortunately had some ties at a low level with some East German intelligence agents. For awhile, before my arrival there, he was under constant surveillance and, fortunately, for his sake and the sake of the United States, for everyone's sake as a matter of fact, there was never any implication that he was less than fully loyal to the country. There was no question about his loyalty or fidelity to the country.

This, of course, was going on unbeknownst to me. I, at the time, was a senior major and had just been promoted to lieutenant colonel in Headquarters, US Army in Europe. I had gone over there quite happy after eleven years in the States, having tried and tried to get some sort of command time. At that time one had to get on a roster, as I guess one does today, to get command. I was assigned to Europe, looking forward to the time that I would get promoted and command a battalion in Europe. Unfortunately, the first turn in the track was to Heidelberg. I was only a Major at that time so I was placed on the staff, the transportation staff of the US Army headquarters in Europe, in Heidelberg. I got promoted a couple of months after I arrived in Germany and knew nothing about the Berlin Brigade, knew nothing about the transportation officer except what I may have heard or overheard in passing in some of the courses, but literally I was very naive on the subject. I found out later that that particular job was a very coveted post and, indeed, I guess it was. It's incumbent, as I say, was a full colonel when I arrived in Europe. Some of the battalion commanders later told me that that was their stepping stone after their command time. They had hoped to get to Berlin. I literally knew nothing about what was going on in Berlin until one day I was called into the transportation officer's office and was told that I was under consideration to go to Berlin. Why these things happen, I will never know. As I say, I had known nothing about it, I was not looking for that particular assignment, but for some reason someone picked me or

nominated me to go up there. Then, and only then, did I feel that this might be a very nice sort of move because of all the nice things I had heard about it.

I felt that way until my first interview in Berlin where Major General James Polk called me into the office and informed me of some of the things that had happened in the course of the surveillance of my predecessor. He told me that the quarters that I was going to occupy had been tapped for a couple of months while they were conducting surveillance on this individual, that the phone had been tapped, there were taps in the house. It became one of those very sensitive sort of things and I'm not sure that my house wasn't tapped as long as I was in Berlin, but you can bet your life that I became the number one straight arrow in Berlin at the time. But it had very little, if any, affect on any demeanor that I had ever had prior to or since. It really had no real effect and Berlin turned out to be the confluence of what I would say was opportunities for the family, in a personal sort of way. The lifestyle was very good since everything was underwritten by Deutsch Marks. It was still under the occupation. My wife found it to be a very satisfying experience and certainly I, from a professional standpoint, had challenges that were really undreamed of for someone of my relative rank at that particular time. I think it does point out that the historical imperative here was one of sensitivity to intelligence activity. It didn't really cloud the tour, but it certainly impacted on all of our actions. It really pointed out the fact that it was a very sensitive sort of position from a political aspect.

As I say, I got this the very first day that I arrived. There was no question that the work had been cut out for me. The Transportation Corps, in particular, did not have a very high regard, especially by General Polk, at that particular time. That was certainly an inferred mission that I had, to regain or re-establish the reputation of the Transportation Corps and to build a somewhat demoralized outfit after the word had come out that a respected senior staff member had let down much of the internal staff of the Transportation Corps. That was basically the way I started my tour there. It did, as I say, color and point up the international aspects. That was pointed up more and more with the rail operations, which tended to be the unique aspect of that. As I mentioned before, we were running two passenger trains out a day, one to Frankfurt, one to Bremerhaven, and two in from those respective points, plus several freight trains a month depending on the volume of traffic.

CPT Ott: Did you work with TRANSCOM at all with the coordination of those trains or was there a TRANSCOM then?

BG Bolz: There wasn't a TRANSCOM at that particular time. All of the train service basically became established out of certain protocols at the end of World War II. The Russians, at that time, and we were certainly on much friendlier terms and had some common goals. While things were somewhat tight, they weren't at the stage of the Cold War that existed there in 1963 and 1964. We did, however, work with the transportation staff and Headquarters Europe because there was a joint East German-West German committee that coordinated the rail schedules themselves. We had access to certain train paths under these protocols that were long, long lasting. I was certainly not

involved in any of those. These, by the time I was there, had become precedents, and these precedents were very, very vital to our access to Berlin. So we did work together somewhat, but this was a very minor aspect of the rail operations. About every six months that committee met and because of time changes and certain operational changes there would be certain slight changes in the schedule. For instance, if they were going to be repairing tracks or something, the schedule might take a little bit longer. These sort of administrative changes were made by a group of West German railroad people and East German railroad people, and it became a technical sort of a scheduling problem more than anything else. The right of the US government to those train paths was established in agreement with the Russians. That really was the foundation for that. There were, of course, these other aspects of scheduling, the technical matters, when the trains would cross the border and that sort of thing, but the right to these train paths was ours from day one, actually.

Basically, the rail operation consisted of a Rail Transport Office (RTO) in Berlin. I also funded for and manned the Rail Transport Office in Bremerhaven and, likewise, the RTO in the Frankfurt bahnhof. That particular portion of the operation was basically administrative. We did all the booking, all the reservations, for these trains that ran.

I probably should give just a little summary background of how this operation was conducted. On a daily basis, a train would arrive in Berlin in the morning from Frankfurt, and one from Bremerhaven. We would then put them on the siding and the RTO, the Rail Transport Office, was basically involved in making reservations and making assignments for the various sleeping compartments. The trains were all sleeper trains. They were all compartments and all trains were overnight. At six-thirty or seven o'clock in the evening, the Frankfurt train would load up in the Berlin RTO, and an engine from East Germany would come into our RTO. East Germans would man this particular engine so that the East Germans pulled our cars, basically. The train would pull out, would leave West Berlin, and would change engines in the Potsdam yards just outside of Berlin for a road engine. That would be another East German engine, an East German crew. That East German railroad crew would carry us down to the West German border, and at that particular point we would process the passengers through the Russian checkpoint. At that particular time, the East German engine would leave and the West German engine would come across the border, hook onto the train, and take it on down to Frankfurt. The reverse would be true, also. The Frankfurt train left about six-thirty in the evening and would arrive at Marienborn at about three in the morning. The East German engine would hook on and bring it all the way into our RTO at daybreak. My train commanders would get on the train in Berlin, travel to Marienborn, the checkpoint, cross into West Germany, get off the train and wait for two or three hours while the incoming trains would come in. They would then board the train, check the train through the western checkpoint, and bring it back. So, that really is the fundamental way that we operated the trains. That was the unique aspect of it.

During that particular period of time, there were a number of incidents that arose that really changed, or attempted to change the method of access. As I said, these precedents become very, very important in the minds of the Russians. Any deviation is

looked on very strangely. As a matter of fact, from a defensive end we have to look at it the same way. In other words, that access has been established under certain conditions and both sides do a great deal to maintain those conditions as they existed with very, very little change.

One of the changes noted by one of the train commanders early on was, one May Day shortly after I arrived, I guess I had been there some months, the train commander noticed that in celebration of May Day, the East Germans or the Russians or someone had affixed red flags to the engine in commemoration of their holiday. My train commanders were fine, fine young men. Every one of them had been a ROM graduate, and I have spoken for years nothing but praise for the kind of people that were turned out. The first time this incident arose, this train commander noted it, took exception to it, and it was probably a portion of a two-way sensitivity to those flags. Probably, one was pure patriotism. He just didn't like the idea of the US Army train going through East Germany carrying the red communist flag. On the other hand, and I doubt whether the young man at that time was sensitized to this aspect of it, it marked a change, albeit a minor change, in the method of access to Berlin. Now, whether some suggestion program, or its counterpart that the East Germans have, where someone said we ought to fly flags on May Day fixed those flags, no one knows. No one knows what the genesis of these flags were on this train, whether it was a test; very often we found little tests like these going on. Regardless of the reason, he objected to the thing and a minor hassle ensued with the Russians at the checkpoint. He finally prevailed, the flags were taken off, and the train came into our station. Whether this had ever happened before or after I don't know, but this young man was alert to this and, as I say, for two different reasons, he did not like it.

As you go up the chain of command, you have consideration of these two aspects. One is the sense of patriotism. You just don't like a communist flag flying on a US train. The other aspect, of course, as you go up the chain of command, is a change in the rules of access. I think that becomes far more important, the picking away, and the modification of precedents that had been established. Regardless of the impact, or regardless of the relative weight of one of these aspects or the other, our position became that we simply did not want those flags on our trains. I'm sure the train commanders just didn't like them, say for the one score. I didn't like them because of what I felt was being done to the access modification. It may be a combination, but the State Department agreed, essentially, that this was an improper act on this thing.

That became sort of a thorn in our side where we saw this happening more and more often on the holidays. It reached a point, at one time, where the train commander was adamant about doing this thing. They were pulling out of the Marienborn station and he literally pulled the air brakes on the train just as it was leaving the siding and going onto the main line. It just so happened that this main line was also the route between Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw to the Eastern Bloc. Then, and only then, did they apparently get the word that we were very sensitive about this subject and, literally, the entire line was blocked. It was going to be disrupting a lot of people and a lot of traffic, in addition to our own. This probably became one of the worst instances where the Russian checkpoint

commander went out to the East Germans and got two engines and started banging and pushing and pulling on the train, actually broke a couple of these couplings. But when you have ten or twelve of these rail passenger cars whose wheels are locked, it becomes an impossible job to move. After several hours, our train was released without the flags on them. This was the type of thing that happened.

One other recurring incident, and this had happened a number of times before I had arrived there, and as a matter of fact even before I had arrived there a movie had been made in this country about the thing. The title of the movie was Incident at Marienborn. It related to a refugee who, while the train was going through East Germany, climbed aboard our train, broke a window, got into the train, and used the train as a route of escape to West Germany. At that particular time, the Russians were very adamant. They apparently had known about the fact that he got on the train and they were holding the train. In those days, we didn't use this word very often, although certainly in the last four or five years since the Iranian situation we have used it, but it was probably the first time that we really had been held hostage by a communist country. In other words, all the passengers on the train were being held there in East Germany and the idea was that that train would not be released until the refugee was taken off that train. These incidents occurred a number of times during the course of my tenure, and I'm certain successive tenures there.

The question then becomes, what do you do in a situation like this? It was a question posed to me at my entrance interview with General Polk: what sort of orders do you give, are you going to be giving to your train commanders? Well, we had a loose-leaf book of former incidents and what to do in case of one thing or another, but I felt that there needed to be something a little bit more. When General Polk asked me how I intended to handle it, I said, "Well, I'm going to go to my train commanders and go back to what I consider the basics, what I learned on interior guard duty as a plebe at West Point." I don't suppose you've ever even heard of interior guard duty. This is where you walk the post with your rifle and you guard ammunition stocks, or you guard anything. In those days, one learned ten general orders, and one of those ten general orders was to take charge of this post and all government property in view. My position was that these train cars were US property; they were US sovereign equipment if there is such a thing as sovereign equipment. Our position, and this was not mine alone, it had been our position before and I just tried to reinforce it, was that no one was to destroy the sanctity of that sovereignty; the Russians, the East Germans, no one would ever be allowed on that train. That was our position before I got there, it was my very, very strong position while I was there, and I'm certain it's still the position today. Here again, it's just a matter of going back to the basics.

When you go into the ten general orders, there's another aspect of this. For instance, when the trains run through East Germany, freight trains take second priority to passenger trains. They always have on every railroad, or on most railroads. I think there are some commodity-oriented railroads where that might not be the case, but in a general rail situation the freights are generally shunted alongside while they let the glamorous trains go through. While our freight train would be going through East

Germany, very often there would be two, three, and four-hour delays. Then the question arises, how does one protect US equipment in the middle of East Germany if you have flat cars with tanks or jeeps or trucks on them? You just can't sit in a caboose on the end of this thing. Our position was that our MPs would dismount and actually patrol the train while it was in East Germany. This, again, was a long-standing precedent. At this particular time, this was the era of confrontation and, I think, really the coldest part of the Cold War. We were tested many, many times by, basically, the Russians, but they used their agents, the East Germans, as often as they possibly could. The Volks Polizei, the Vopos, of East Germany, would often confront our MPs. Our position was that we did not deal with East Germans, period. The US government does not recognize East Germany, and we recognized no particular part of East Germany. We would not speak to the Volks Polizei and if they wanted any words, they would have to go find a Russian to speak to us.

CPT Ott: On the trains, were the Americans allowed to speak to the East German crews at all?

BG Bolz: There was very little chance of that because the crew was all up in the engine except for one person. We did have a coach car. It's primarily a sleeping train, but we had a coach car basically for the MPs. There would be three or four MPs, the train commander, an interpreter on every train and, because the rules of the road in Europe called for a conductor within that particular division to be on the train, the East Germans also put a conductor in that coach car. He was isolated. He was never spoken to, but again this was one of those things where we were willing to go along with that particular protocol. They could have one on there, but there was no contact with him. Had there ever been a train wreck, a derailment, I suppose there might have come a time where we would be forced into making some kind of technical communication with him, but that never arose while we were there. We had no contact with the East German crew and, essentially, the only one with whom any contact might have been possible would have been the conductor who sat in the coach car.

CPT Ott: What problems were posed by the fact that West Berlin was divided into English, French, and American sectors?

BG Bolz: Very little. Basically, the fact that we were members of tripartite or quadripartite contingency planning really made it a matter of liaison to make certain we had coordinated procedures. Now, I'm not certain that the British foreign office, their equivalent of our political mission if we go back to the rail access, would put as much emphasis on the flags as we would, but we certainly made our positions known to them. There was a certain amount of coordination procedures and I think, in those days, we found that the Russians would often see a much better target for some change like this in the French or the British than they did with us because they weren't as involved in the depths of the Cold War, I don't think, as we were.

One of the nicest aspects about the fact that there were English, French, and American sectors was that, for the first time in my life, it gave me a little feeling of what protocol is

involved in the service. We're brought up all through our lives, in our democracy, to hear that all men are created equal and this and that, but we know that in the real world there are various social strata. While we're created equal, politically, economically, and otherwise, including rank-wise, we are not created equally. This, I think, was probably the first time that I had been involved with the protocol aspects to this particular degree, not only in the British, French, and American sectors, but also in the pecking order. We had the two parallel organizations, the State Department and the Berlin Brigade. The business of equivalency of the various grades in the State Department with the various grades of military became very, very important. I think the higher one goes in Washington, or in business, this becomes something that one should really have a little are training on. I wish I had been more sensitive to what protocol involves and the reasons for it and why it works and why it doesn't work, particularly.

That was just another aspect there, and no real problems were posed by the French, British, and American sectors except that they looked at the Russians, I think, through different eyes than we did, just as they do now. I think the French have always been relative patsies for the Russians. I think that that stems from a very large portion of the vote going communistic from time to time, and I think it's been reflected when they threw us out of France, all our bases, our logistic bases, when they left NATO. At the same time, they're still involved with us in Berlin.

CPT Ott: You mentioned earlier that the US Commander had people from the State Department working for him. How involved was the State Department in Berlin, and in what way did they interact with the military?

BG Bolz: They were intimately involved. As I mentioned before, on the flag situation, when these incidents arose, there would obviously be liaison meetings with State Department representatives. If things reached a point where there had to be communications with the Russians, it went through our State Department channels to the Russians. During this period of time, incidents arose quite often, unfortunately. Our freight trains, for example. When our people get off to patrol the ground, the East German Volks Polizei use the German Shepherd dogs, the mean, mean junkyard dogs, and there would be provocations. For instance, one of the provocations that came up a couple of times was that when our people were patrolling and would run up against an East German, the East German would take the muzzle off the dogs as a very threatening, provocative sort of gesture. This would be reported back through our channels and, usually, this would mean a call in the night reporting to me that this was happening, through radio communication. If it were serious enough, I would call the State Department duty officer. We'd get together at the Emergency Operations Center and discuss it. There was a very intimate interplay on incidents like this. Any time the highway access was involved, it was the same thing; they would become involved in the same way. We would be involved in that we would have to have a debriefing explained, have the people involved explain and document the thing. A written formal protest would go, then, to the Russians. As I say, we didn't deal with the East Germans.

CPT Ott: Complaints didn't go back to Washington first?

BG Bolz: Sometimes they went back to Washington. When they were serious enough, the State Department in Washington would be involved. One of those incidents was on an Armed Forces Day. My aviation detachment commander came up with a suggestion that we ought to have a display of Army aircraft at Templehof, in Berlin. He thought we ought to fly in so all our people could see all of our airplanes. I forget the designation of this, but at that particular time, we had an observation aircraft, a twin-engine aircraft, which could be fitted with side-looking-airborne radar (SLAR) for intelligence purposes. We brought one of these planes in. The suggestion was made to me and I thought it was a good suggestion. We set it up and said this was going to be our display. Well, it so happens that in Jane's Annual of Aircraft and Ships, that particular aircraft had a designation of an armed reconnaissance airplane. The Russians brought that up and said, "You're spying on us... You're doing the wrong thing here... and, "That airplane will not fly out of Berlin... You've brought it in here and it won't return." That involved the air corridor. While this was part of the show that I, as the Transportation Officer, had gotten involved in, obviously this went up to a much higher sort of thing. A lot of people in Heidelberg and back at USCOM headquarters, the native headquarters in Washington, got involved. Do we fly this airplane out of here, or do we dismantle it and take it out by freight? I was there in the Emergency Operations Center for quite awhile. It might have been the Fourth of July or Armed Forces Day. I forget which day it was but the decision was made. We flew that in. There were never any kind of provocative intentions except we just wanted to show off aircraft there. The decision was made to fly it out. We asked for a couple of volunteers in our aviation detachment to fly that thing out because the Russians said they were going to shoot it down. They're prone to do this sort of thing. They buzzed it with some of their fighters on the way out, but other than that it flew out without incident. So yes, we were involved with the State Department and they were intimately involved in incidents like that, time after time after time. In delivering protests to the Russians, our train commanders would take the written protests and when they processed the documents would also deliver them. That would be the lowest level sort of a protest, but there were other higher level protests, various other levels within the State Department.

CPT Ott: Sir, as you mentioned earlier, in 1961, The Wall was built, and that was only few years before you started your tour in Berlin. How did the building of The Wall impact on transportation in Berlin?

BG Bolz: Very little, directly. I think one of the things, as I mentioned, was that there was probably a slight increase in the refugees. In other words, there was now no more freedom to move between borders and, probably, the incidents of refugees on the trains rose quite a bit. Probably, from an operational standpoint, the biggest impact was that General Polk and General Paul Freeman, who was the four-star in Heidelberg at the time, agreed that The Wall should really provide some sort of incentive and a very good picture of just what a totalitarian government can do. There was quite a program on within West Germany to urge people to actually visit Berlin. So our traffic, during my tenure there, probably went up two- or three-fold. It literally soared because there was a program that soldiers and dependents in the zone [West Germany] ought to see [Berlin] for themselves, first hand, really why they were in Germany, what this meant to them. It

was an overt, a very physical, kind of a lesson for them. It certainly impacted on us that way.

During this particular time, it impacted operationally for a short time. There are one or two little islands in Berlin that are part of West Berlin, but are not contiguous. One of those is called Steinstucken. This was a small enclave of maybe a couple of hundred people. They were part of the city of West Berlin, but there was no physical tie-in. So when The Wall was built, they actually built another wall around this little enclave of Steinstucken. They cut off access between West Berlin and this little Steinstucken during that particular time. The incidents keep going on and on. It's difficult to remember all of them. It seemed there was something going on with these people all of the time. For awhile there, with our helicopters, we were running a sort of rinky-dink airlift between West Berlin and this portion of West Berlin that had been isolated on the ground. We ran an airlift, actually, between West Berlin and Steinstucken, and they relented after awhile. Again, it was just harassment.

The building of The Wall obviously had an impact. Psychologically, it was a great impact, and on our operations it certainly exasperated the access problems, without any question. It set the stage for this much cooler war which was part of the Cold War. It goes on until today.

CPT Ott: Do you feel that we have learned any important lessons or have furthered our transportation technology because of our involvement in Berlin?

BG Bolz: When I consider transportation technology, I go back to a short tour that I had with the Research and Development (R&D) office there at Fort Eustis. It was only for three or four months before my Advanced Course, but it seems to me that most of our R&D is devoted to logistics-over-the-shore (LOM) type things, and to Army aviation. Certainly there are advances in highway transportation in the way we move those goods, but as far as any direct lessons that I can think of, I can't. I fall short on something like that because we were using the technology on the rails that existed over there. Our highway technology was about the same and aircraft was strictly administrative.

I think that the one lesson that I learned was the importance of communications and control, especially in what I now refer to as these hostage situations arising from our train when these things would be stopped. Another one of the more lengthy situations probably lasted some five or six hours. We found that the batteries were not keeping the radio power requirements up so we added to all of our trains portable generator sets after awhile. This was certainly a part of the communications and control because that train commander is out there in the middle of East Germany. He's isolated from everything. He might be a first or second lieutenant and with the precedents that he has established, these train commanders had more on their shoulders, I think, than many people ever would believe when they were faced with this sort of thing from the Volks Polizei, or just the adamant actions on the part of the Russians. They deserve everything that we can do to keep in communications with them. That is one of the

things. Another thing that we finally did, we stocked emergency rations on the train because we weren't certain how long these things might go on. The Cold War seemed to be getting worse and worse instead of better and better. I think that probably, since my time there, I read very little about this, but I think that we've reached a modus vivendi that is probably at a relatively warm stage, rather than a cold stage. But certainly, communications and control would be number one on my list if I were to go back there again. If I've got to do this again, I want to make sure that there's some redundancy there. I want to be able to talk to those poor guys out there. They deserve all the help that they can get.

CPT Ott: In listening to this entire conversation here, it sounds like the lessons were more in the political arena.

BG Bolz: I would say they were, yes, because there were no real difficult problems with the routine movement of household goods and internal distribution of goods within Berlin. That sort of thing we should be experts at almost automatically after we come out of the schools. The procedures are pretty well down pat, but it's when you are exposed to some of these new incidents for which there are no precedents, there are no textbooks, this really, I think, is what tests one's metal. That was a good time and a good place to have that done.

CPT Ott: Looking back, is there anything that you would do differently if you could relive your Berlin experience?

BG Bolz: I suppose that one really ought to, but to a degree, with this whole oral history program I've been a little concerned. It can be an exercise, I'm afraid, in self-aggrandizement, and it shouldn't be. If I say there's nothing that I wouldn't do differently, then I sound like the egomaniac I probably am. I think that rather than doing anything differently, to me it was a very, very satisfying experience. Officially, professionally, personally, socially, it was just a great, great experience. I just wish that I would have had more experience along those lines having gone in there because I'm certain there were times when I was vacillating when I shouldn't have been, when an incident arose where I may have reacted more quickly. But I can't think of anything that I would have done a little more differently.

I'm especially proud of the way our train commanders handled refugees during my tenure. It brings to mind an incident, after I got back to the States, where the Coast Guard had a very analogous situation. As I recall, a Russian seaman jumped ship up near Nova Scotia and got onto a Coast Guard cutter. I don't know whether it was a Russian trawler or just what, but they demanded that they get this person back. The Coast Guard cutter commander, who is very similar to our train commander, called up the headquarters in Boston and talked to the rear admiral back there, and said, "What do I do at a time like this?" They allowed the Russians to come on and take that man off and, again, they gave up the sovereignty of US property. That admiral, as I understand it, was later pretty much summarily retired from the service. He made, basically, the wrong decision.

I think that one thing I would do differently would be in my relations with the State Department. I don't think that we worked well enough together, and that was probably as much my fault as their fault. There tends to be, whenever you get into a bureaucracy, a dichotomy. We had the Berlin Brigade and we had the US mission there. Our social lives tended to keep us within the Berlin Brigade and I don't think there was nearly enough informal communication with the mission staff, with the State Department staff, that there should've been. Part of that is due to the structure of the beast, the organizational structure, but I think that we, as individuals, have to take some of that on our own shoulders because we ought to be able to recognize that we could do better. We're each pretty jealous of our own turf, and that's not a good thing. I would have to plead as guilty as anyone to that. I'm very sensitive to what my prerogatives are and I don't want to give any of those up, but I think that's the nature of a good commander. At the same time, it doesn't mean that you can't have communications. I would say that my relations were probably more awkward than they should have been with the State Department. I think that there could have been much more social intercourse with them, which would have helped, probably, in the professional, or in the operational matters that came up day to day.

One of the reasons why I hesitate to say that I'd do anything differently is because, when I look back years later, six years after I left there I was in Vietnam and I got a wire indicating that I'd been selected as a brigadier general. About a week later, the members of the board were announced and it just so happened that Lieutenant General John Haye was a member of that selection board. Brigadier General John Haye was a brigade commander while I was in Berlin. Who knows, if I had done something differently things might not have turned out quite the same. I never have seen General Haye since Berlin and never had any contact with him afterwards. I don't know if he voted for me -- or against me on the board, but I just have the feeling that that might have helped.

CPT Ott: In conclusion, what do you think was your most important contribution as the Transportation Officer for the Berlin Brigade?

BG Bolz: I think, principally, you have to look and say, "Did I perform my mission?" When I go back to my initial interview with General Polk, I think the important contribution was that I did my part in carrying out national policy in a successful manner. I didn't get us into a great, great deal of trouble that I know of. We were in an era of confrontation after The Wall was built. There's no question about it. It came up in presidential elections later saying we're going to shift from this confrontational posture to one of negotiation. I think I was sufficiently confrontational while I was there to do the mission as it was given to me. Principally, I'd say that was a contribution.

Then, on a personal plane, I think that by the time I left, I think that we had restored the Transportation Corps. I shouldn't say "I", I should say "we", because I had some of the nicest, most dedicated people, the train commanders principally among them, but I couldn't leave out someone like Olger Burch who ran the motor pool for me. I had to give him his head because I was often doing other things. Or people like Jack Sturn,

who ran the RTO. There were all sorts of people like that that I think did a great deal to restore the faith and the confidence and the reputation of the Transportation Corps which, sort of by osmosis, probably had been a little bit tarnished by their leader. I think that by the time we left, there was a great deal of respect for the Transportation Corps. As a matter of fact, General Polk, before he left, selected my Rail Transport Officer, Jack Sturn, to be his Aide de Camp. This is one of the few times, I think, that an Infantry or an Armor officer had picked out a TC officer, and Jack Sturn went down with him. General Polk immediately became V Corps Commander and Jack Sturn left us and went down to V Corps with General Polk. I think the whole aura of transportation improved during that time, largely because I had lots of good staff people who were helping me.