

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

JOHN EINAR MURRAY, Major General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 22 November 1918, Clifton, New Jersey

YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE: Over 33 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 1 September 1974

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

New York Law School - LLB Degree - Law

George Washington University - MA Degree - International Affairs

New York Law School - LLD (Honorary) - Law

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jan 65	May 67	CO, 37 th Trans Grp, USAREUR
Jun 67	Oct 68	Mil Asst to Dir of Trans and Whrhse, OSCECDEF
Nov 68	Apr 69	CO, 124 th Tml Cmd, USARV
Apr 69	Jun 69	Dep CG, SUPCOM, USARV
Jun 69	Nov 69	CO, 4 th Trans, DCSLOG, DA
Dec 69	Nov 70	Dir of Army Trans, DCSLOG, DA
Nov 70	Nov 72	ACSLOG, J4, USPACOM
Nov 72	Feb 73	Dir of Log, MACV, USARV
Mar 73	Aug 74	Def Attache, US Embassy-Saigon

PROMOTIONS**DATES OF APPOINTMENT**

2LT	6	Jan	43
1LT	24	Sep	43
CPT	25	Dec	44
MAJ	16	Nov	50
LTC	11	Jul	57
COL	21	Dec	64
BG	2	Jun	70
MG	1	Mar	72

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit w/4 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal
Joint Services Commendation Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION OCS (Miss State)



INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

Interview with **MG (Ret) John E Murray**

MG (Ret) John E. Murray was interviewed on 1 June 1985 by CPT Martin Pitts in Fairfax, Virginia. **MG MURRAY** is an OCS graduate beginning his commissioned service in 1943.

Discussion during this interview centered around the concept of morality and the United States Army today. **MG MURRAY** elaborates on his experiences in the closing stages of the Vietnam war in the context of the US's failure to live up to the promises made to the Vietnamese to support their fight with equipment and funding.

The role of U.S. flag officers in Vietnam is also discussed extensively. **MG MURRAY's** opinions regarding the level of morality among these flag officers is brought out.

Effective use of Non-commissioned and warrant officers is a concern brought out by **MG MURRAY**.

This is the Army Transportation Oral History interview conducted with MG John Murray on 1 June 1985 by CPT Martin B. Pitts at **MG MURRAY's** home in Fairfax, Virginia. **MG MURRAY** speaks on various topics including joint command, generalship, Vietnam, logistics, OERS, and warrant officers.

CPT PITTS: General Murray, in your opinion, what is the competency of the general officers of today's Army?

MG MURRAY: Well, if Vietnam is any example, and I realize I am reflecting on myself, I don't think much of the competency of the average American general. I think that mediocrity has been institutionalized, so has hypocrisy. Now, I say this not only on the basis of observation, but also in regard to what is already in the record.

Let's look at Doug Kinnard, who was a classmate of mine at the Army War College in the class of '61. He is a recognized historian who has just resigned as the Chief of Military History and who wrote a book called The War Managers in which he interviewed the combat generals (unfortunately none of the logistic type) who were in Vietnam.

Half of these generals admitted, that there was a lot of fat in the body count. They knew it and they accepted it. Also, half of them said they didn't believe in the search-and-destroy tactics employed in GEN William C. Westmoreland's strategy. If you have generals who don't believe in what they're doing and lie about what they're doing, what good are they? How can you have commanders like GEN Westmoreland, GEN Creighton W. Abrams, and GEN Frederick C. Weyand, and be successful in battle?

All this talk about the U.S. Army never losing a battle in Vietnam... maybe you better ask GEN Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), if the Marine Corps won the battle at Khe Sanh. All you have to do is analyze why GEN Giap fought at Khe Sahn. He set it up as a feint. He wanted to pin down a good number of the Marines so they wouldn't defend the cities he was attacking in the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Why did the U.S. Army, that was allegedly so successful in battle, try to take on the Tri Phap area in the central Delta? We never took it; we couldn't handle it; that's why we stayed away from it. When we left and supported the South Vietnamese, they went into Tri Phap and took it. The same thing happened in the Seven Mountains region along the Cambodian border. I was out there during the so-called "cease-fire" and was told that the US Army had cleaned up the Seven Mountains area. If that was so, who were all those guys running around with AK-47s and mortars? They were there. We sent the South Vietnamese in there and they cleaned it out. So, you have to take all this talk about how successful we were in battle with a grain of salt.

Now, as far as generalship is concerned, I don't think we did much thinking about how we fought that war until it was over. They say that generals always fight the last war, and that's a mistake. However, that isn't always true. In Vietnam, we didn't fight the last war, and we should have.

The last war we fought was in Korea. We were successful in Korea in our political aims; we saved the South and that was GENs Douglas MacArthur and Matthew B. Ridgeway's mission. Saving South Vietnam was GEN Westmoreland's mission. We could have done the same thing by following the Korean War strategy.

First, you try to draw a line. Well, you can draw a line on a Korean peninsula, but maybe you can't do it in Southeast Asia. In effect, we had what is called a peninsula because of the Mekong River. We could have drawn a line across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Secondly, we could've implemented an extremely successful training strategy that we learned while training the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army called the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program. We discovered that by accident because we were running out of combat troops in Korea. We started to place Koreans in squads, platoons, companies, and even battalions. We had infantry units with a company that had about 25 Americans, and the remaining 200 were all Koreans. But, they learned how to fight our way. This was further proof of the benefits of integration. We learned this before through the integration of the blacks in World War II in combat units.

When I was in World War II, we were told the blacks weren't good soldiers. That wasn't true. We would integrate them, and they were just as good or better because they were more physically fit than the average white troop. And the same thing with the ROK soldiers. I would say that in the jungle environment and their homeland, the Vietnamese were better soldiers physically than the Americans, even though they were smaller. We didn't try to "KATUSA" them, even though we could have.

In reading history, I find that President Johnson asked GENs William C. Westmoreland and Earle G. Wheeler why we didn't do that sort of thing. As far as I can determine, there was no answer. Yet, this strategy was proven by recent history.

The next thing we did in Korea was not just to draw a line, but to establish unity of command. Can you imagine GENs MacArthur or Ridgeway not commanding all the units that were there--the British, the Americans, the ROKS, the Turks? They commanded all the real estate in which the battle was being fought. There was no question of the fact that they couldn't fight wherever they wanted to. But, not in Vietnam. We didn't have unity of command, but Giap did. Giap didn't have any borders; he fought in Laos and Cambodia. We had the ambassadors--those striped-pants field marshals--trying to fight the war in Laos and in Cambodia, and telling us what to do in Thailand.

The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Commander did not command and had no command, except the US Army and part of the US Air Force. He didn't command the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Australians, the Filipinos, or the Thais. There's some doubt as to whether he ever commanded the US Marine Corps, and he certainly didn't command the units of the Seventh Fleet. They were supposed to coordinate. (Of course, MacArthur had that trouble too. I guess in our history we are never going to get the US Army ever to command the US Navy).

The whole idea of joint command is a farce. It's more farcical in the Air Force--we had about seven different air forces over there. We let all the helicopters stay with the Vietnamese. We took them out of the Army support and into Air Force support, so all our requisitions had to go through Wright Patterson Air Force Base and they got all screwed up in their computers. We never did properly support and maintain the helicopters that we let go to the Air Force. Joint command was not evident because the Fleet had responsibility for certain aerial attacks in the North; the Air Force had certain types of real estate to bomb; the MACV commander could attack by air only just above

the DMZ; the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had its headquarters in Omaha; the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) had certain authorities; and then you had LBJ picking out targets back in the White House ...

I think it's a reflection on our generalship for not speaking up and doing something about it. Unity of command is a fundamental principle of war. Why do we spend \$50,000 a year for four years to train and educate a thousand or more cadets at West Point who ignore this military primer?

When I took over in Vietnam on the so-called "cease-fire" (what a misnomer), I was told that the main problem was logistics. Yes, they had logistics problems. They were huge, no question about that. I was also told they were ready to fight that war in case it recurred, but they were not. Why not? Because our great generalship, our great combat commanders, never told anybody. They certainly didn't tell me that we left them without a reserve. Every time I went to GEN Cao Van Vien, the chief of their joint general staff, that's all we talked about. His book on the collapse includes references to how we left them without a reserve. So what did this mean? We're told that the '72 offensive came out to the advantage of our side, but it really didn't.

In the '72 offensive after the ARVN 3rd Division broke up in the North and they had to send the Airborne Division up there, they had the five best divisions committed in the North--all as far away as they could get from the capital. About 13 ARVN divisions were committed. Giap and his commanders knew well enough that everything was committed. They had 20 divisions and could concentrate anywhere they wanted. If they had tried to handle those divisions in any way, they would have had to make a hole. Once they made a hole, the whole thing started to unravel. Well, I guess that's about enough about our generalship in Vietnam. I don't think much of it.

CPT PITTS: Sir, what is your estimation of the Officer Evaluation Reporting (OER) System?

MG MURRAY: Having been in a joint command, I participated in writing efficiency reports for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Each had different names for the same thing--Efficiency Report--Effectiveness Report--and Fitness Report--. Even though I understand they have done away with it, I think the Marine Corps had the best evaluation form. They required you to do it in your own handwriting.

I think this was important because I have seen situations where the rating and endorsing officers responsible for writing the Army efficiency reports didn't write them. They were typed by someone else and the officer simply signed them. That lack of involvement in the rating process took away a lot of the authenticity of the officer's rating.

Also, I was considered to overrate other people. But, it was not that way at all. In a superficial way it was, but I'll tell you why. First of all, I had to say to myself, "What is my mission? How do I best perform my mission? And do I perform my mission with

people?" When I rate officers, the important thing to me is not what I think of them but what they think of me. I have to perform the mission through them and, if they think poorly of my judgment, and I rate them in a poor fashion or rate them lower than what they think they deserve, they're not going to have much faith in me. So, I say to myself, I'm going to give this officer a high rating.

One of the fallacies that I find is the cliché--"Never ask someone to do something you can't do yourself." There are a lot of people who can do a lot of things better than I can, and I could always find them. I could find a guy who knew more about maintenance, supply, or warehousing in the logistics area, or when it came to just basic leadership, one who had a better way with troops than I did. I could also pick a certain guy to do a certain thing, maybe over-the-beach operations, ferreting out intelligence information, and finding a signal officer to write an ode to a diode, or just to go out and handle a certain personality. I could find something in a guy that he could actually do better than I. This is what I'd always write in his OER. What about the officer who is really a slob? You could get a poor reputation if you rated a drunk or a notorious womanizer highly. If the guy was so obviously bad, I would make sure I got rid of him, and I would low rate him so that the rest of the officers wouldn't think poorly of my judgment.

I'd say to an officer, "You write out your own efficiency report. You tell me what you think of yourself and how it should all come out." I have always found that officers are generally pretty honest, they are hypercritical and they underrate themselves. They don't know how good they are, especially most officers in the US Army. When I was in World War II, I saw 28- or 29-year old generals, and I worked for one. I think most officers today are ready to go two or maybe three times higher than their present grade, and that's pretty much as it should be because we should be prepared for war. This is the Army system. It's a tough system. It's one of the few systems where you either go up or you go out. You've got to be good. You've got to be good right off to become an officer in the United States Army.

I think that the efficiency report should not have any numbers. All you should do is write what you think of this officer, which should be good enough for a promotion board and for the assignment officers. If you look at the efficiency reports I've written on officers, you'll find that this officer should serve in the joint command or this one should become a combat officer. He's got that kind of leadership ability. You shouldn't look at a guy and say, "Well, he's a logistician" or "he's a transportation officer." No, you should say he's got the kind of leadership quality with troops that you always have to watch for in the Army, and he can keep his cool. This is the one who's not going to panic in tough situations.

I say all this on the basis of history. How did Napoleon pick his marshals? He didn't have any big efficiency reporting system. How did Wellington pick his commanders? You shouldn't do it by a centralized board. You should always do it through the chain of command, as it was done in World War II. The promotion system worked through the chain of command. When I was with a railway division, all the recommendations, for

promotions, except for general officer, went through the chain of command (the same as with enlisted men). This is really how you should promote.

If you think that I'm exaggerating when it comes to how you should select your people, all you have to do is read GA Omar N. Bradley's book A Soldier's Story . What Bradley felt was that GEN George S. Patton should have never been an Army commander, and he's probably right. You know that honesty, as far as the efficiency reporting system is just not there. I think the Air Force has a good system. When you write an efficiency report for the Air Force and recommend a colonel, you cannot recommend him on his regular efficiency report as a general officer. There is a special, confidential report for all colonels that he never sees. You can or cannot recommend him for a general officer, and then you have to explain what position you think he should be in as a general.

I think that's good. I evaluated efficiency reporting systems around the world wherever I went. I talked to the Chinese in Taiwan, and they had an honest system that we haven't got. You know why it was so honest? If someone recommended an officer for promotion and he failed to prove outstanding (if an Inspector General (IG) came along and found out that he was running a lousy command) then the person who rated him, got down-rated for his poor judgment in evaluating subordinates. Now that's a tough system. Why don't we try something like that?

The Navy has something that the Army tried, but it didn't work because people wouldn't be honest and they fought it. The Navy tells you if you're rating 10 captains or 10 commanders, you have to put them in order--1 to 10. You can't get the Army to do that. They tried to do it and failed. The whole system needs revision. There's another problem with the selection of general officers, and that's the "old boy networks." I talked to one lieutenant general who spent a lot of his time on promotion boards. (I never served on boards, I always wanted to but, for some odd reason, they never nominated me.) I asked this lieutenant general, "With all the highly qualified colonels you've got, how do you select generals, or how do you go from brigadier general to major general ... ? " He said to me, surprisingly, "Well, it's easy. First, you cut out the guys who are obviously not qualified. Then, you take the water-walkers and you've got about a half a dozen guys on the board. If nobody knows one of these water-walkers, he's excluded. They say he can't be very good if none of us ever heard of him." That, to me, is ridiculous.

Suppose you work for a civilian. When you want to influence the influential, there are political appointees in the Pentagon where a heck of a lot of power lies, and you assign some of your best officers to them. These people might be doing a lot of good for the services, but they're never recognized. I know a lot of guys who I never heard of that I met after I retired, and I found that they're outstanding people. If that's a way general officers are selected in the Army, it is not fair.

CPT PITTS: General Murray, what were the positions you held in Vietnam from 1969 to 1974?

MG MURRAY: I was a migratory worker in my first assignment there from 1968 to 1969. I first went over to command in Cam Ranh Bay, the Port of Cam Ranh. After that, I was assigned as Deputy Commander to the Logistics Command in Saigon. At that time, we had maximum strength in our MACV command. We supported five divisions. I was a colonel at the time, working for a very fine general named Arthur Hurow. BG Hurow was a thinker who taught me that you can look at a sausage and think of Picasso, that the best way to handle idiocy is to laugh at it, and that to delight in existence is good. You know, the brightest officers are either in or took their time at logistics--Lee was an engineer; Grant was a quartermaster. The top graduates out of West Point are engineers. Wellington always had his quartermaster close on the battlefield. When I came back the second time, I was a major general and I was the Director of Logistics replacing LTG Jack C. Fuson. From there, I was told by GEN Weyand, "Johnny, you're staying." We had about 40 general and flag officers. I became the Defense Attache, which was a cover for my real job--head of the Defense Resource, Support, and Termination Office. Fundamentally, I had to support a million men in battle. This was a sui generis (unique) assignment never given to any officer in the U.S. Army.

CPT PITTS: Sir, which was the most challenging of your positions, and why?

MG MURRAY: Well, certain things happened that I guess I should have expected. When our generals and flag officers went home, I started to pick up their jobs because I was the guy staying behind. For example, I was the last commanding officer of troops. For a while, I was the Commanding Officer of United States Army Vietnam (USARV), and I was also Acting Chief of Staff, so I had a lot of power. As Director of Logistics, I recommended things that I would approve myself. You never saw a bureaucracy act with such speed. It was temporary paradise! I had more authority to get things done quickly and without question than when I was a corporal in World War II (WWII) in the 35th Field Artillery.

The most difficult job I had was when Congress decided to cut off the money and stop supporting the Vietnamese. We had to sacrifice blood for ammunition and fuel, and try to support a valiant army. That was the most difficult job I ever had, I suppose, because I failed. I was unable to do it, and I saw that I was unable to do it. It was an understatement to say it was difficult. I would say it had a lot to do with how I felt and the sad things I learned about our country.

One of the lessons of the Vietnam War was that when a country engages in negotiations with the United States, that country is playing a dangerous game of political lottery. South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu understood this. The United States was treacherous because the Constitution is a treacherous instrument. President Richard M. Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford told President Thieu, "Don't worry, you're going to be supported." We told them that we were going to work it out. In order for Thieu to agree to the so-called peace treaty, we told him we would have a one-for-one replacement for everything they lost in battle or consumed. But we didn't do it. Not only that, we stopped furnishing the amount of ammunition, fuel, and batteries that they needed--everything it took to move, shoot, and communicate. So, we failed to keep our

promises. We failed as a country. It was a very sad experience. I never had that experience in World War II, Korea, or in any way as a member of the U.S. Government or the U.S. Army. In Vietnam I was in the forefront; the point man in the duplicity. We promised them if the peace treaty was violated in any substantial way, we would return with U.S. air power and U.S. sea power. I believed it. But again, the Congress passed the so-called Cooper-Church Amendment so that we could not keep our promises. Our Constitution permitted it. Our political process endorses it.

CPT PITTS: Of the positions you held, which one gave you the opportunity to have the most contact with the South Vietnamese?

MG MURRAY: My last position with the Defense Attaché Office and Defense Resource, Support, and Termination Office during the whole cease-fire. At that time, I was the senior U.S. military representative in the country. Under my terms of reference, I was personally and directly responsible to Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, on all Defense Department activities in the country. I dealt with the South Vietnamese military daily, sometimes minute-by-minute.

Since retirement, my wife and I have sponsored 26 Vietnamese people, and we've kept in touch with them.

CPT PITTS: How was this position different from your position as the MACV Director of Logistics?

MG MURRAY: Quite different. As Director of Logistics, I learned I was responsible for all of the logistics activities of the armed forces there. Initially, I felt like a penguin. I waddled around. All I saw was the tip of the iceberg. But there was a consolation. To a penguin, the tip of the iceberg is enough for salvation.

CPT PITTS: Sir, based on your recent article in "The Military Logistics Forum," you tried, as Director of Logistics, to institute a plan to make the South Vietnamese logistically self-reliant. Can you give a brief outline of the plan?

MG MURRAY: The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) was divided like MACV, with an Army, Navy, and Air Force. There was only one plan developed when I arrived, and that was for the Navy. It was a well thought out 14-point plan given to me by RADM James B. Wilson. It called for major refurbishment of the Saigon shipyard; reduction in, and consolidation of, naval supply bases, and getting the glitches out of the computerized supply system. It also called for much needed improvement of maintenance at sea in the Blue Water Navy, as distinguished from the Riverine or Brown Water Navy.

The Army plan was developed mainly with our quarterbacking by their Chief of Logistics, LTG Dong Van Khuyen. LTG Fuson had worked on it before I arrived. He had a great deal of foresight and was forthright. He wasn't the kind of guy who would call a

spade an agricultural instrument. LTG Khuyen streamlined their logistics according to his bold base-reduction plan from 200 logistic support units to 37.

One of the illusions about Vietnamization is that we, the U.S. forces, turned over the work of logistics to the Vietnamese. What a farce! What the U.S. forces did was turn over the big jobs: maintenance, construction, warehousing and stevedoring, and long-haul, to contractors who were mostly from the United States, along with some Singaporeans, Filipinos, Chinese, and Koreans. My task was to do what the United States Forces should have done--turn the job over to the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). The happy contractors liked the money; they balked, fought, and contrived to keep their jobs. But LTG Khuyen was up to the fight.

The VNAF had the worst logistic situation, and the US Air Force didn't help to make it self-sufficient. It's amazing how the services fail to follow orders. Secretary Barry J. Shillito (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics 1969-1973), more than once, in my presence, told the U.S. Air Force to get into high speed and quality performance in turning the logistic, mostly maintenance functions, over to the Vietnamese. It just didn't happen.

CPT PITTS: Sir, to carry this thought further in reference to making the Vietnamese logistically self-reliant, did it seem as though they were ready to accept the plan, and if they were, could the plan have worked?

MG MURRAY: Sure, the plan could have worked if we had given them the resources and if we had had the time to do it.

I was told by so-called experts that things would go like clockwork. But they must have been referring to the cuckoo clock. All that impressed me was what looked like a dead bird. There was a lot of clanging. We were trying to turn the logistics entirely over to them at the same time that they were trying to do two things: political and operational. They were trying to convert under our political pressure to a democracy. A democracy, in my view, is something that only a very wealthy country can afford. At the same time, the war was increasing. While the combat was getting bloodier, and hospitals were being flooded with the wounded and the dying, we had to get these contractors out of the act. It was a very difficult job.

How can democracy cause problems? Well, it can cause them when you start talking about corruption. We had generals, like MG Nguyen Van Toan in the Highlands, who were stealing and selling aluminum matting; but they fought. So these were the kind of commanders you had to keep. With regard to democracy and corruption, in our democracy we tried to instill American morality. General Toan finally had to be relieved. When he was, they put in a second rater, MG Pham Van Phu, also from the Highlands. Then the whole country broke open. It would not have happened that way under MG Toan.

Another example of the problems that democracy can bring about was sending representatives over from our unions. The first thing the labor guy in the embassy did was to cause them to form unions. So, they formed unions and what did they do? They struck against us, the United States. The Stevedore Unions struck against our contractor at the Port of Saigon. The same thing happened within the commissary. Democracy is something that is very difficult to install overnight in a country that is used to autocracy. Autocracy may be the best way to handle a third-world country, particularly during war. Democracy can be intoxicating; it can be like too much booze to a society. It's too hard to handle.

CPT PITTS: Sir, with these problems of transition that were unavoidable, did it seem as though the Vietnamese were ready to accept the plan?

MG MURRAY: Oh, yes. They were trying. But, the most trying thing for them was to understand the Americans. I think they had great difficulty with that, and I must say, I did too.

CPT PITTS: One last question on the logistical plan. What would have been the advantages had the plan worked and been fully implemented?

MG MURRAY: Given support from our US Air Force and Navy carriers and gunfire, and the ammunition, fuel, and spare parts they needed, I think the cease-fire plan for one-for-one replacement and combat would have worked. I think we'd still be over there; the enemy never could have messed with our B-52s (bombers).

Again, though, I think we should have gone back to the things we learned in the Korean fracas, which we ignored. We should've insisted on keeping United States forces in Vietnam. We've got 40,000 that have been there for 30 years now. That's the trip wire. We have the same thing in Berlin. We should have insisted on that for Vietnam. It's history. We know it works, and we should have insisted on it.

CPT PITTS: So, as you're implying, sir, the plan of logistics self-reliance was very much related to or hinged upon the cease-fire plan and how well it would have worked, correct?

MG MURRAY: Yes.

CPT PITTS: Sir, let's consider the moral responsibility of the U.S. military as a whole, to itself and to other nations. In your book, Quick on the Vigor, you refer to spending billions of dollars on research. How can moral men detect the hidden enemy that is causing us to spend 16 billion dollars a year in research and development? This estimate was based on calculations in your 1966 book.

MG MURRAY: There's a moral paradox here. Morality is generally disassociated with money except when we're asked to contribute to a charity or put money in a collection plate. But for moralities sake the ultimate lies in the hope for world peace. The money

invested in R&D, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), is an investment of the finest moral achievement, the prevention of the destruction of mankind by nuclear war.

But in reference to the R&D I referred to in my 1966 publication, the amount of money that's gone into research is much more now, largely due to inflation. If I've learned anything, it is that morally, the U.S. Government had no scruples, particularly during the Vietnam experience. Maybe governments, if they follow Bismarck or Machiavelli, shouldn't be burdened with scruples anyway.

When I say that, I'm not pointing the finger at President Nixon and Watergate. Let's take the Clausewitzian factor: that you cannot really separate military aims, or the US Army aims, as part of the military establishment, from the political ones.

As an aside, the current Secretary of Defense (Casper W. Weinberger) says that we cannot go to war and that we can't commit ourselves to any objective unless we know the American people are with us. I contend that this is not anything for the Department of Defense (DOD) to say or for the US Army to say. We're not supposed to ask those kinds of questions. Whatever the political hierarchy tells us to do, or the Commander-in-Chief tells us to do, we should not question it, and we should not run around and look for law books or for the support of the American people. We should be like the old Army sergeant who says, "When orders are given around here, either the men or the order is carried out".

As far as scruples are concerned, I think we have to take a look at the personality of Henry Kissinger. I think maybe he had the wrong job. When it came to deceptive packaging, he should have worked for Madison Avenue. And, of course, he's the one who developed the cease-fire plan. If you want to indulge in trivial pursuit, read his two volumes. You can get a lot of interesting information on a lot of questions that probably don't answer the real question about his personality and why he did things. While he denies that he followed Machiavelli, maybe Metternich, I think he was basically Machiavellian-powered, which means no scruples.

I take it your question is also whether the spending of billions of dollars on research takes away from the poor. I don't think so. Without it there would be more poor. That money is recycled with a multiplier effect and the teflon effect and the serendipity effect. Research helps everybody and hopefully it keeps us ahead of a potential enemy. The extraordinary 50 to 1 Israeli kill ratio of our aircraft over Russian MIGs is a hefty advertisement and endorsement of our research and technology.

CPT PITTS: Sir, is moral man still part of our national power as you indicated in Quick on the Vigor?

MG MURRAY: Well, I think he is. Although, when you read about the corruption in our society and discover that former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul W. Thayer (1983-1984) is in jail for absolutely immoral and illegal conduct, it becomes discouraging. All you have to do is read the recent headlines about E. F. Hutton. Every day when you

pick up the paper, you read about more and more corruption in our society. You say to yourself, our morality is going to pot. But I think we've had a problem with morality for a long time. That's why Moses came down, or up, with the Ten Commandments.

You've got to ask yourself, what is our moral status as compared to our big enemy, the Soviet Union? Here, I think, we do have a moral edge because Soviet society is now going through the third generation of atheism. They don't believe in religion. They think it's all superstition. But religion is the fundamental base of our morality. You can probably argue for the Golden Rule on the basis of survival. Even though we live under Darwinian laws (for example, survival of the fittest), if you want to survive, you've got to treat somebody else as you would want to be treated yourself. Because if you treat me in a good way, I'll treat you in a good way. That's the kind of balance I think we have.

But, you get back to the problematical fact that as a military officer, if you eliminate the euphemisms, we're involved in industrialized carnage. That's our business. We're really involved in killing or not being killed. As a society fundamentally based on religious tenets, we believe in an afterlife. We believe in the sentencing of heaven and hell. We're up against adversaries who believe that the only life they have is this one, with no such thing as an afterlife. I think believing in afterlife helps when you go into I, - battle, because you know this isn't the end. But the other guy knows it is the end. Because of that, the only thing he's got is his life and so he's not going to be as willing to give it up as you are. This is just a theory. This argument would make the best soldier, the one with the Kamikazi mentality or the Shiite, and I think there's something to it. But my theory is shattered somewhat by the Israeli soldier, who doesn't believe death in battle is an automatic opening of the Pearly Gates, as the Shiite soldier does. But the Shiite soldier is endowed in the Old Testament with the deity's endorsement.

CPT PITTS: Sir, to carry your thought about morality in war further, would you elaborate on our moral values as related to our reaction to crisis.

MG MURRAY: I've been in three wars: World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. I think that Oliver Cromwell was right, that "The best soldier in the world is the one who knows what he's fighting for and loves what he knows." We best react to crisis when we gain that understanding by ourselves. I think we definitely had it in World War II and in the Korean situation. Pearl Harbor and Adolph Hitler presented us with the Cromwell formula. That is not to say that we were wrong in fighting a war in Vietnam.

Thomas Aquinas said, "For a war to be just, three conditions are necessary: public authority, just cause, and the right motive." Consider the two million Cambodians, the one million Vietnamese in Gulags--those drowned trying to escape their country, and consider the continued repression. Then ask yourself if the war was moral.

In the three wars in which I was engaged, I was motivated by our first Commander-in-Chief. I always felt I was following General George Washington's agenda. For him, as for me, and others in uniform to follow, human nature is such that "Liberty is an unfinished business."

Allowing non-service for other citizens, who may be members of elites or what you might call "yuppies" today, is wrong. We should not really expel them or permit them to escape from their responsibility as citizens to be members of the Armed Forces. Or, if they are pacifists, and I understand conscientious objection as in World War II, they could become medics or perform some other service. As a private in basic training during World War II my peers were outstanding all-American guys with tremendous backgrounds; some were even Harvard and Michigan State graduates. We didn't experience that either in Korea or in Vietnam. I think our Army, despite the fact that we've got more high school graduates than we've ever had, is not that competent. If it were, why do we have to turn to so many contractors for maintenance?

I've talked to some of these high school graduates, and to me they sound like kindergarten dropouts. A lot of them can't read. I've even talked to college graduates who don't seem to have ever studied history. So, I think we must glean all the talent we can when it means clearly saving the country.

The other thing I'd like to discuss is the military schools. I don't think the schools have done enough. We need to look at this whole question of serving on a joint basis. Then maybe you'd think we should standardize things. For example, when I was in the Pacific theater working for ADM John S. McCain, Jr. and ADM Noel A. M. Gayler on the joint staff, there was the problem of not only acronyms--which is bad enough--but four sets of acronyms: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. There were such things as an ASL—an Authorized Stockage List in the Army, which is in the Air Force the Activity Safety Level. In the Army an ASO is an Ammunition and Supply Officer; in the Air Force it's the Area Supply Officer; in the Navy it is the Aviation Supply Officer; and the Marines had their own book on what ASO meant. So you might say that we should standardize acronyms, and I'm all for that. But I'm not so sure that we should put everybody in the same uniform, even though it might save a lot of money.

Robert M. McNamara wanted to, but was unable to standardize the belt buckle. I'm glad he didn't. In 1961 when I was at the Army War College, we students had time to do a lot of thinking. At that time, a famous novel and movie called "Seven Days in May" was popular. In it an Air Force General, James Matoon Scott, plans to take over the country and is almost successful. I think he fails for the wrong reason; he gets involved with women. I think other reasons might be more realistic. Our War College group decided to try taking over the country, but after planning it, we discovered we couldn't.

One reason we couldn't do it was our country's fiscal and auditing setup. In the novel, Scott managed to get ten million dollars. With it he sets up an unknown camp in the Southwest where he puts government officials under house arrest. As the military, we live in a glass house. With the General Accounting Office (GAO), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), defense and Army auditors, inspector general (IG), whistle blowers, and press snoopers, there is no way to hide \$10 million.

The second reason concerns tense inter-service relationships. We decided if anybody, like an Army general or an Air Force general, told a Marine sergeant to put handcuffs on

the president of the United States, he'd say, "Forget it." That type of chain-of-command relationship and feeling is good. A certain tension between the services exists. It's good. It establishes diversity and helps thinking, particularly on world strategy.

Unfortunately for the Army, there's only been one classic strategic thinker in our military history, Navy Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. Mahan, of course, was an advocate of sea power, and quite rightly so. He said, "A country has to make a decision as to whether it wants to be a land power or sea power; you can't afford to be both."

If you look at Russia with its real estate and the way it's set up on the map, it should be a land power. On the other hand, as an American strategist, even as an Army officer, I must say that we should be predominantly a sea power. I say this because we've got the Atlantic on one side, the Pacific on the other, and the Gulf to the south; even the Great Lakes give us a partial sea frontier.

After Mahan passed on, we experienced the advent of air power. I look at this as a lawyer might. As I once heard a lawyer say, "Looking at admiralty, an aircraft is a ship in another element." Essentially, I think that's what it is. I think we should combine our air and sea power rather than attempt to become a land power. We have 24 divisions, including our reserve, and by gosh, we're not going to handle 300 Russian divisions. What we've got to do is accept the fact that from the land-power viewpoint, we've got to depend on our allies and work through an alliance. We must try to depend on British divisions, German divisions, and the Far East manpower resources (although I have some doubts about Japanese divisions). We do have the Koreans, Taiwanese, and perhaps the mainland Chinese, and, eventually, maybe the Indonesians. But our perspective should be that of the alliance when we think of fighting on land.

CPT PITTS: General Murray, is the moral force still the key Western resource?

MG MURRAY: No, I wouldn't say that. I would say it is a resource. I think our key resource is technology. This has always been our advantage in our wars, including our civil war. It was the technology of the North that really found the automatic rifle that was given to Sheridan's cavalry and developed the North's 20,000-mile railway system. For the first time in military history, the railroads were used tactically. When Stonewall Jackson went into Bull Run and turned the tide of the first Battle of Manassas, his troops deployed right from the railroad cars. The North didn't follow through on this maneuver in that battle, but later they copied the Jackson technique at Chattanooga. A whole corps was railed strategically to turn that battle. Part of Napoleon's success was also technological. Not only was he probably the first commander to effectively use artillery against masses of men, he also was the first one to use a tin can for rations for his troops.

We can't overlook the fact that while men are important, a man is a replacement part just like a spare part. What we have that excels any other army in the world is a replacement system for people just as we have a replacement system for parts. The Russian analyzed and evaluated how we handled ourselves in Vietnam, but they

couldn't understand our mobility, and they couldn't understand how we kept fighting. We kept up the pressure.

We're the only army in the world that does not pulsate. The army supply system for the Russians and other armies in the world is based on days of supply. You get about thirty days supply to fight, and then you stop or you use up your supplies and get more. Well, we don't do it that way. We've got an individual line-item replacement system run by computers. You have a safety level, an operational level, and your supplies keep coming all the time. It's the same with our people. The British have a famous regimental system and so do others. They say that we don't have their kind of esprit because we don't replace units, and we don't pull a unit out of the line when it takes a certain number of casualties. We keep feeding replacements all the time. Well, the advantage of this is that we keep the pressure up. We get in there like bulldogs and we hang on. No other army does this. Our individual replacement system and our individual supply system are crucial to keeping up this pressure. We should never forget the benefits of these systems.

Also, since we're talking about technology, I think the finest strategist we ever had was Ulysses S. Grant. You've got to point out that he started out as a quartermaster. He was a quartermaster in the Mexican War. Then finally, you've got to look at a guy like Rommel, probably the best field marshal that the Nazi's had. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel said that "Battles are won and lost before they're fought by the quartermaster." Then, we've got to recognize that the modern soldier is a machine operator. If we don't understand this, we can't even understand the common sense of that great American Al Capone who was the first to understand that a machine gun is a piece of business equipment. To me, technology is the thing that we've got to keep up on, and that includes research and development and going ahead with so-called Star Wars, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). You've got some critics in Congress who say it's never going to work. You've got scientists that don't want it to work. Well, why is it that the Russians are so upset about it? They must think it's going to work.

CPT PITTS: Sir, what was our inherent moral responsibility to Vietnam in the Vietnam conflict?

MG MURRAY: Our inherent responsibility was spelled out by the poet Robert Frost. We had promises to keep. We failed in those promises. From the moral aspect of the war and the moral climate in our country, I think we don't understand our promises.

Fifty percent of the people getting married today won't last. Those marriages are going to end up in divorce. Something like 70 percent of the children today, for one reason or another, are going to end up with single parents. The basic moral fiber of the country depends upon the family. In assessing whether a man can or cannot be a good soldier, I can make a better judgment by finding out what kind of a mother he had since a mother is dominant in the influence of a person's character.

Our marriages are deteriorating because people consider promises like Kleenex: a throw-away item. The marital promise is "Till death do you part." If people don't want to take a moral view, they ought to take the statistical view. Studies have proven that when people have a bad marriage, or what they think is a bad marriage, they get divorced and married again, and that marriage fails too. They just get in a worse situation, and they don't seem to understand how well a marriage can work out and how important a good marriage is to our society, to our children, and to the future of our country.

I understand that Russia has even worse problems with marriages breaking up than we do. On that statistical basis, I guess we've got an advantage. But the current breakup of marriages and of families, to me, is very disheartening. Unfortunately, a lot of our life-style is established on fairy tales, Cinderella and Prince Charming, and that sort of nonsense. Even in my own experience, I didn't think I'd get married again after my first wife died 27 years ago. But 3 years later I did. You know, there are very few people in the world who really care about you as an individual. It's good to have that kind of caring and that kind of understanding. I'm not saying that there aren't certain instances where marriages should break up. But I do think that they're very few.

CPT PITTS: So, our broken promises to the Vietnamese are related to the family, and in turn, to our governmental or military system as a whole?

MG MURRAY: Well, I couldn't directly compare our promises in marriage to the promise we made to the Vietnamese. I think that would be stretching things a bit far, but the overall climate and attitudes that make promises pragmatic rips the social fabric and makes Dante's title to his masterwork challengable. Life is a comedy, but its not divine.

CPT PITTS: You have already discussed some of the effects of our broken promise to the Vietnamese. But what were the ill-effects that the broken promise had on our logistics system, specifically, the Transportation Corps?

MG MURRAY: I was pretty far removed from the Transportation Corps in my last job. As a general, you become a generalist. Like Shakespeare: you learn a little about a whole lot, not a lot about a little.

However, as I noted, there were broken promises and deceit within the services and failure to support the Vietnamese in a way you would think you would support an ally. For example, at Tong Le Chan during the cease-fire, the South Vietnamese were surrounded and while we were making airdrops, the North Vietnamese had come in with a Strella missile and 57-millimeter anti-aircraft weapon. We were air-dropping without much accuracy and supplying the enemy as much as we were supplying ourselves. Consequently, we wanted to improve the high altitude low opening (HALO) parachute supply system--airdrop, mainly with ammunition and food but other supplies as well. My scientific advisor, Bill Marrolotti came up with ideas to improve that airdrop. It looked like it would cost about \$50 thousand . I didn't have \$50 thousand. So, I went to the US Army, who I thought would be very much interested, and \$50 thousand is nothing to the US Army. I was turned down. Then I thought the other service that might be able to help

us was the Air Force. They turned me down too. Much to my embarrassment, as a last resort, I went to the Navy. Although they had no particular technical interest, they saw the importance of it, and they came up with the money.

There were other things, too. I made a mistake when we were turning things over to the Vietnamese. Their air force was like a museum. They had 13 or 14 different types of aircraft. Thus, the more you could reduce it the better. The Air Force suggested to me that we shift from the C-123 aircraft and the C-7 (the old Caribou) and exchange them for C-130s. I liked the 130. I said, "Oh, sure, that's a good idea." So, we gave up our older aircraft. We wound up with 32 or so C-130s with cracked wings and leaky fuselages, and we could only keep about 6 flying. It cost us a lot of money to try to get these aircraft repaired. And they still weren't very good. They came from the US National Guard. The National Guard got brand new C-130F aircraft. Well, who was dying in the National Guard? We were having people killed who couldn't be supported. Because the ARVN didn't have a general reserve, it depended heavily on our aircraft and air transport. Talk about unethical. Talk about lack of scruples. The same thing with our medical supplies.

Even though the U.S. Army was being supplied out of Okinawa, our ARVN requisitions and the fiscal accounting for all our supplies were coming through some place else in the Continental United States (CONUS) Army, and they never matched it up. Subsequently, we lost \$13 million worth of supplies. They never tried to rectify it. Didn't give a darn. This was a lack of, let us say to politely understate it, just compassion. People within the U.S. Army failing to support the Vietnamese was enough to make you sick.

CPT PITTS: Sir, in former President Nixon's book, No More Vietnams, a correlation is made between cutting the cost of support and losing real estate. Can you comment on that, please?

MG MURRAY: Well, as Shakespeare said, "Money is the best soldier." Because the cost of technology was the crux of that war, the lack of money was increasingly catastrophic--particularly the problem of inflation on fuel and ammunition. One artillery shell cost \$225. Well, of course, that was more than the monthly salary of a major general in the Vietnamese army. They knew it, they knew the cost of all this stuff, and they had to start curtailing the use of their ammunition because they were running out of money. Down in the delta, the infantry soldier used to pin on 10 grenades. When I left in August of '74, they were pinning on 2. This was one of the reasons the Vietnamese were taking casualties of five to one as compared to American casualties.

This business of their using harassing and interdicting (H&I) fire was exaggerated. They never used H&I while I was there. They didn't do it; they couldn't afford to. They couldn't attack as we did because they didn't have the artillery preparation and, of course, we had the unusual situation where the enemy's 130mm gun out-ranged our 105mm gun. The 105 is a pretty good gun, but it's not very good when it's out-ranged.

Just to give you an example of the accountants who were figuring out how much money they should get while reporting this through the comptroller channels and to Congress, they said, "We're authorizing 6,000 rounds a day for 105s." Of course, that seems like a lot. But you had 44 provinces and 1,000 guns. That's only 6 rounds per day per gun. When you talk in terms of 6,000 rounds, you must remember in the '72 offensive, for example, they fired 200,000 rounds in a day. But, when you tried to explain this to the comptrollers, they believed that you were only firing 6,000 rounds a day because you knew you had to conserve for a future offensive. That didn't include any for training. In order to save this money, I asked the U.S. Army for a special device they had which would allow us to simulate firing the 105 without actually firing the ammunition. I asked for the device, but I never got that either.

[At LZ Falcon in support of LZ X-Ray, 2 batteries (12 tubes) fired 20,000 rounds in 3 days.]

CPT PITTS: Sir, was the lack of financial support the root of our broken promise to the Vietnamese?

MG MURRAY: It was the lack of financial support and the lack of supplies which resulted from it. Of course, it was also the congressional withdrawal of the Air Force and the Navy, which I referred to as the pair of sevens. The Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force according to the Kissinger peace plan were supposed to smash the enemy if it violated the peace. But the Congress revised that part of the policing package. Without that threat, the Congress gave away any hope of preventing an enemy offensive.

CPT PITTS: How did the climate of politics on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon near the end of the Vietnam conflict affect the financial support from the U.S. government to the South Vietnamese?

MG MURRAY: It was brutal. From what I can read now, the congressional support was based on what they thought the American public was thinking. I don't believe that was accurate. I think the American public wanted to make sure that we did keep our promises. The whole thing was affected by the climate of Watergate. Anything that Richard Nixon was for, the opposition was against. To say that he didn't have as right views as the other presidents did about the war and supporting it was wrong. If it hadn't been for Watergate, we might have had a different situation. That's conjectural. There is an inane fandango, a sort of Pavlovian reaction in our politics between the "ins" and the "outs," the Republicans and the Democrats. Whatever the Republican president may want, if he's got a Democratic congress, he's going to have a tough time with it, and vice versa.

Again, if you want to get back to morals and integrity--all that these political hacks want to do is get reelected. What they think is best for their reelection is important, not what might be the best thing for the country or the best thing morally. But again, I think we've got to get back to what we originally said about generalship.

Here were these generals that were lying about what was going on in the war in the way of body counts and accepting it, and then not believing in the way the war was being fought. They didn't want to stand up to be counted because they knew if they did, maybe they thought they'd be discounted. It's only after the fact, and well after GEN Westmoreland went out of authority, GEN Abrams died, and GEN Weyand retired, that they're willing to say this sort of thing. I just think that's a shame. But again, you've got to look at the system. If that's the way the system develops people, then there's something wrong with it.

All the talk about honor turns out to be claptrap. I talked to GEN William R. Peers, who investigated My Lai, and he was incensed about the cover-up and the wrist slapping the generals escaped with.

I don't think any form of government will legislate morality. I think when you really look back on it and while you do talk about religion, maybe it's the religious people in our churches who have really fallen down. This might be affecting the split up of our families and the decline of our morality. Maybe they ought to start looking in the mirror and start criticizing themselves a little bit.

CPT PITTS: Sir, the press played a role in the Vietnam conflict by heightening our nation's awareness of it. To what extent was it concerned with our morality?

MG MURRAY: Well, I think we take the wrong view of the press. The press can be used as a weapon and in what you might call an immoral way. In wartime, I think we should use the press pretty much like the Russians--you know, propaganda. Sometimes telling the truth really hurts. First of all, the problem I have with the press was solved by ADM Ernest J. King in World War II. He said that, "We should only tell the press two things. Tell them when the war is over and tell them who won." Aside from using the press as a propaganda machine, I think that's as far as we should go; particularly, with the advent of TV. The bloodiness of war coming into the living rooms of any population is going to turn people against it. If we're going to engage in this horror, it would be a good idea not to let the people know what that horror is all about, except for the training of those that are actually involved in it. There are other factors that are even more important than that. The purpose of the guys engaged in TV is show business. That's all together different from the war business. They're really interested in entertainment and Neilson ratings. As far as I am concerned, and I think any commander is concerned, the death, or the wounding, or the morale, or the security of a single soldier isn't worth the slightest advance in a network's Neilson rating. So, we have that basic conflict. The idea that must be overriding is the success of your operation--and the least number of soldiers being killed on your side and the most on the other side. It's just a different ball game. The other problem I saw in Vietnam was that members of the press were engaging in money changing, engaging in the selling of dope, making a lot of private money, and getting away with it because they weren't under any court-martial jurisdiction. They didn't come under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Therefore, we couldn't do anything with them. They just escaped unscathed. Yet, at the same time, we had soldiers that we were sending to Leavenworth for the same thing.

CPT PITTS: Recalling some of the abuses that you mentioned earlier in reference to the logistics system in South Vietnam, how did this, directly or indirectly, affect the American taxpayers?

MG MURRAY: I don't think this affected the American taxpayer as much as some other things, such as organization and structure and personnel. More than half of the military budget is pay and allowances for people. First of all, I think we've got too many officers, especially senior officers. We've got more generals and flag officers in a three million-man force than we had in a twelve million man-force during World War II, and they had far greater obligations. I think perhaps one of the reasons we've got so many officers is probably the requirement that you have to have an officer flying a plane. Nonsense. Sergeants fly million-dollar planes in armies around the world and they do very well. You must consider the value of what they're doing. We've got truck drivers who are privates hauling cargo of greater value than the whole aircraft that a pilot might fly. The other thing is that it takes away the responsibilities of your non-commissioned officers (NCOs). If you look over the history of the 37th Group, it was when I had lieutenants commanding companies and sergeants running platoons that it did very well. We had too many officers in Vietnam. They were stumbling over one another. They were getting all this combat pay plus the cost of moving them and their families.

Today, the cost of a screwdriver might be \$200 or an ashtray might be \$700. Well, it turns out that the contract was charging \$700 for the ashtray, but when the Navy had the ashtray made internally, they found that it was \$1,000. That's because of the stupid way we do our funding. One of the big farces we've got going in the military is the so-called industrial fund. What you've got there is a monopoly. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are compelled to move their tonnage through industrially funded Army terminals. The Army and the Navy are compelled to go through the industrially funded Military Airlift Command (MAC). Well, when you've got captive customers, you're going to charge them. You could save a lot of money if you commercialized all the ports. You would have a better strategic situation, and tactical defensive situation too, if you went commercial in all these ports. You could place a military headquarters in the Pocono Mountains where it could be protected rather than down in Bayonne, NJ. You could rid yourself of the industrial funds and let the services go right ahead and move their cargo according to their own course.

If you want to talk just transportation, why doesn't the military require people to pay for transportation like civilians do? If you order something from Sears and Roebuck and you want it the day after tomorrow, you'll pay Federal Express. But if you want to take ordinary mail, you'll pay a lot less but you'll have to wait maybe a week or two. When the U.S. Army in Europe wants to get some supplies, they just set a priority on it. If it goes MAC airlift then it costs twenty times more than commercial lift. But, if it were in their budget, and they had to pay for their transportation instead of having it come coming out of one centralized swill pot, then they might change their minds about ordering all this expensive airlift.

The same thing applies to the industrial fund. Make the guy who orders transportation pay for it. Then you'll see transportation costs go down. The same thing applies in the movement of household goods. The services pay a billion dollars a year for moving household goods. Well, everybody gets a certain allowance. For a colonel it's now 15,000 pounds or something like that. Every colonel moves up to the 15,000 pounds limit. But, if you said, "Larry, look, you are authorized 15,000 pounds, but if you only move 10,000 pounds I'll split the difference of what you save." That would certainly be an incentive.

I knew a guy who saved all his Wall Street Journals through his whole military career and moved them around the world at the taxpayers' expense. I was involved as a Director of Army Transportation. While evaluating the tonnages, we noted that everybody was moving up to their weight out of Japan and Korea. Go around the world - you have some people who were below their weight, and they didn't pay much attention to it. They just moved what they had. But, why, over in the Orient, were they moving all their household goods and weights right up to the limit? It turned out that they were getting gifts from the household goods mover. They were getting stone lanterns and other types of pottery. The movers would give them these items in order to raise the weight to the maximum and thus permit the shippers to maximize their revenue on each shipment.

Many things could be done to save money in the military, but you have vested interest that prevents this. The household goods movers in the industry get back to Congress and say, "Let's not fool around with this stuff."

Look at the cost of sending the privately owned vehicles (POVS) overseas and back. Why not a sort of Hertz system? When you get overseas, and you want a car, it should be on a lease arrangement for the length of your tour. That way, we could avoid moving all these vehicles back and forth. It's just like closing down military bases. The Congress wants to keep them open since their constituents want to keep their jobs, and their constituents vote. The Congress knows that the military is a pork-barrel operation. It's a camouflaged pork-barrel. That's why everybody says they want peace, and they want to cut back on defense activity, but they're all voting for the missile experimental (MX) missile because every state in the Union will benefit financially.

CPT PITTS: Sir, in a rather prophetic excerpt from Quick on the Vigor, it was mentioned that we could not sham while involved in Vietnam, or else the sham would be our shambles. Was this an understatement?

MG MURRAY: I think that without intending, it was prophetic, as far as Vietnam was concerned.

CPT PITTS: Do you consider it an understatement?

MG MURRAY: It's pretty accurate, but not pretty.

CPT PITTS: In summary, in reference to Vietnam, sir, what are the lessons that we have learned and that we should have learned?

MG MURRAY: There's nothing wrong with learning from experiences and applying the lessons learned in the last war. We didn't apply the lessons from the last war--Korea.

The whole question of unity of command; the whole question of training allied forces through the KATUSA program; the whole question of whether, if we get into a stalemate situation, to leave American troops there as we did in Berlin and as we did in Korea. Then, of course, was the horrible expose, I think, of our generalship.

The generals always blame the politicians for the loss of that war by saying, "Well, if we had been politically able to do what we wanted, we would have gone North, and we would have cleaned their clocks." This is a stupid statement because no war has ever been fought that hasn't had a political basis. We know what Clausewitz had said: "War is the extension of politics by other means." And before he said it, Alexander the Great knew it, and so did Caesar. There are always political limitations to a war, and there were to that one.

Given those political limitations, we still came up with the "light at the end of the tunnel." We still told our political masters that give us these kinds and numbers of troops, and then we'll win it for you, we'll do the job. We kind of forget about that. We keep blaming the politicians. Three of them are pointing right back at us saying we were wrong and we made these mistakes. But no, the generals say it was somebody else's mistake. It was the politicians' mistake. No it wasn't. The politicians made mistakes but they relied on us and finally found their reliance

ill-founded. It was fundamentally our mistake, and to me, we had the wrong generalship. Of course, it might have had something to do with our structure and all the commands we had.

I have serious doubts about the benefits of a unified command, mainly because power goes where the money flows, and the money doesn't flow through the unified command. I was there at CINCPAC working for the CINC. In theory, the MACV Commander was under ADM MaCain, and later ADM Gayler, but in practice they were not so, because CINCPAC didn't control the money. The money was controlled through the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Westmoreland was called back by the President and so was Abrams. Abrams even slept in the White House at the invitation of the President, the Commander In Chief. He ignored the unified command. As a part of the unified command, I felt that because we didn't have any money in CINCPAC, I could tell the Army, Navy, or Air Force to do something, and they would say fine--give me the money; give me the resources; give me the manpower.

I never had any resources to allocate. So I got involved in dumb things in Hawaii. I found out that the Navy commissary was buying milk some place, and the Army commissary was buying milk at another place. Why didn't we have one contract?

Economy of scale, right? In quarters, the cleaning of venetian blinds was on separate contracts--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Other things were incongruous. In Oahu, the National Guard got a lot of publicity and newspaper headlines. One Saturday morning the National Guard marched along the boulevard to the airport and cleaned up all the waste paper, beer, and coke cans that people were throwing around. Made it look good for the tourists. At the same time, around our Army bases we had contractors cleaning up the parade grounds and highways. It was just contradictory. Just didn't make sense at all. I wanted to get the contractors out of that business and have the troops do it. But you couldn't do that anymore. The troops always had to be training. Well, why couldn't they go out on a boulevard and clean it up? Something the civilians should have been doing?

The other thing is there is no reason for U.S. European Command (EUCOM), the joint command in Europe, particularly since we've got the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). EUCOM has its own communication systems; NATO is supposed to be a command, and it has its own communications system. Since we're going to conduct a joint war out there, we should be under NATO. We shouldn't have separate unified Army, Navy, and Air Force commands out there with huge staffs and their own planning. They actually got involved in Middle East activity in Lebanon and messed that up.

J.P. Morgan said, "There are two reasons for everything, a good reason and the real reason." Maybe if we didn't have the Russians, we'd need them as a threat. We don't want war; we just want to have the threat of war because we've got three million people in uniform with families and have so many contractors and their employees. The multiple effect is that we've probably got 12 million workers depending on the military and the DOD budget. What would happen if we did have peace and all these 12 million people were turned off on the labor market when we have 7.5 percent unemployment? These are good and talented people. What would you do with all this talent? Suppose you've got people that really aren't working and really aren't doing anything. Yet, they are doing something. Maybe our purpose in life is really to recycle money. Maybe the whole idea is, you know, this guy might not be doing anything, but he's paying his mortgage on his home. He's sending his kids to college. He's going to the Giant food store. He's paid off an automobile, and he's going to get another automobile into the garage. Maybe that's the whole purpose of our society, just to recycle money. Now, the DOD is doing that.

CPT PITTS: Sir, where is our logistics system going with reference to the Vietnam conflict?

MG MURRAY: A few years ago the Army logistics experts decided to ask that same question, and I think you should be complimented for asking where is the Army going to be in the way of logistics, and what can it do to improve its whole logistics system by the year 2000, which isn't too far away. I received a letter from MG Robert L. Bergquist asking me to reply to that question. I answered it in about 16 parts of about 26 pages. I didn't cover everything. But I did say that initially I was not going to reply to the letter,

though I considered it a compliment in that it suggested that I could offer something of value. Not that I didn't have something to offer; I just thought that people wouldn't think so.

At the time MG Berquist wrote me, there was an article by Vermont Royster in the "Wall Street Journal". He wrote about the "Jimmy" story and a Pulitzer Prize. He said a woman reporter had received a Pulitzer Prize for writing a story in the "Washington Post". It was a complete farce about a little boy that was taking dope. The whole thing was exposed. Vermont Royster said that the nation's newspapers are no more sullied by the sins of the "Post" than all the clergy would be by a bishop caught in a brothel. He used a military analogy. He said that a classic example is Napoleon, who was doing all right until he decided to diversify into Russia. His marshalls raised some doubt about that venture, which Napoleon brushed aside. Apparently nobody asked what, in retrospect, was really the right question. The question was,

"Emperor, after you have conquered Russia, what are you going to do with it?" This came only after Napoleon was in Moscow and his Army was freezing. So, what is involved here is the reluctance to find and face the right questions. That's a human frailty not limited to emperors or newspaper editors. Royster says illustrations abound everywhere from politics to business. I want to compliment you, CPT Pitts, on what you've asked me, because I think you've gone straight to the right question.

In keeping with that same thought there was a USMC general, whose name I've forgotten, who said to MG Berquist, "The first sign of a military amateur is when he talks about strategy and tactics. The first sign of a military professional is when he talks about logistics and sustainability." Of course, that's what the Army was trying to talk about. I talked about leadership, some of which I discussed with you. Then I talked about general officer assignments.

I feel that you'll find it a practice within the Army to take combat generals who fail in their combat roles or fail for whatever reason, or even if they don't fail, and try to promote them into logistics. Logistics is a science, in my view, and combat is an art--two distinct things. It requires a much higher intelligence quotient (IQ) on the part of the logistician because to be a logistician you really have to be like a great lawyer: that is, a great judge. I think good combat generals are pretty much like Blucher (Field Marshal of the German Army). Blucher, of course, saved Wellington's rear end at Waterloo. GEN Giap was kind of like Field Marshal Blucher. Blucher was described as, "A perfect soldier's soldier who was brave, loyal, and utterly unimpressed by his own numerous defeats."

You can't take these guys who are unimpressed with their numerous defeats, even though they're brave and loyal, and expect them to be good logisticians. The powers in the Army take the failed combat types or the combat types who can't be put in combat, and without hesitance, put them into logistics. But they have never thought of taking a good logistician and giving him a combat job. They might be surprised how well he would do. I would like to see a good logistician in command of a division and see what happens. Logistics is far more intellectually demanding. Just take the fundamental

principles of strategy and tactics. It's not complicated. Good sergeants are good tacticians. As a logistician, I have visited the headquarters of combat generals who are so-called engaged in battle, and they're off in very quiet places. There is not much activity. Then, in contrast to those long lulls, sudden periods of liveliness may occur, but it's all in contrast to the procrustean pressures that you find when the battle's going on for the logistician.

One great personal manpower treasure that we don't use is the Army warrant officer. I have never met another general officer who was, like me, once a warrant officer. They may be around, but I've never met them. As an enlisted man, I never quite understood how officers who have never been in command, never been soldiers, manage to understand that the national pastime of a soldier is to fool his officer. A lot of them are fooled. An enlisted man (EM) wants to do one thing. He wants to get promoted and get ahead in the world just like officers. Most of them don't have the education, but they really don't need it. An EM's way to advancement which will yield him the pay of an Army major is to become a chief warrant officer. I don't think we have enough warrant officers. I think it's very good that we've got warrant officers now who are pilots. The Air Force used to have them as flight officers, but they don't have them anymore, which is a mistake. You've got to give your enlisted talent the opportunities to move ahead. This is upward mobility. We don't give it to them. The snobbism among officers concerns all of the uneducated masses of enlisted men. It makes me wonder how the country responded to giants who wrote the Federalist papers but who never went to high school. What was George Washington's education? This has nothing to do with basic intelligence. I know general officers who pride themselves on their rapport with troops. They go up and say, "How are Molly and the kids?" They don't realize, as I said, that the national pastime of soldiers is to outwit the brass. Most professional privates and NCOs should get Tony awards for the average phony attention they pay to the dullest of officer cliches and lectures. It's a laugh.

I think the most common sense, no nonsense, underrated men and women in the Army are the warrant officers. When I had the 37th Transportation Group, I was asked about troop reduction because of the demands on Vietnam, and we had to clean out France because we had a mandate from DeGaulle to get out of all our depots. The 37th was the major way of getting the job done. The 37th Group had 165 million ton miles (25 percent more than Redball Express in World War II).

I had to answer the question, "What could I do without in the way of officers?" I said, "Get rid of me. Get rid of my executive officer. Get rid of all the officers, and the only people you want to keep above your enlisted men are your warrant officers." These were the guys who maintained the fleet and kept us supplied. They were doing it. They would do it. They're the logistic invisibles. They should be developed more. They're a bedrock corps of specialists that should be expanded, absolutely. Incidentally, it would not only raise morale, but it would lower the cost of paying for the Army. With each warrant officer you eliminate at least one officer. Most of the time they're worth at least two. You could take more money then and put it into equipment, into research and development, and into technology. I just have to keep singing this song because I think

many enlisted men see their future blocked by limited education. They feel that academic and other selection criteria will keep them from gaining upward mobility. The warrant is a surgical bypass of that blockage. If anyone thinks that officers are superior to warrant officers when it comes to burnishing the tools of war, just take a look at who's got the grease on their fatigues and who's got the dirty hands.

Strengthen and broaden the warrant officer corps and the Army will tap a huge wealth of common sense. It's the emancipation of enlisted serfs. And it doesn't come with hair dryers, junk food in the mess halls, or elimination of reveille. It comes with the recognition of their efforts and their willingness to take part. The Army should respect their capabilities. Don't treat and coddle soldiers as if they were primary creatures of mother's milk. All you'll have is babies. Not soldiers.

One other thing I worry about is esprit in what they call the technical services. Why is it that the Army nourishes elite units, but they're the Green berets, the Rangers, and the Airborne? The only elite logistic unit you ever hear of is a Navy one. That's the Seabees (Navy construction battalion (CB) outfit).

Pride in the unit development and craftsmanship of our technical service is not developed enough. A Rolls Royce doesn't get that way because of its clientele; it gets that way because of its product. Why is the combat clientele of the logistic forces continually considered as the aristocracy of the Army when it takes a moron's IQ to pull the trigger of a carbine or dive out of an airplane? It takes much greater wit to buy, maintain, replace, improve, and deliver a working gun to the gunner and to ensure the reliability of his shot. I don't want to deride the infantry. The infantry's got to have two essential items and there's no federal stock number for them, nor can logistics supply it. They are courage and adrenaline. These two items are the only two in the Army ground forces needed from top to bottom. They are thankfully not in short supply.

The young technical service officers, such as yourself, have got a decided edge over the young combat arms officer--that is, when it comes to dealing with a peculiar species of mankind. They are hilariously called the American civil servants. That's a breed that's often uncivil and not inclined to serve. They make up a million parts of our one and a half million in the Army. The civil service can be divided into three categories. First there's the comfortable rut--don't bother me type. Second, there's the cuckoo birds--they lay eggs for others to hatch. Buckpassing comes when they reproduce themselves through the obscurity of elaborate job descriptions that qualify them to be Jehovah. But, there's a third type that's the conscientious, devoted, usually cheerful, frequently frustrated man or woman who tries his or her best. Fortunately, these are in the majority. But the former two types tend to bewilder a novice. The technical service officer who is more familiar with them is less bewildered and less likely to succumb to the first two varieties.

I think we've also got a problem with semantics when we talk about civilian control. That does not mean civil service control. A lot of civil servants assume, and a lot of officers accept the fact that because they're civilians, and they might be GS-18s, you might be

under their political control. The only ones in control are civilians appointed by the administration with the consent of Congress. They're the ones who maintain the civilian control. We seem to forget that.

You know, I said before that war or combat is an art, but logistics is a science. Here you've got a basic conflict between ground force officers and the logistics ones. The principles of war, like the principles of any art, are applied in a skill that is largely intuition, experience, or feeling. The good division and Army commanders are essentially artists. The technical service types and the logistics types essentially work as scientists. They work as engineers with the mathematics of stresses and strains; transporters with time-distance-volume capacities of lift; quartermasters with issues and consumption factors; Chemical Corps with the qualities and quantities of toxins and toxic substances; ordnance with explosives and engine dynamics; and medics with the laws of biology. Now that's all science.

I've observed and I've talked with leading ground force commanders, among them Ridgeway in World War II, James A. Van Fleet in Korea, Westmoreland, Abrams, and Weyand in Vietnam. It's not a coincidence in my book that Abrams was as addicted to classical music as Patton was to poetry, and Weyand was an accomplished musician who, like Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick the Great, played the flute. But combat commanders ultimately live and decide on how situations feel. Technicians, like I consider myself, don't feel. We use yardsticks. I know that ground force commanders have to know the range of various weapons and the weight of various explosives and how far troops can march to stay within air cover. That may require some basic science, but where is the science of morale, art, and intuition? It comes crucially into play when you're a commander; you're deciding whether to concentrate your forces, to try your feints, to initiate surprise, to refuse a wing, to question or accept intelligence, to estimate the enemy, or to hold up your reserves. This is the ultimate burden of the risk taker. The eminence of that kind of artist is well deserved.

But the point is that the commander won't be preeminent if he doesn't lend an ear to a qualified logistician. If he's his own logistician, the better for it. You can think that artistic and scientific talent only exists in people like Leonardo Da Vinci. At West Point they have a peddler's horse and an Indian's tepee that Grant has drawn. He did free-hand pencil art and paintings along with caliper and engineering drafting--that sort of thing.

I think the Army can develop generals, colonels, and field-grade officers that have these two eyes--one for logistics and the other for combat. However, I've got to tell you about LTG Jack Fuson. He and I have talked about this together, and he taught me a lot. He disagrees. He said, "It'd be a waste of time to attempt to change the entrenched warlord system . . . It's not a question of two eyes, but two hats. You try to two-hat a man as a ground and logistics type, and he won't wear either hat very well." There's something to that. I usually felt more comfortable when I had the ear of the commander. Sometimes not. For some commanders when I began to speak of logistics, they gave me the attention span of a microsecond.

The way they separate logisticians, for example, has always aggravated me--when they separate us from military intelligence. For example, in the selection of targets: I think a guy who can run a railroad knows a lot more about how to wreck them than somebody whose only rail experience is to lay a Lionel train around a Christmas tree. Have you ever been involved or thought of a logistician being engaged in selecting targets in Russia. I'm going to go over to Russia; I'm going to look at their railroad. I'm going to be able to come back and tell them how to look at targets. But, will they ever pay any attention to me now as a retired old has-been? Never.

You know, they've got some Air Force types who don't know anything about railroads trying to wipe out the Russian transportation system. I say there's nothing wrong with what I call combat chic. But sometimes they're more chic to chic. A good way to reverse this path to a career tombstone tendency ("a la" Custer) is to put young company-grade combat officers into arbitrary logistics slots for a couple of years--just as they used to put technical service officers in the ground forces; unfortunately, they don't do the reverse. Why not? Take a few of those five percenters who are full of disdain for logistics--take them off the line where they wear the cross rifles and cross cannons and armor, and where they pride themselves on duty. Just rub their noses in a rear rank, far off from being a general's aide or a Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) and closet them far into a rear area. There's a great difference between searching an enemy's flank and searching for reasons that your own side has a stock out. The German army in the siege of Stalingrad must have wondered why the Luftwaffe was dropping planeloads of pepper and contraceptives, just as I wondered in Vietnam why we didn't have cotter pins when we had plenty of catchers' mitts.

I think that's the kind of problem that would intrigue our Rhodes scholars. Of course, I think one of the worst things that happened to the U.S. Army was GEN Patton, not just because he slapped hospitalized troops and made his troops wear ties into combat, but because of the way he encouraged the wrecking of the logistics system by the scrounger--you know the guy who would steal supplies from somebody else. He'd steal engines, and then they wouldn't have them; this ruined the whole historical base for our requisitioning system. Omar Bradley not only said Patton was not qualified as an Army commander; he also said "Logistics were and remain a mystery to him."

I won't name this guy, but part of our logistic troubles started out because our first head of MACV logistics, who was a good friend of mine, was known as the Airborne's bad boy. He was the last man in his class at West Point and the first guy to get a star, but he also detested detail. We called him Happy Jack. We talked about required delivery dates (RDD) and demand performance, and in his words, "All that's shit" Logistics was beneath contempt and he conceived a man's job description as one that was only properly written with the point of a bayonet. He wasn't a mutton-head; he wasn't addled because he liked martinis; he was just misplaced.

If you like to explore the problems of morals as you do CPT Pitts, the philosopher Herbert Spencer made a transcendent statement, a formula to live by, that is applicable

to logistics. He said, "It's not perfection as the final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining, that is the sum of living."

CPT PITTS: Thank you, sir, for this very enlightening interview.