

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

Of

RUSH BLODGET LINCOLN, JR. Major General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 2 December 1910, Fort Thomas, Kentucky

YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: Over 33 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 1 February 1965

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Engineer School, Basic Course
The Armed Forces Staff College
The National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS Degree - Military Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology - MS Degree - Civil Engineering

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (Last 10 Years)

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Dec 54	Aug 58	CG, Fort Eustis
Aug 58	Mar 62	Dep Chief of Trans, HQ DA
Mar 62	Jun 63	Chief of Trans, HQ DA
Jun 63	Feb 65	CG, Def Traffic Mgmt Svc

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	10 Jun	1932
1LT	22 Sep	1935
CPT	10 Jun	1942
MAJ	5 Mar	1942

LTC	22 Oct	1942
COL	13 Sep	1944
BG	2 Oct	1954
MG	6 Jul	1956

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Legion of Merit w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal

SOURCE OF COMMISSION USMA (Class of 1932)



INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

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Interview with Major General (Ret) Rush B. Lincoln

Major General (Ret) Rush B. Lincoln, Jr. was interviewed by CPT Catherine Higgins on 20 April 1985 in Wellesley, Massachusetts. MG Lincoln is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, Class of 1932.

MG Lincoln's assignment to the Logistics Division, SHAPE, at its inception in April 1951, provided him with the chance to utilize his experience during WWII when serving at conferences between heads of state and combined chiefs of staff in locations throughout the world. The mission of SHAPE was to ensure the NATO countries would be ready to repel any attack that might be instigated against a member nation. The Logistics Division was responsible for developing facilities, plans and coordination throughout NATO countries to enhance the overall readiness of the Allies.

The leadership assigned throughout the first years of SHAPE was outstanding -- Eisenhower, Ridgeway, Gruenther, plus the staff officers from all nations. Cooperation was outstanding among the officers, and many viable training exercises, facilities improvements, and contingency plans were developed and adopted.

Today, the foundations laid by the first cooperative years of SHAPE are still firm. As long as planning keeps pace with technological advances (i.e., containerization, for example), SHAPE will be a great force in ensuring peace.

INTERVIEW

Interview of MG (Ret) Rush B. Lincoln, Jr., conducted by CPT Catherine A. Higgins at General Lincoln's home at Wellesley, Massachusetts on 20 April 1985.

CPT Higgins: Sir, I would like to begin the interview by asking you how you were selected to take part in the logistics division of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

MG Lincoln: Well, I might preface my description of my personal assignment with the reminder that the NATO alliance was officially consummated in August 1949 and the North Korean communists invaded South Korea in June of 1950. This alerted all the western allies to the possibility of a communist worldwide expansion that could lead to a prolonged extended war... so that the idea of military arrangements to defend Western Europe particularly became extremely important. As a result, a North Atlantic Council

approved in December 1950 the appointment of General Eisenhower to be the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This, of course, meant that he had to immediately assemble allied officers from participating countries to form a headquarters and subordinate commands that would be a part of Allied Command Europe. This, of course, started the various nations to assign officers that they felt would fulfill the requirements, so that it stems really from Eisenhower's appointment and his initiative to establish a headquarters that would be adequate and capable of doing everything he required.

In the logistics area of which I was assigned, the background is also related to my probable appointment because General Eisenhower had had General Edmund H. Leavey as his G4 in North Africa during World War II. General Leavey subsequently went out to the Pacific Ocean areas and the central Pacific and was a logistics officer for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in the latter part of World War II. When he returned to Washington after VJ Day (Victory Over Japan), he became the second Chief of Transportation of the US Army. He was in that capacity when I perhaps came to his attention since I had (of course) during World War II a rather unusual sequence of assignments, and interesting details. I took part in all of the conferences between the heads of state and the combined chiefs of staff that were held in Washington, Quebec (twice), Cairo, Tehran, Malta, Yalta. This gave me considerable insight into international allied operations, staff work, and the considerations involved when you deal with more than your own country.

After that World War II assignment, I was with the Joint Staff Planning, and while attending these conferences, I was transferred to the Pacific Ocean areas and from there went to the Philippines in the Army Forces Western Pacific, which were headquartered in Manila at that time before the VJ Day period. At that time, General Leavey also came out to Manila and was a Deputy Commanding General of the Army Forces Western Pacific, and actually received the surrender of the Japanese in the Philippines when the war ended.... I was serving with him at that time also, and therefore was known to him. In fact, after the war, I came back a year later from the Philippines and was sent to the first class of the Armed Forces Staff College, that gave me some more staff and academic instruction in this area. General Leavey then assigned me as the Assistant Commandant which was essentially the head of the Transportation School for the first post-war courses. When it came time to nominate officers in the Logistics field from the US Army, he wrote to General Heilmann who was then Chief of Transportation and for whom I was a special assistant, having just graduated with the class of 1950 from the National War College. And General Heilmann agreed that he would assign me to SHAPE so I suppose that you might say my selection was due to personal knowledge of the senior officers who would be involved in making choices, and also the broad experience that I had been fortunate enough to have, which qualified me to deal with this type of assignment.

I joined SHAPE which was activated in April 1951, and I joined it as one of the original staff groups that were assigned there. I continued until July of 1954 - about 3 1/2 years - before I came back to the States. The physical arrangements were interesting: When

we first started, the headquarters and all of the offices were in the Hotel Astoria, which was on Rue De Presburg, which circulates around the Etoile where the Arc De Triomphe is located. We had our offices in various bedrooms. They put plywood over the tub so you would have a desk space and put file cabinets in the bathrooms, closets and everywhere else, so it was a very improvised system. That was what we were working with until about August or September of 1951, when the permanent location out in Rocqencourt near Versailles was completed and the headquarters was transferred out there.

The officers selected at that time felt proud of the fact that they were given this opportunity. As I mentioned, the whole thing was born under the thought that the Russians might attack and start a worldwide confrontation, so that those of us who were there at the beginning felt we could contribute a great deal to the readiness. The type of officers that were assigned is indicative of the quality that every country made available. In the group that I worked with in Logistics, I could name a few examples. First, I might point out that the Logistics Division had a Planning Division, an Engineering or Infrastructure Division, a Movements and Transportation element and a Service Branch. These divided up all of the logistics functions from a general staff type of approach. The officers assigned from the American side included, the Planning Division Chief, General Frank Bogart who was originally Army but transferred to the Air Force. His capabilities are indicated by the fact that before he ended his career, he was a four star General in the Air Force. His immediate deputy was COL Tom Harvey, who happened to be a West Point classmate of mine, and both General Bogart, COL Harvey and I had worked all through the war in operations and logistics, and had attended all those conferences I mentioned as well. We were well known to each other and could be trusted to help one another with all our staff problems.

In the Engineering Division, a US COL C. Rodney Smith, a very highly capable Engineer Officer, was the Chief, and that was the part of Logistics that dealt with construction of air fields, general hospitals, supply depots, distribution depots, all of the major construction items that have to be made available to the Allied Command Europe. Of course, I didn't mention that equally important was the communications system which, of course, had to be built from the ground up. The Movements and Transportation Branch had as our Chief a Dutch COL Onno Siersema, who happened to be a prisoner of war of the Germans. He was captured in 1940 when they went through Holland and he spent the entire war as a prisoner of war. He was educated at the Staff Colleges after the war when he had been liberated and was a very smart man. He assimilated all the modern techniques, equipment and things that he had not actually used during the war while he was a prisoner, but he was very capable, and was a Chief of the Movements and Transportation Branch. I was assigned as the Deputy, and, since I had more continuous and complete experience, was given principally the job of running it for him when he was - I wouldn't call just the figurehead - but at least he supported me entirely, and depended on me a great deal to prepare the first initial drafts of all the documents we dealt with.

One of the other officers that would be of interest in the Planning Division of Logistics was a French COL Charles Ailleret who was a resistance paratrooper, and a very competent officer. He later became the Chief of Staff of the French Army and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unfortunately, he was killed in an aircraft accident at Madagascar while he was the Chairman. I'm sure we would have heard more about him if he had survived the accident, and been in office longer than he was. He was typical of the fact that the French, the English, the US, everybody, selected the best qualified officers they could find to assign to the headquarters.

CPT Higgins: Could you explain, Sir, how the Services Division, that you previously mentioned, came about?

MG Lincoln: Yes, when we first started, we just had the Planning, Engineering, Movements and Transportation Branches. General Leavey, after some months there, decided that it might be useful if he provided a Services Branch which would have elements for each technical service (Engineers, Signal, Quartermaster, Transportation, Ordnance and so on). He took officers from each of those branches and other portions of his Logistics Division, and put them together in a Services Branch which was under General Early of the US Air Force. We worked that way for five or six months, I guess it was, and it became clear that, basically, we were still all dealing with the essential general staff work that we had done in the branches from which we had come. The work that SHAPE was responsible for didn't quite get into the technical details of service for each Army that the nations contributed forces to, and therefore, you didn't have the real technical liaison requirement nor the authority to prescribe training and doctrines and all those things since each Army was responsible for its own national system in that regard. As I say, General Leavey tried this for awhile to see if that would help. It did not and so we all reverted back to basic branches from which we had come in the Logistics Division.

CPT Higgins: Did anybody there really try to push having everyone on a similar logistics system, or did they just say there's no way to do that?

MG Lincoln: No. Any allied command thing such as this is completely complex and the NATO status of forces, and all of the treaty arrangements for military assignments to the allied command were very clear that the logistics support of all assigned elements was the responsibility of the nation providing that element. If there was a French Corps, its logistics support was entirely a French matter and the UK, Italians, Belgians, Dutch and the US all had the same thing. Each nation was completely responsible for the logistics support of its assigned units. The coordination of authority in a theater over these allied elements existed in case of an emergency or actual war time operations. Even then, the supplies that moved from base supply and supplied through the line of communications to the forward elements were a national matter simply coordinated by the allied commands, so that the only thing we could attempt to do would be to create agencies that could coordinate and establish standard procedures and capabilities for submitting claims for supplies, and then allocating these to the respective commands that required them. You did have a series of these arrangements made, and one of the principal

purposes of SHAPE was to set up standard procedures and ways in which coordination would be implemented in an emergency. In that same connection, we tried to standardize equipment to the extent we could. The successor to the 30 caliber rifle and M16, adopted some years later, was based on this standardization of equipment between the NATO commands. That's just one example, but artillery and many other things were put on the same standard basis and governments and their procurement services accepted that, and followed it accordingly.

CPT Higgins: Sir, in movements and transportation, did you have any special projects or procedures towards standardization?

MG Lincoln: Basically, it was an attempt to set up planning groups which leads me to another comment -- that SHAPE in peacetime was primarily planning to provide ways that you would need in an emergency, and then the plans would be prepared so that they could be executed in case of an actual wartime situation. One of the features we tried to accomplish was to set up planning boards for transportation activities. As a matter of fact, before SHAPE had been actually established, the NATO countries had provided what they called a Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, which was patterned after the World War II Combined Shipping Adjustment Board which the British and the US operated during World War II. This was to be responsible for the operation of all the maritime fleets, other than combatant ships. It included those that carried the petroleum, cargo, troops, and everything else. The ships were all put into a single pool, and were allocated according to the requirements submitted by the separate national forces, so the accomplished strategy that the Chiefs and Heads of States had approved could be carried out. This World War II system between the US and the UK, which was really a worldwide system, because before we got into war, the UK had taken over all of the merchant-type shipping that the western countries had that the Germans did not get their hands on. In other words, all of the tremendous Norwegian, Dutch, Belgium, and French fleets were added to the British and they had that as their contribution to this worldwide maritime activity. It was very similar to what actually existed when SHAPE was established. You had allied requirements and you hoped to have an allied pool of shipping that these separate allied nations would control and contribute to. They set up a system very similar to what we had during the war for control and allocation of maritime-type and it provided for both essential civilian requirements, and military requirements in any wartime situation.

In the pure transportation side of it--an area that SHAPE tried to accommodate--we have a concept. I was the one that personally proposed and carried this concept through to approval--the establishment of what was known as the Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST). We set up a system whereby each of the Western European NATO members; the US, the UK, and SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), were represented on this planning board to develop all the systems that would be followed in the use of ports, railroads, highways, pipelines, and any land transport supporting the forces. We were able to get this approved. When it was proposed, I had to staff it through the Logistics Division and then, through the Operations Section and all the other elements of the SHAPE Headquarters. Because it

was something that was being established under the North Atlantic Council, and not under SHAPE as such, it also involved the approval of all the participating nations. This immediately brought in not just SACEUR, but his foreign service counselor and advisor who was from the US State Department and I had to explain this whole thing to him and convince him that it was something necessary and worthwhile, and to urge the other nations to accept that and approve it, which, fortunately, we were able to do.

They had their first meeting in early 1952, would meet just about every six months to start and then pretty much every month because they had a great deal to accomplish. They did enter right into the urgency of it and provided many procedures that would be followed. At the beginning, because I was a SACEUR representative to the planning board and had taken the initiative to establish it, you might say, therefore, I thought I understood what it was supposed to do. They had me as the Chairman of the meetings, and when I got to be accepted at a very high level NATO sponsored activity, the French Minister of Transport became the French member, and became Chairman. When he retired, his successor took it over. Later when the West Germans became part of NATO in 1955, Herr Busse from the German Ministry of Transport became the Chairman, so that it was given good leadership by the various member nations who were members of this board. As a matter of fact, the US member was generally the Army Chief of Transportation. When it was first formed General Heilmann was the US member, then, later, General Yount who was the Army Chief of Transportation and they attended the meetings representing the United States. Although a US Army officer, I was there actually as a representative of SACEUR. Every other country had some civilians, some military representatives. The UK had a civilian who was the Deputy to the Minister of Transport--Robin Goodirson--was an extremely intelligent and helpful person. He understood the way we did things in World War II. He was very supportive in getting agreements to somewhat parallel what we had proven was a good way of doing it. We used what we termed "movement control" which I might admit the British really taught us in World War II and we adopted it from them. The other European nations were not quite so familiar with these systems so that the support Mr. Goodirson gave us as a UK representative helped us establish a lot of the procedures and rules that we went by. For the Belgians, I always recall a COL Wagner; a big well-spoken man who could really express his views and he took a great deal of leadership, people of that sort, were all very capable and helpful in forming this activity.

I might, I know we discussed earlier, describe a little bit about the particular type of people who were assigned to the headquarters and how it was organized. I mentioned the SACEURs under which I first served, since there were actually three of them during my 3 1/3 years there. General Eisenhower had been the first selected commander and he was a very fine choice because he was particularly good as a politician, in arranging compromises, and encouraging people to work together - more in that field than as a pure military tactician or a trainer or person of that sort. His first responsibilities were to get all the ministers of defense and foreign ministers of all the NATO countries to agree both as to the participation, the way in which they were assigned forces and the complete support of what General Eisenhower wanted to do. He was well placed to accomplish that. I might read a little piece out of a letter that I received when I was

assigned there. At the beginning, General Eisenhower did send a letter to each of us to welcome us and compliment us on our selection and he somewhat indicated his feelings as to what should be done and how it should be done in this letter. He said among other things in here:

"We have been charged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with certain missions which are designed to provide for our common security and thereby ensure peace. The responsibilities that thus fall upon this establishment are of a gravity without precedence in the history of free peoples. They called not only for a high order of professional ability but for a complete and selfless dedication to the noble purpose we serve. There can be no compromise of these fundamentals. As a member of supreme headquarters, you are given the opportunity of contributing heavily to the preservation of a peaceful world and to those values cherished by free men. The worth of your contribution will depend in large measure upon your recognition of the fact that the purposes to which your country has subscribed will be best served by your unswerving loyalty to our allied team. With best wishes for your personal and official success... "and so on."

I think the latter part of the letter shows that what he was urging was complete cooperation with our allied staff and to bury personal international prejudices and work together. That really was something that he was good at, encouraging people to do and see that they did it. Of course, while he didn't personally attend too much to the military details of maneuvers and training and things of that sort, he did have as his Deputy Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, who was well known for his field command capabilities and the way in which he did go into the details in both the training and operational use of his troops. Marshal Montgomery took on almost the total responsibility for inspecting the assigned allied units, attending and observing or sometimes supervising the exercises' field or command posts so he and General Eisenhower made a good team in that regard. It might be pertinent to point out at this time that Marshal Montgomery had been the head of the Western Union that was the five-nation alliance group that preceded NATO. The French, British, Belgium, Dutch and Luxembourg, (Benelux), the UK and France, were the five member nations and they had established a considerable number of planning boards, organizations, committees, and groups to study and prepare plans that predated NATO, but followed right along the lines of what we were going to do there. This was very helpful and those Western Union countries transferred everything they had to SHAPE at the beginning and with Marshal Montgomery having run Western Union, being the Deputy, why it made a very easy transition with the helpful system he began. Most of the Western Union officers and committee groups had been meeting in London, so for the first five or six months, we did a great many meetings of our own, over there with them... picked things up and transferred these projects that were on our way.

When Eisenhower was persuaded to run for President early in 1952, he decided then to resign his post as SACEUR. At that same time, General Leavelle, who was the head of the Logistics Division of the Staff having been persuaded by General Eisenhower to come out of retirement himself to be his logistics man in SHAPE, decided he had made

merely a personal commitment to General Eisenhower to come from retirement to work there and when General Eisenhower left, he felt he no longer needed to stay himself, so he went back into retirement. General Garvin, US Army, relieved him, and later, General Walter Weible, US Army, was in succession for the job that General Leavey started. When Eisenhower left as SACEUR, he was relieved by General Matthew B. Ridgeway who had just come from Korea where he had been the United Nations and 8th Army Commander. He was a completely different type of commander. His emphasis was on the military preparation and capabilities of the units. He was much more of a field soldier than General Eisenhower was and this was an appropriate time after the first year and a half to let another type commander take over and emphasize the necessity for good training and field exercises that would bring out whether or not they were properly prepared. Under both of them, General Alfred M. Gruenther was the chief of Staff. He was an extremely brilliant man, and had a personality that made friends with the allied officers and staffs as well as the Americans who already knew him. When General Ridgeway, just after a short year, was returned to the United States to become Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Gruenther, who had been Chief of Staff since the beginning of SHAPE, succeeded him as SACEUR in 1953. General Gruenther having been at SHAPE since the beginning was well aware of everything that had been developed and how it was done and who the persons were and the various nations' ministries of defense and so forth. It was a very easy transition and his personality contributed a great deal to the success of it. He could start the most formal meetings with a few light remarks and get everybody in a receptive mood and then get right down to business, be very specific and correct in what he did. He was always considerate and I have one illustration of how nice a person he was: After I returned to the US from SHAPE in July 1954, I was soon after promoted to Brigadier General and was very pleased to receive a handwritten note from General Gruenther complimenting me upon my appointment and also referring to the fact that he thought I had done such fine work for them in SHAPE. (This was something you wouldn't expect to receive from such a busy individual as he was, but it indicated his personal approach to things and how the small details which he knew would be appreciated were not too low for his personal attention. He was a very fine leader and in most respects. The thing that comes up here, thinking of all the US commanders and the US members of the staff that I'd been emphasizing, is the work in World War II of the US Army, Navy and Air Force in which they had, of course, given us the opportunity to develop all kinds of procedures, equipment, and methods for landings, amphibious assaults, and large scale operations that scene of the NATO countries had not been fortunate enough to participate in and learn all the lessons. As a result, the US felt they had a considerable obligation to try to describe our procedures and the ways in which we did things, so that they could see these and emulate them, or adopt them and use the equipment and everything else... the same way we did. Along those lines, in our logistics area, we put on a good many logistical "Over-the-Shore" exercises on the coast of France where we would take selected groups of the NATO staff officers. I would frequently be the escort and briefing officer to take them when we would show them how we use our equipment in an amphibious assault or in a follow on support through line of communications without normal civilian-type port facilities being available. We used and demonstrated for example, everything from the DeLong Piers to the Aerial Tramways, the US Navy way

of landing craft and DUKWS and the various types of barges and equipment that we had developed and used so successfully in World War II. We did these as true exercises. The troops, the ships with the cargo, everything on the equipment we used to establish these ports were all brought from the US as part of the operation, and put into use. We demonstrated actual cargo movement and movement control, and the allocation of truck, rail, and all the other capabilities that go along with this. We were able to use US resources, and you might say train and indoctrinate the allied units that had been assigned to SHAPE. This was done to a considerable extent. We also had field exercises that SHAPE would go along as observers and report back and then try to contribute standardization, or corrections, or praise, as the case may be. I recall those of which I got involved in, for example, were in September 1951. The French had what they called "Operation Jupiter" which was a movement of French forces from France to the front lines in Western Germany. They moved an entire division with all their trucks, guns, tanks, and the whole works by rail to Metz and then they distributed them further out through Kaiserslautern into Germany. I went along with this maneuver for a couple of weeks and visited all the headquarters where they controlled this thing and they really did this in splendid fashion. They had good field headquarters established everywhere, well camouflaged, and complete communications set up between their trailers, tents, headquarters in other areas. It was very interesting to see that the French Army was completely modernized and up-to-date on the combination of rail and highway movement that we would use ourselves.

Another interesting maneuver that I attended was one that took place after Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. They put on a maneuver in early 1953 on the European portion of Turkey north of the Dardanelles. The Greek and Turkish Armies put on a joint maneuver where they joined on their common border and then turned North toward Bulgaria where there had been an assumed enemy. It was very interesting to see that these countries, which had been traditional enemies for so long, were, for at this short time, very good friends. When the two forces met finally after going through their field operations, they had big demonstrations of friendship and the troops were all hugging each other and having a fun time. They did quite well in their field work, too. They are prone to put on a show although they really made a big exhibit of this. The field headquarters of the Army would have all the whitewashed rocks leading up to every headquarters tent, the flag poles looked like the barber shop poles with the red stripe painted around them all the way down, and this all in a field exercise which moved day to day from one place to another. All tents were floored with Persian-Turkish rugs it was really fantastic ... they put on a great big spread buffet in the evening for all the observers and everybody who had been there. It did show that they could organize things and were complete in the things they did. They did have a great deal to learn. These maneuvers showed that they were going to be an effective part of SHAPE for-- what they call--"Land South East Area". That maneuver was probably the last one where the Greek and Turkish contingents cooperated and were friendly. Today, after Cyprus, the two of them hardly participate in SHAPE, and Greece is prone to withdraw if their prime minister has anything to do with it. In those days, when I was there, all of the countries were very sincere in trying to develop things for the best accomplishment of

the allied purposes and I would say, they all were quite reasonable in the way they approached it.

CPT Higgins: How were the facilities in Europe at that time, since it wasn't long after World War II

MG Lincoln: Well, many of the ports had been destroyed and damaged in many ways, but we reestablished US operations and a great many of them: St Nazaire, Bordeaux and all over the place. We made some improvements with our own resources, but basically they had recovered quite well in the five or six years that intervened between VJ Day and the establishment of SHAPE. We didn't feel we had any real problem in the physical plant. It was a matter of improving it and coordinating the allocation of its use for military purposes. The railroads had been, I would say, almost completely restored and they were running high speed trains from Paris to Nice in the Riviera that beat any trains we have in the US now. They really had developed their signal control, their track and their equipment very well. They had a lot of electrified rail lines. They really are specialists... SNCF (French Railroad System) was very helpful, in fact, the director of that, within the first week I was at SHAPE, had a big dinner party where General LeMay and I and all the heads of the rail activities in France were invited and discussed what they were doing. They were proud of showing us just what they had. In fact, in September of 1951, they had a big meeting down at Annecy on the Swiss border. It was a wonderfully arranged thing. They demonstrated all the equipment: the new types of locomotives, the controls, the signals, the cars and the whole thing. They were very technically minded and very efficient, in my opinion, in the way they had reestablished their rail and were controlling it. They did a very fine job. In Europe, the Germans, the Dutch, everybody depends more than we ever have on rail for personnel transport as well as cargo, and they really did a fine job of keeping schedules and having equipment signals so that the thing was done safely.

CPT Higgins: What did you consider your major problems when you were in the Logistics Division... if you thought that there were any problems?

MG Lincoln: I guess basically it was getting these diverse military personnel from different armies to think along the same lines and accept a single way of doing it without just reverting to what they felt they had always done and maybe that was best ... and so forth. It was a matter of getting people to work together for the same purpose and doing it the same way. It was not a problem in the sense that they were actively opposed to it, but it was a matter where you had to teach, indoctrinate, explain, and convince that this was the proper way of doing it, without trying to impose the fact that this was a US system or that we were trying to dominate the whole thing.

Another one of the ways in which we attempted to coordinate and indoctrinate was the work we did with various proposals that came up from time to time. Actually, the French had proposed a European Army with West German participation even before SHAPE became activated. When SHAPE was formed, General Eisenhower accepted the responsibility for coordinating this and having it studied thoroughly. They set these

people up in the NATO Headquarters Building, which was at the Palais de Chaillot, that had been a temporary building erected for the UN General Assembly until the buildings in New York City had been completed. In 1952, when these buildings were available, all of the NATO headquarters and committees and everybody worked there. This group studying a European Army did a considerable amount of detailed work there with West German Staff officers involved as well. While they were doing this, each one of us in the different elements of SHAPE would spend an afternoon or morning with the Staff group explaining our part of SHAPE activity and what was involved and the methods of standardization we thought they should consider in any European Army. Unfortunately for the project, it finally fell through and was not accepted by the European countries but it did bring a considerable amount of cooperation to light because the people who worked with it eventually reverted back to assignments in SHAPE and in the case of the West Germans when they joined NATO, they had a clear understanding of how we were doing things and how we were organized so it wasn't all lost effort, even though there was no standard European Army as a result of it.

Another area in which we were able to help bring the people together, was in the NATO Defense College, established in Paris in 1951, and again, each of the elements of SHAPE would have a portion of the instruction we gave them. For example, I recall I had two hour portions where I would discuss the organization for movements and transportation. We would show them what we actually had in the way of organizations and approved procedures and plans of what we hoped to have so that when they joined the commands they would be well up-to-date on just where things stood. This Defense College is now in Rome, since everything we had in France had to leave when Charles De Gaulle ordered a change there in 1967. The instruction at the NATO Defense College was primarily for officers just preceding their actual assignment to NATO commands. Not only SACEUR's command of SHAPE but the Northern, Central, and Southern commands as well. I think it did a very good thing to bring people together, give them instruction on how things were being done, and alert them to the cooperation that we had and they would continue when they were assigned themselves.

CPT Higgins: Could you mention, Sir, some of the detailed procedures that you agreed upon? Are they that much different now than they were when you were there?

MG Lincoln: No. I think they pretty much accepted the fact that following the premise that national military authorities are responsible for the logistics support of their own troops. Nevertheless, they did set up systems whereby a national logistics authority would submit its claims for port capacity or railroad capability and so forth..... and a body would consider all these claims including those of the national civilian governments and allocate capabilities accordingly and then execution of this would require actual allocation of specific things, not just so many tons per day on the railroad but how many trains or how many wagons and so forth and so on, so that the procedures were pretty well established and agreed upon so that everybody would follow the same system presumably in an Emergency. Only one thing has really changed, since those first years when SHAPE was at Paris. When the French area was the base of supplies and had most of the line of communications in it, we had a

traditional system, where the front line would be supported from the rear, and would be perpendicular to the line. We established depots, distribution points, storage points, pipelines, and things that followed that plan. In 1966, when Charles De Gaulle announced on 1 July that he was going to withdraw French military assignments to NATO, and that on 1 April 1967, all NATO military establishments and headquarters and units would be out of France, we had a completely different arrangement, whereby Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Bremerhaven were the principal ports of debarkation and the distribution to our troops meant that the line of communication was really parallel to the front. This is not the classical way in which we try to do things, but the circumstances just forced it to be that way. However, the same general principles and system would be followed in the use of port facilities and rail and highway ability and everything else. It is a different geographic situation but procedures are pretty much the same now as they were then. We do have a considerable number of new commands to be coordinated. They have the Air Warning System now which is a completely independent and separate thing than what we had before. Their command, control and communications is all with different types of equipment than we had to begin with, but it's all coordinated from SHAPE and built under the staff supervision of the Infrastructure Division, and all this sort of thing. Basically, the same procedures for getting things built or organized or exchanged between forces, exists now as it did at the very beginning.

CPT Higgins: Was it hard to do any actual planning then, without Germany being in NATO?

MG Lincoln: No. Because, of course, when we started there, we still had large occupation forces in Germany and those were assigned to Allied Command Europe so that without the West German forces themselves being a part of NATO, the entire area in which they would operate was still covered by our other forces so that it was a matter of magnitude rather than any special arrangement that was involved. We really didn't have, in my opinion, any great difficulty there and we had field exercises both through the West German areas without any trouble whatsoever. The German Railroad System (Bundesbahn) was good at organizing and carrying out instruction so we were fortunate there—they were a very efficient railroad group.

CPT Higgins: Sir, in my research, I read that the Logistics Division in SHAPE was one of the fastest growing divisions. I wanted you to give some insight as to why this was said.

MG Lincoln: Just quickly, off the top of my head, the reason for that would be that we started, you might say, with nothing; airfields, communications, radio, telephones were practically nonexistent for military use. Ports of Embarkation, and pipelines... were all established by NATO agreement in SHAPE. The beginning point was that we had the most to do because we started from scratch. Every military unit (Army, Navy, Air Force of all the other countries) had their own system of issuing operation orders, carrying out attacks, withdrawals or anything else, I mean that operational part was pretty much part of being in the service. The logistics support is something that you always have to make available: As I said, with so little there to start with, they had a tremendous field in front

of them and as they got involved in it, why they simply did have to build up quickly. Just the construction of the airfields, for example, in Turkey (when Greece and Turkey joined). There was nothing to accommodate our military-type aircraft and we had to start with nothing and arrange for the plans and then the physical construction.

Naturally, before that, the allocation of the budget money was needed to pay for it. There was a great deal to be done and you had to set up a staff with the capability of accomplishing it. The same thing with the general hospitals, storage depots, distribution depots--all of these things were something that had to be built and manned and controlled. In order to do this, you obviously had to almost operate on a wartime basis where you had big projects and you put a lot of resources into it which in peacetime you don't usually do. In this case, we did have that problem because they intended to set it up so that it would be operationally ready. I think that in every area of logistics, (construction, communication, engineering, ordnance, etc) it didn't matter that they had a great deal to do. It was built up very quickly and rapidly and I think quite efficiently.

CPT Higgins: Sir, in your opinion, if we were attacked next week, would SHAPE be ready.?

MG Lincoln: It is a very difficult thing to predict. Certainly, they have command structure, they have arrangements to cope with these things and it's more of a question of how effective would the equipment and the troops we have there be against what would be thrown against them. We have this forward system now where they are talking about going over and disrupting the enemy's line of communication and support and things like that. They do have techniques and military plans that presumably could cope with the problems we might be faced with. There are the difficulties in saying it's automatic, for example I have been at SHAPE almost each year now at the end of September. The SHAPE officers Association has what they call a SHAPE Assembly and the SACEUR will give us a classified briefing and then a discussion and answer questions and accept suggestions about strategic or other activities. He was quite frank in some of the nonclassified things the last time I was there last Fall: He mentioned that he would like to have specific instructions from NATO where the countries in the NATO Council would actually authorize him to take certain steps under certain conditions. For example, he asked them, 'what if the Russians use chemical warfare in any attack they might make, would he be authorized to respond in kind or what reaction could he take with their authority.' NATO chose not to give an answer. They leave it up to the situation at the time. I'm sure that SACEUR, in case of a true Emergency, would just have to take the bit in his mouth and go ahead and do things without being told yes or no. That is one of the, if not weaknesses, shortcomings that they have not been that specific about. The reason is that every country, including ours, in a democracy is so much controlled by public opinion and parliamentary or congressional representatives, and you can't really give a national policy and say this is it regardless, because there is always going to be 49 percent of the country that think the other way. That's why these leaders are reluctant to go out on a limb and give real positive instruction as to what might be done. Perhaps I would say, one weakness in the readiness, not that they don't have the stuff but that you're leaving it on SACEUR's shoulders as to just how it would be used. Same

thing goes for nuclear weapons, and all the other unusual methods of warfare we now have.

CPT Higgins: I'm going to ask you another general question. This one deals with transportation.... How has transportation planning changed in the last 30 years--as far as what was emphasized back when you were in SHAPE as to what they emphasize now

MG Lincoln: There again the use of materiel makes the biggest difference. When I was there, the only containers were practically non-used commercially.... the Army had the Conex container which is sort of a half size thing which was conceived to be able to fit into a 2 1/2-ton truck and other means of military conveyance and now normal commercial cargo goes almost continually and completely in containerized methods. The ships are that way, they have to be discharged with special equipment. I would think that one feature alone makes a tremendous difference in the kind of facilities you would use and how you would make use of railcars in one thing or another which wasn't so important when I was there... you had general cargo and boxes and crates and bundles.... you don't have that so much now... it all comes in big containerized units and has to be handled with special equipment. To me, I would imagine it would make things quite different now than they were then.